24

April-June 1958

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

SPECIAL CHINA NUMBER

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O. Brière

ILOSOPHY IN THE NEW RÉGIME

T. Hsi-en Chen

E RECTIFICATION OF ERROR

Joseph R. Levenson

STORY UNDER CHAIRMAN MAO

Cyril Birch

E DRAGON AND THE PEN

THREE SHILLINGS

UNDER FIRE

Comments on Western authors in the Soviet press

Francoise Sagan

'She refuses to give any indications about the real historical situation in which the characters of her books are living .... Individual psychology as well as social life are missing .... The success of her writing is not determined by her literary talent. Externally a-political, it serves, willingly or unwillingly, quite definite political purposes, by its apolgia for spiritual poverty ....' (*Znamya*, 1958, 1).

Igor Stravinsky

'The rôle of a prophet, of an apostle of the new music, is very much after his heart, and the old Stravinsky has no intention of leaving the international tribune .... Everything in the ugly music of his *Canticum Sacrum* speaks eloquently of the ideological and creative blind alley in which the former ruler of souls of bourgeois Europe, Igor Stravinsky, finds himself towards the end of his life ....' (*Sovetskaya Musika*, 1958, 2).

John Gunther

'In an attempt to justify the continuing existence of colonial exploitation Gunther, in company with many other apologists of colonialism, tries to show that the Europeans have linked the Africans with "Western civilisation," and have done more good things to them than bad (*Inside Africa*, p. 13). At the same time it so happens that the facts quoted in the book convincingly bear witness to the contrary ....' (*Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1957, 5).

Hans Kohn

'The real political significance of H. Kohn's theory of "nationalism" is disclosed in his opinions about the character and historical rôle of nationalism .... His opinions about the "humanitarian" and "peace-loving" character of American nationalism are contradicted by the genocidal policy vis-a-vis the Red Indians, by the grabbing wars against Mexico, by the colonial robbery in the Philippines, and by many other facts .... From a cosmopolitan position Kohn attacks the principle of national independence and sovereignty which, he says, is obsolete ....' (*Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 2).

B. H. Liddell Hart

'The great victory of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad, which was the turning point in the war, creates great difficulties for the bourgeois falsifiers of history. To gloss over this victory is not so easy, though there are authors who try to do so. This is precisely what Liddell Hart is doing. In his book *The Strategy of Indirect Approach* he devoted few pages to the battle of Stalingrad, and they are written in such a way that, after reading them, one might doubt whether the destruction of the Nazis at Stalingrad had really taken place, and was accomplished by the Soviet Army ....' (*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 1958, 1).

Arnold Toynbee

'Contemporary American bourgeois historians and politicians are dissatisfied because the United States did not succeed in achieving the mutual and simultaneous annihilation of the USSR and Germany. They regard Roosevelt's agreement on German unconditional surrender as the biggest mistake. The destruction of the fascist "New Order" in Europe is also condemned. The British historian Toynbee has even published a whole bulky volume, *Hitler's Europe*, in defence of the Nazi "New Order" ....' (*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 1958, 1).

Arthur Lewis

'There are "theoreticians" and active members of the working class movement who take on themselves the task of justifying the policy of wage-freezing or even lowering of wages for the sake of "the growth of productive forces" and the further development of the "industrial revolution." Professor of political economy and member of the British Labour Party, Arthur Lewis expresses such views .... It is not surprising (in view of the existence in the ranks of the social-democratic movement of "theoreticians" who have openly gone over to the side of the class enemy, of the bourgeoisie) that they try with all their might to disrupt the united front of the working class, and to split its ranks in the struggle against the class enemy ....' (*Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1957, 12).

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SOVIET SURVEY

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No. 24 April-June 1958

Editor: *Walter Z. Laqueur*

Associate Editor: *Leopold Labedz*

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Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend

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Published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 104 Boulevard Haussmann, Paris, 8e. Editorial and business offices, 25 Haymarket, London, S.W.1. Subscription rates 12 shillings or 2 dollars a year, post free.

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SUBSCRIPTION RATES :— One year, DM 25.– ; quarterly, DM 8.– ; single issue, DM 3.–

DEUTSCHE VERLAGS-ANSTALT STUTTGART

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Present

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Book Reviews

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Subscription, $5.00 a year, single copies $1.25, in the U.S., foreign $6.00.
Subscriptions accepted by Blackwells of Oxford.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

235 Baker Library

Hanover, N. H.
U.S.A.

Editorial

THE SHADOW OF REVISIONISM

THROUGHOUT the Soviet orbit the order of the day is the struggle against revisionism. Chinese economists and East German philosophers, Soviet poets, Bulgarian scholars and Rumanian musicians, Polish and Yugoslav ideologists, Djilas and Nagy, Sartre and Howard Fast, 'national Communists' and Communist liberals—they are all being attacked as the sprouting heads of that ugly old hydra, revisionism. Everywhere in the Communist world an intense propaganda campaign is being waged against its dangers. Party leaders and newspapers hammer away at its baleful influence and prove their own doctrine orthodox by apostolic anathemas and excommunications.

Their campaign has been noticeably accelerated since the publication in Moscow last November of the Declaration of the twelve Communist Parties. The menace was then defined as follows:

> Modern revisionism seeks to smear the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism, declares that it is 'outmoded,' and alleges that it has lost its significance for social progress. The revisionists . . . . deny the historical necessity for a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . . deny the leading rôle of the Marxist-Leninist party . . . . They call for a rejection of democratic centralism and for transforming the Communist Party from a militant revolutionary organisation into a kind of debating society.

An even more comprehensive definition of the ins of revisionism was given by B. Ponomarev. According to him they consist in playing down he aggressive essence of imperialism, denying he directing rôle of the Communist parties, enying the fundamental laws of the class struggle, reaching class collaboration and the possibility f a gradual transformation of capitalism into ocialism, lapsing into social democratic attitudes, rying to reconcile the programme and political rinciples of Communist parties with the prinples of social-democratic parties, denying the niversal importance of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, revising Lenin's tenets on the structure of the party, rejecting proletarian internationalism and degenerating into national communism (*V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniyu*, 1957, 12).

Kommunist (1957, 18) quoted with approval Mao's statement that 'revisionism is much more dangerous than dogmatism' and proceeded to unmask the revisionist 'renegades' in various Western Communist parties, among whom were Hervé, Giolitti, Saltzberg, Cadogan, Hill, Pinto, Gates, *et al.* But fire was chiefly concentrated on the revisionists in Eastern Europe as 'nationalist renegades . . . . used by the imperialist bourgeoisie . . . . to sow the idea of 'national communism' within the communist movement in order to split the Communist parties' (*Izvestiya*, 29 December, 1957). The three figures most frequently attacked, a sort of unholy trinity, were Imre Nagy, Milovan Djilas, and Leszek Kolakowski. They were censured as representing the same political danger in different spheres—Kolakowski and Djilas on the theoretical, and Nagy on the practical plane. 'What Imre Nagy did in Hungary in political practice, is being done by Kolakowski in theory,' said Konstantinov, the head of the Agitprop, in an article in *Pravda* (5 February, 1958).

Nagy, who was subjected, after his arrest, to ceaseless denunciation for his rôle in the Hungarian revolution, is said to have revealed his atttude in 1953. 'Nagy's revisionism, so clearly shown in last year's events in Hungary, is not an accidental phenomenon. The roots of his opportunist opinions are to be found in the past. This is proved by the two volumes of his works published in Budapest in 1954' (*Voprosy Istorii*, December, 1957, p. 65). The Hungarian *Nepszabadsag* (14 January, 1958) compares the old and new revisionism, and argues as follows:

Attacks on Marxism by the bourgeoisie remained ineffective, but the attacks of the socialist revisionists were 'most dangerous' and did great harm to the workers' movement. 'A new kind of revisionism has now appeared in the communist and workers' parties of the popular democracies

building socialism. It has appeared in a 'Communist' disguise and strives to liquidate the proletarian dictatorship, to abandon the building of socialism, and to restore the capitalist and bourgeois order. In Hungary Imre Nagy and his followers were the chief representatives of this treacherous policy. And while Bernstein and his companions openly declared that they were revising Marxism, Imre Nagy and his followers disguised their intent in cowardly fashion and professed to be Leninists.'

REVISIONISM is indeed no new phenomenon in the history of the socialist and communist movements, and though it may be tempting to draw parallels between the debates in Bernstein's days and ours, there are actually very few, for the original 'revisionist' debate around the turn of the century took place in very different conditions. Bernstein and his followers based their observations on changes they had witnessed in *capitalist* society. They realised that in the advanced industrial countries 'peasants do not sink, the middle class does not disappear, crises do not grow ever larger, misery and serfdom do not increase.' Pre-communist revisionism, then, was preoccupied with trends and events in *capitalist* society, while the revisionism of 1958 is naturally preoccupied with trends and events in *communist* society. Bernstein was concerned about the fact that capitalist society had not developed as Marx predicted it would; *Po Prostu* was concerned with the fact that Soviet society had turned out to be something quite different from what Lenin had predicted.

The original revisionist debate of 1900 was a battle of ideas; Bernstein wrote his *Evolutionary Socialism*, and Rosa Luxemburg, Kautsky and others replied in books of their own, and a heated discussion went on for many years. In 1958 there are no heated discussions; the ideas and arguments are on one side, the political power on the other. While revisionist ideas are denounced daily, hardly anyone has tried to refute them. The great discussion of 1900 was carried out between the members of an opposition party, while the 1958 struggle is between ideas and the most powerful vested interests in the world. The defenders of orthodoxy in 1958 are not so worried about the philosophy and economics of revisionism—on this they might even be ready to compromise. To them revisionism is unacceptable because it would gradually do away with their monopoly of political power, and here no compromise is possible.

The historical fortunes of pre-Communist revisionism were curious. Decisively rejected by the great majority of Socialist Party leaders at the time, it nevertheless gradually became the official doctrine of Social Democracy in the West. For the reasons suggested, no such good fortune seems to be in store for present-day revisionism. Nor are contemporary revisionists likely to be let off as easily as their precursors. The worst that ever happened to Bernstein was to receive a letter from Kautsky, in which the then keeper of Marxist orthodoxy wrote:

> Dear Ede, Draw the conclusions and become an Englishman. The development which you have undergone leads away from German Social Democracy, although not from socialism. Try to attain a place in the English movement and become a representative of English socialism.

The advice given to present-day revisionists (as well as the measures taken against them) are less friendly in tenor and substance.

Among the few parallels that could be drawn is the rediscovery and introduction of a system of ethics by both groups. For Bernstein, it was a logical step to turn to Kant after he had discarded Hegelian dialectics. For the post-Stalinist revisionists the issue is less academic, for they have seen with their own eyes the actual consequences of an anti-humanist socialism. They know that discussions of means and ends are not at all abstract, and they fear that no radical change in communist states and societies is likely until they are based on a somewhat firmer ethical foundation than a dialectic subject to arbitrary interpretation by a great leader or a central committee. It is occasionally argued in the West that both Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung follow a 'centrist' policy between 'revisionism' and 'sectarian dogmatism.' This is an optimistic exaggeration, at best. 'Sectarian dogmatism' (a euphemism for Stalinism) is quite obviously taken to be a venial sin, a minor deviation, in the Soviet orbit, since it does not affect the party leadership's monopoly of power. Dogmatism and sectarianism have been explained away as the heritage of parties that had been illegal too long, thereby losing their

ies with the masses (*Kommunist*, 1957, 18)—a ather unsatisfactory theory, since it certainly loes not explain the rise of Stalinism in the Soviet Jnion. Revisionism is considered the far more langerous enemy throughout the Communist vorld. Mao Tse-tung, to whom some Western bservers have attributed liberal tendencies, said s much as early as February, 1957.

THE struggle against revisionism is linked to the 'bourgeois ideological offensive launched fter the 20th Congress.' 'Despite their cunning efinement, present imperialist tactics are gener- lly transparent. Imperialist propaganda . . . . opularises and propagates various articles and pinions of Polish revisionists (Kolakowski and thers), quoting them as examples to follow . . . . Among Yugoslav Communists they have Djilas s an example . . . . of the gradual development of revisionist into a renegade . . . . Djilas's book *The New Class* . . . . and Nagy's *Confession* . . . . re the kind of literature which receives wide ublicity in the West and is designed to augment nd replenish the worn-out arsenal of shabby nti-Communist propaganda' (*Rude Pravo*, 9 anuary, 1958). The editor of *Rude Pravo*, Vladimir Koucky, stressed the danger presented y the revisionists at the conference of the Czechoslovak Communist Party held on 20 December, emphasising the urgent need to destroy evisionism ideologically and organisationally, nd deploring the lack of prompt and energetic eplies to 'non-Marxist or even anti-Marxist' rticles still appearing in literary periodicals (*Rude Pravo*, 23 December, 1957).

Kolakowski in particular has become the *bête oire* of the orthodox. He is frequently attacked, nd has been singled out as a symbol of revision- sm. His name has not only been coupled with hose of Djilas and Nagy, but with other revision- st deviationists such as Harich, Lefebvre, etc. In n article called 'Revisionism is Anti-Marxism' *Moskva*, 1958, 1) M. Sidorov draws attention to imilarities in the ideas of various revisionists: Lefebvre is no doubt similar to Kolakowski, and Kolakowski to Hochfeld. Although the first, ompletely rejecting contemporary Marxism, ccepts Marxism-Leninism, and the second and hird do not accept either, all agree amicably on he rejection of the basic propositions of Marxism- eninism: the teaching regarding social revolu- tion originating in the class struggle, and deter- mined by the economic conditions of bourgeois society; the teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat as the régime for the transition from capitalism to socialism, and the state as an instru- ment for building socialism; the teaching on the Party as the leading and directing force of socialist construction . . . .' The decisive struggle against revisionism is considered essential for the victory of Communism:

> The path of contemporary revisionism, as has been shown by Djilas and Nagy, leads to direct betrayal of the cause of socialism, of the fundamental national interests of their countries and of their international duty . . . . Historical experience teaches that the work- ing class cannot conquer if it does not re- move revisionism from its path. Our Communist Party could not have rallied the working class nor organised the alliance be- tween the working class and the peasantry and brought it to victory in 1917 if it had not led the people against the Mensheviks, those liquidators and opportunists who attempt- ed to divert it from the Marxist-Leninist road. It could not have ensured the victory of socialism in the USSR if it had not dis- carded the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, bour- geois nationalists, and other liquidators. Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party could not have ensured its victory if it had not resolutely overcome the right and 'left' wing deviations from its general line (*V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazo- vaniyu*, 1958, 1).

Several explanations have been given for the emergence of the revisionist 'menace.' One in- volves the insufficient mastery of Marxism- Leninism by the deviationists. A second ex- planation refers to the impact of Western 'bour- geois thinking,' which has somehow affected the revisionists. 'Like all other revisionists, Nagy tried to cover up his departure from Marxist- Leninist principles by referring to the 'special conditions' of socialist development in Hungary . . . . One of the main causes of the counter-revolu- tionary plot in Hungary was the fact that an opportunist group existed in the ranks of the Hungarian working class which stood for capita- list restoration . . . . It was Radio Free Europe which was actually the leading agent and orga-

niser of the counter-revolutionary insurrection of the Hungarian reactionaries' (*Voprosy Istorii*, 1957, 12).

This is, of course, quite contrary to the facts, for contemporary revisionism was first and foremost a reaction to Soviet realities. 'National Communism,' the belief that different countries may find their own way to socialism, is explained as a mere nationalist deviation, denying the Soviet Union's leading rôle in this connection. Of the various forms of revisionism, 'national communism' is perhaps the least dangerous from the Soviet point of view, since it is the least original and radical; but it is also, for obvious reasons, the most difficult to tackle. For the present struggle against revisionism is carried on not with arguments but with administrative measures, and deviating countries are less open to pressure than individual heretics. A fourth explanation of present-day revisionism combines the theory of 'old-fashioned moods' ('the influence of the petty bourgeoisie and small peasantry reluctant to take the road to socialism') with alleged external sources. 'It consists in yielding to imperialist propaganda and threats, in succumbing to doubts about whether the new system will be able to cope with imperialist pressure and with attacks threatening atomic warfare' (*Nepszabadsag*, 14 January, 1958).

IT is difficult to speculate about the prospects of revisionism because so many divergent views and trends have had this label pinned on them. Most national communists do not want any change at all in the political power monopoly of the Communist Party leadership, while other revisionists have realised that the existence of that monopoly (and not the 'cult of the individual') is the real source of the evils they deplore. Many revisionists would like to reform their parties from within, while others believe that radical reform of a communist party from below is an utter impossibility, a contradiction in terms, since it is so tightly organised and hierarchically directed. Some of those labelled revisionists have only demanded limited and specific changes—greater freedom and relaxation of controls—in the fields of literature, the arts, or the sciences.

Any discussion of the prospects of revisionism is closely linked to the more general problem of the possibility of change in a communist régime. Certain changes are clearly not revisionist, for otherwise Mr. Khrushchev's proposed unorthodox innovations in agriculture, for example, could be attacked on these grounds—and indeed may very well be one day. In present circumstances it is obviously up to the Soviet leadership to decide which changes are desirable and therefore permissible, and which are revisionist and reprehensible. The general situation in the Soviet Union and the relations between Moscow and the other communist parties are not what they used to be under Stalin. Far-reaching changes could result from an attempt to streamline the Soviet economy, changes that could run counter to established doctrine. Some modifications, involving the abolition of controls and of certain dogmas hampering the progress of the natural sciences in the Soviet orbit, have been carried out and more may perhaps be expected. There is considerably less room for optimism in literature, the arts and the social sciences.

But these are, or would be, changes that would not undermine the present system, and the orthodox Leninists are correct in accusing the revisionists, or at any rate some of them, of advocating changes that would disturb the system itself. They are right to charge the revisionists with the intention of tampering with a basic element of Leninism—the dictatorship of the proletariat, or, more precisely, the power monopoly of the party presidium. For only this could produce decisive change. Such a development seems most unlikely, for with the balance of power as unequal as it is, revisionist tendencies can be stamped out. And yet the system is bound, by virtue of its own shortcomings and inner conflicts, to provoke revisionist trends and movements. If, as Marx predicted, capitalism produces its own gravediggers, Communism is apparently destined to produce its own as well. It has established a far more powerful state apparatus than capitalism ever did and can suppress conflicts far more efficiently than any previous social and political system.

The great ferment of ideas in 1956 and 1957 may be followed by a long period of suppression and stagnation, longer perhaps in China than in Russia. But however long that night lasts, revisionism will follow Communism like a shadow. Unlike Peter Schlemihl, neither Mr. Khrushchev nor Chairman Mao will be able to get rid of his shadow.

THE PARTY AND THE INTELLECTUALS

Blossoms that Withered

Roderick MacFarquhar

TWO years ago, Mao Tse-tung enunciated the policy 'Let the 100 flowers bloom together, let the 100 schools contend.' His speech, made before a closed session of the Supreme State Conference on 2 May, 1956, seemed to herald an era of intellectual freedom of a type unknown to Communism since the early years of the Soviet State. A year later, on 30 April, the Communist Party published its decree launching the rectification movement. Not only were intellectuals to have freedom in their own fields; they and eventually other sections of the populace were to be encouraged to criticise the Communist Party in its own sphere of political leadership. To the manifest displeasure of Mr. Khrushchev, Mao had proclaimed a theory that admitted conflicts between Party and people and sought their resolution by permitting criticism in the one-party state. To many on both sides of the iron curtain it seemed that communism had taken a new turning from which only good could come. Today the flowers have withered, the schools are mute, and the critics have been silenced. The party spokesmen still proclaim the old policies; but the anti-rightist campaign has ensured that no intellectual will respond. It is appropriate to ask the meaning of Mao's 'liberal' policies and to consider why they had to be abandoned so abruptly.

Chinese communist policy towards the intellectuals has always aimed at resolving one basic contradiction. The party needed the intellectuals, but it could not trust them. Their skills were vital for the development of education and the economy; but inquiring minds might question the universal validity of Marxism-Leninism and the omniscience of the Communist Party. It is a dilemma faced by all ruling Communist Parties to greater or lesser degree. In China it was complicated by the background of the intellectual class.*

The communists knew they could rely on the patriotism of the intellectuals. Disgusted by the corruption, brutality, and inefficiency of the Kuomintang, even those most fearful of communism were prepared in 1949 to give Mao Tse-tung their support if he could better the country. So on the one hand the communists could 'unite' with the intellectuals. But at the same time they had to 'struggle' with them to eradicate their 'bourgeois' ideologies. For thirty years Chinese education had been based on Western models. A number of Chinese universities were run by Christian missionaries; and many students went abroad, particularly to the United States, to do graduate work in Western universities. Thus many of the teachers and administrators taken over by the communists had intellectual and personal ties with a country with which China was soon at war.

It was not surprising, therefore, that when the communists launched their ideological remoulding campaign in 1951 (after an initial period of 'uniting' had allowed them to consolidate their control over the country), one of the main targets was the 'pro-America, worship-America, fear-America mentality' of the university teachers. During the years that followed, the struggle centred around the figure of the expatriate scholar Hu Shih who had fled to the United States in 1949. His pragmatic philosophy was anathema to the theorists of Marxism-Leninism, and they used him as a symbol of all that was worst in the Chinese intellectuals. The communists forced the intellectuals to study Marxism-Leninism, attend criticism and self-criticism sessions, and to write confessions in an attempt to eradicate this Western influence.

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* The Chinese Communists count as intellectuals the academics, the writers, the artists, the scientists, the engineers, and the doctors. But, especially in a country like China, where merely to be literate puts a man apart from his countrymen, one must take account of the administrators and the students. Many senior non-communist administrators have excellent academic backgrounds, and as in traditional China, the connection between scholar and official is a close one. In modern China, the students have often had a profound effect on their seniors, and have always been quick to follow intellectual trends; indeed their activities during May, 1957, clearly illustrate why they must be counted as part of the intellectual milieu.

The writers presented a somewhat different problem. Though most of the leading ones had also received a Western-style education, few of them had actually studied in Europe or the United States. Politically, many of them were left-wing; and some, like the women novelist Ting Ling, joined the Communist Party. But Mao's speeches at the Yenan forums on art and literature show that, as early as 1942, even the party writers resented the subordination of art to politics and of general humanist values to the dictates of party strategy. The early remoulding of the writers was directed at their liberal and reformist inclinations. But a more fundamental struggle occurred in 1955, after the communist writer Hu Feng demanded that writers should be allowed to choose any subject matter and should not be forced to undergo ideological remoulding or to acquire the Marxist outlook. The party attacked him vigorously, combined a drive against counter-revolutionaries with a campaign against Hu Feng 'elements,' and eventually arrested Hu himself—ostensibly because he was in league with the Kuomintang and not for his literary views.

BUT by the end of the year the political atmosphere had improved remarkably. The communist leaders were in a state of great optimism. The 1955 campaign against counter-revolutionaries seemed to have eliminated or subdued the régime's remaining opponents. There had been an excellent harvest. Peasants were being shepherded into collectives at a rate which indicated that collectivisation would be basically completed in 1958, nine years earlier than had been anticipated. Private businessmen, after an encouraging speech from Mao, were soon beating gongs to signify their joy at bringing their firms into partnership with the state. With the socialist revolution virtually accomplished—if not consolidated—the communist leaders turned all their attention to problems of economic development. In January, 1956, an ambitious programme to develop agriculture and eliminate illiteracy was published.

The lot of the intellectuals improved immediately. In the same month, the Prime Minister Chou En-lai promised them better living and working conditions, and freedom from persecution provided they bent all their efforts in the service of the state's economic plans. Chou's speech indicated that the party felt it had won its battle with the intellectuals, that the policy of struggle could be replaced by one of uniting with them. It did not delude itself that all intellectuals now embraced Marxism—Chou said only 40 per cent of higher intellectuals were progressive and active supporters of socialism. But the middle-of-the-roaders (40 per cent) and the passive opponents of socialism (10 per cent) were willing to work for their country and were not likely, after ideological remoulding and the anti-Hu Feng campaign, to question the *fait accompli* of collectivisation. Since the country possessed only 100,000 higher and 3.8 million ordinary intellectuals, full use had to be made of all but the 10 per cent of active counter-revolutionaries. The party had not abandoned its ultimate target of complete political conformity, but for the present there was to be less political study and less self-criticism.

Mao's 100 flowers speech (the text was never released, but the explanation of it by Lu Ting-yi, the head of the party's propaganda department, is presumably a reliable guide) was an elaboration of the new line charted by Chou. It contained in embryo many of the ideas to be expounded in his speech on contradictions in February, 1957. Within the ranks of the people, there was freedom to adhere to idealism and other non-Marxist philosophies. In other words, so long as an intellectual supported the régime he was to be allowed fairly wide licence. There were to be no class labels attached to the natural sciences; Western achievements could be studied. Writers could write about fairies instead of workers so long as they served the people, (*i.e.* so long as their books were read). Lu Ting-yi was less precise when he came to the sensitive field of social sciences; but he warned party members against monopolising the field and promised that historians would not be hamstrung by a Chinese equivalent of the *Short History of the CPSU*.

The policy was designed to release the intellectuals from the sterile conformity which prudence had led them to adopt. And despite their unpleasant experiences, the intellectuals responded to it. Though the debates on early Chinese history were rather forced and politically uncontroversial, at least there were more academic works published in 1956 than in the previous six years. Literary magazines sprang up all over the country and a number of traditional operas were revived

Indeed by early 1957, some of the party faithful had become alarmed at 'poisonous weeds'—such as Wang Meng's short story *Young Newcomer to the Organisation Department*, which exposed the demoralisation of a party cell in Peking—and had to be reassured by the spokesmen of the central committee.

MAO'S speech on the correct handling of contradictions within the ranks of the people (made before a closed session of the Supreme State Conference on 27 February, 1957) was not specifically directed at the intellectuals though it contained a re-affirmation of the 100 flowers policy. It was designed to provide a new theory of the communist state. Where Stalin proclaimed the sharpening of contradictions, Mao proclaimed their softening. Once socialism was established, contradictions became non-antagonistic and should be resolved by discussion and not by force. Criticism of the Communist Party was desirable because otherwise it might lose sight of the people's immediate needs; even strikes were permissible to rectify bureaucratic abuses. Mao had learnt the lesson of Hungary. He did not want the non-antagonistic contradiction between leaders and led to become antagonistic: in plain language he wanted to prevent tensions within China increasing to an extent that would face him with a major revolt.

But as far as the intellectuals were concerned Mao had learnt his lesson too late. The euphoria of 1949 was not to be recaptured by two speeches however benevolent and sincere. When the party launched its rectification movement, the intellectuals were the first to be asked to offer criticisms that would help it temper its autocracy. But there was misunderstanding as to the amount of freedom Mao had proferred, and many attacked the very foundations of communist power. Not content with the elimination of bureaucratic abuses, they wanted also the termination of party control in their particular sphere. Administrators complained that the party had usurped the functions of the government; teachers and students objected to party committees in the universities, to the elevation of the politically reliable over the academically proficient, to Marxism itself, which was asserted by some to be out-of-date and by others to be the source of all dogmatism. Lawyers accused party officials of legal nihilism and asserted that they considered themselves above the law. Writers objected to party control of literary magazines and newspapers, and Ting Ling, so the communists allege, decided to lead her followers out of the official Writers' Union. Many revealed a hatred of the arrogance and special privileges of communist officials; others demanded retribution for the excesses of the various campaigns, such as the ones against counter-revolutionaries, by which the communists had consolidated their power. What must have been most alarming to Mao was to find numbers of communist intellectuals and of university students thoroughly disenchanted with the régime. Only one month was needed to convince him that the critics had to be silenced.

THE communist counter-attack, the anti-rightist campaign, that started with an editorial in the *People's Daily* on 8 June, 1957, was justified by the unlikely allegation that two non-communist ministers, Lo Lung-chi and Chang Po-chun, had been directing a nation-wide plot against the Communist Party. The familiar pattern of criticism, self-criticism, and confession re-appeared, and the party took steps to strengthen its control where it had been most strongly questioned. Regulations were passed to ensure that no graduate would get a job if he were not politically reliable. One thousand senior party officials were transferred to work in universities and middle schools; two hundred were assigned to senior positions such as president or vice-president. Dissenting writers were removed from editorial boards and they and others were ordered to live in the country to reform their ideology by physical labour. Ting Ling, a provincial governor, and many others have been expelled from the Communist Party. At the National People's Congress session in February this year, 54 delegates were recalled and Lo Lung-chi and Chang Po-chun were finally dismissed from their posts. Political education has been increased for all intellectuals, and even peasants, workers, and soldiers are getting instruction, to counteract the effects of any contamination by rightist heresies.

So far only three people have been executed—significantly the leaders of a student riot. But the other measures that the communists have taken are sufficient to ensure that no intellectual

will ever dare to criticise them again. Not that they are likely to be given another opportunity. The evidence scarcely suggests that Mao was out to trap them; he simply made his biggest political mistake by thinking that the party had won the intellectuals over. He cannot afford to make the same mistake twice, for there is always the risk that the ferment among the intellectuals might touch off demonstrations at a more popular level. Onc again the party is having to struggle with th intellectuals to force them into the pattern o desired orthodoxy. And, as before, the intellec tuals will go through the motions of conforming But as Mao himself has said, you may ban th expression of wrong ideas, but the ideas will sti be there.

Marx Sails Eastward

PHILOSOPHY IN THE NEW REGIME

O. Brière, S.J

MARXIST philosophy had flourished in China even under the Nationalist Government. Both before and during the Sino-Japanese War innumerable pamphlets and manuals of Marxist philosophy presented popularised versions of dialectical materialism. A personal recollection will indicate the atmosphere of that period. One day, in the window of a conspicuously Marxist Shanghai bookshop, we saw an enormous poster from which two gigantic red characters flashed *Chih-hsueh* (Philosophy). Inside the shop, the casual visitor was greeted on all sides by pamphlets popularising dialectical materialism, which was presented in very simple terms, with examples drawn from everyday life. There was obviously no commercial intent; the object was Marxist propaganda. The Marxist press could not come into the open at that time because of the government censorship, but Marxist philosophy, no doubt considered innocuous, could be freely promoted.

One might have expected that after the 'Liberation,' with a Communist Government officially installed in Peking, Marxist philosophy would really come into its own and flourish. Oddly enough, exactly the opposite was the case. Thus, while all bookshops automatically became Marxist overnight, pamphlets or manuals of dialectical materialism vanished from the shop windows and counters. This is explained easil enough by the priority given to politics: a efforts were concentrated on reshaping the att tude of the people. To attain this end the govern ment employed means more drastic and also mor effective than the abstract exposition of th principles of dialectical materialism, periodicall launching violent campaigns against one socia stratum or another, temporarily abandonin interest in philosophy. We were struck forcibl by this moratorium on the Marxist dialectic— applied to popularising pamphlets as well as t more serious works—during the first four year of the régime, when we were still in Shangha What we witnessed personally in Shanghai ha been confirmed by reliable observers for the re of China.

Nevertheless, one must not exaggerate. Th principles of dialectical materialism certainly ha their place in courses given on political theory, bu one may still speak of a marked decline. It wa the same in the field of education. Only one (i the Peking National University) of the twelve t fifteen Departments of Philosophy that ha existed in Nationalist China remained, and clearly specialised in the teaching of Marxisn The party's higher schools included 'centres

hilosophical research,' but this was a rather retentious title for the meagre course offered to e students.

It was only in 1955, six years after the 'Libera-on,' that the first timid efforts were made to rganise a Department of Higher Philosophical udies. At the Academy of Sciences (the successor the Academia Sinica of the former régime) ans were made for the establishment of a epartment of Philosophy, to teach dialectical aterialism and to study the problems raised by e transition to socialism. However, P'an zu-nien, nominated Vice-President, complained tterly at the time that 'in philosophy and the cial sciences, which should be the backbone of e régime, there was complete stagnation.' loreover, he strongly deplored the fact that a mple manual of philosophy and the social iences had not been published for the use of niversity students. The Research Institute was ally established in 1957, with P'an Tzu-nien as esident.

Aside from this Institute, there is also a ientific Philosophical Association, but we lack formation on its composition and activity. The lence of the press in regard to this Association ggests that it is neither very active nor influential. e know the name of its President, Li Ta, and of s two Vice-Presidents, Ai Ssu-ch'i and Cheng sin. Li Ta, who once taught law, sociology, and onomics, was the first thinker to join the Party, nd he is also well qualified for the post he occu-es. His principal work is a massive 850-page olume modestly entitled *A Precis of Sociology*, hich describes the laws of dialectical materialism nd the materialist conception of history. His olleague, Ai Ssu-ch'i, the famous author of *The eople's Philosophy*, is one of the most publicised inkers of the régime, but he is above all a opulariser of Marxism. Cheng Hsin, who is now cognised as an orthodox Marxist, was at one me one of the most fervent Chinese Kantians. e once remarked, 'I think that Kant's philos-phy is the height of philosophical good sense.' owever, he does seem to be a sincere convert, of hich his membership in the Association is the st guarantee.

SINCE governmental efforts and energies were directed to other fields, it is not surprising that hilosophical writing was on the weak side. Of a number of treatises mentioned in the press, we shall only refer to three. *An Outline of Dialectical Materialism* appeared in Shanghai in 1955 under the signature of Hua Kang. The (Marxist) critics rebuked the author for copying Russian manuals closely, while occasionally taking the liberty of expressing (erroneous) personal opinions. In other words, Hua Kang was trying to straddle both sides of the fence—too much obsequiousness on one side, and too much originality on the other. It is hard to find the exact mean in everything.

In 1957, Ai Ssu-ch'i published *Teaching Outlines of Dialectical Materialism*, of which a non-Marxist account reports: 'We search this book in vain for real philosophical thought; these are pure commentaries on certain canonical Marxist texts and on some of the writings of Mao Tse-tung.'

In the same year, Teng Ch'u-ming, another Marxist philosopher and sociologist, though a less famous one, published *How to Develop the Moral Virtues in a Young Communist*. This moralising tendency is something quite new in the Marxist press, and it goes without saying that the morality referred to has nothing to do with traditional Chinese ethics, to which no allusion is intended. One can therefore apply to this essay what a Shanghai professor said last July about the dialectic: 'It is the European mode of thought; it is not in accord with the mentality of Oriental nations.'

The Marxist thinkers usually write in the form of essays, polemics and critiques, their writings appearing in periodicals and newspapers, and especially in the review *Philosophical Research*—and generally echoing problems already discussed in Soviet Russia. Thus, during the last eighteen months, the principal problems dealt with have been: the negation of the negation, formal logic and dialectical logic, economic base and social superstructure, aesthetics, the reinterpretation of Chinese philosophy. This last problem, the only specifically Chinese one, is also one of those which kept the most ink flowing. The philosophers who have ostensibly rallied to the support of the régime prefer this subject above all others. Fung Yu-lan is such a philosopher; he has abandoned philosophical speculations and Neo-Confucianism in order to try to discern traces of materialism, and therefore the roots of Marxism, in traditional Chinese thought. In this effort to find even the most tenuous trace of materialism

the authors often end up by falsifying the thought of the ancients, but they hardly have any other possibility of philosophising, except to repeat obediently Marxist slogans and principles while trying to prove them with quotations drawn from the classics.

To put it briefly, then, while the 'critical essay' is more or less accepted in the philosophical field, profounder analyses or studies which carry the subject further are rare. To the reason already mentioned we must add another: publishing houses do not dare take risks. 'The negative attitude adopted by the publishing world, as in other sectors of national life, stems from fear of the complications that might ensue if a new work were to be found ideologically unsound. Thus the offers of new interpretations are accepted without hesitation, but after delays, the manuscripts are rejected.' We are obviously referring here to philosophy in the strict sense of the term, and not to semi-political, semi-philosophical works, which abound.

On the other hand, in the field of translation there is enormous activity. Here the government gives all encouragement and the publishing houses run no risks. Thus the works of the Marxist fathers have had incomparable luck in China to this very day. In 1954 alone, six million copies of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (the Stalin of the period preceding the anti-Stalinist reaction) flooded the market. In addition, between 1949 and 1954, four million copies of the works of Stalin alone were published in China, and another two million in Russia for the Chinese market.

As for Mao Tse-tung, a three-volume edition of his selected writings was put on the market in nine million copies, and some of his work has been translated into Mongol, Tibetan, Uighur, and Kazakh, and more than fifty of the world's languages. However, perhaps we should not mention Mao in this connection, since his works are more political than philosophical.

It should be clear that such a plethora of publications floods the market, and the books are remaindered and put on sale at a price lower than the value of the paper they are printed on. But this is no source of concern to the government; in order to attain uniformity of thought, all sacrifices are legitimate.

THE first concern of the government in regard to the intellectuals was to win them over, whether by force or persuasion, or to crush them if they were recalcitrant. Non-Marxist philosophers who had no taste for the régime and were not prepared to submit to terrible mental pressures, went into exile in Hongkong or on Formosa. But it must be admitted that the majority preferred acquiescence to exile. In the first years of the régime they had to take indoctrination courses and make their general confession. Several of them published accounts of their intellectual reform, some out of opportunism, others because they were forced to do so. Naturally, these confessions were not all equally satisfying to those in power at the time, for the required degree of reform was not always sufficiently apparent, whence developed the dramas we shall describe briefly below.

One of the first and most anxious to make his confession was Fung Yu-lan, the most representative of contemporary philosophers, former president of the Philosophical Society of China, which comprised 120 members under the Kuomintang. The man who had once preached the Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi, which he had ordered and systematised into a coherent whole, suddenly started—with no transition at all——to laud the merits of Marxist thought. In a public confession he 'disavowed his previous philosophical theories and proclaimed his discovery of the great truths that philosophy divorced from politics is an illusion, that the duty of the philosopher is to expound Marxism and Leninism.' As a matter of fact, he had indeed admitted certain Marxist principles in his earlier works, but his conversion, whether genuine or opportunist, is nevertheless a real volte-face. While some accused him of opportunism, the Marxists were jubilant and insisted on the authenticity of his conversion. One fact seems quite certain; he is now no longer disturbed in his work and can re-explore traditional Chinese philosophy in the light of dialectical materialism. However, one does have the right to remain sceptical about this conversion: one does not expound a basically idealistic system all one's life in order to pass at one bound into the materialist camp.

Another philosopher, Chang Tung-sun, former professor in Yenching (Peking) University, and ex-leader of the China Democratic League (the party made up of left-wing intellectuals), had

en more obvious indications of Marxist
inations in his later works. Known as a
ialist and an adversary of the Kuomintang, he
ocated the accession of the communists to
ver in his political writings which appeared at
time of General Marshall's attempt at
diation. He was rewarded for his efforts by
ng appointed by the People's Government to
Government Council, the highest political
mmittee of communist China. He thought that
could influence the communist government
ards moderation and induce it to adopt a
em approximating his own social ideals. He
quickly undeceived, but if he had had illusions
showed more dignity than his colleague Feng
-lan and did not capitulate. When he became
re of the futility of his efforts, he 'refused to
e part in any political demonstration or in-
trination; as a result he was dismissed from the
vernment Council and put under house arrest.'
is no longer referred to in the press.

A third well-known philosopher, Hsiung
h-li, who had expounded Buddhist philosophy
his life, has also made amends for his past and
now interpreting antiquity from a Marxist
le. He claims that Marxism is the supreme
h and contends that certain assertions of
nfucius and Lao-tse can be understood in a
ialist sense. We need hardly add that this late
version of a veteran Buddhist provides us
h a rich source of speculation.

Chu Kuang-ch'ien, a specialist in the philo-
hy of aesthetics, who had introduced the
thetic theories of Kant, Hegel, and above all
ce into China, was one of the first, with Fung
-lan, to repudiate his previous work and
ught. But he is not mentioned much in the
ss, and no doubt prefers to keep silence
ead of collaborating actively with the
rxists.

While Chin Yueh-lin, one of the best-known
nese logicians and metaphysicians, did not
ke the efforts so many others did to accommo-
e himself to the régime, he was recently invited
occupy a chair of philosophy in the University of
ing in order to expound Russell's philosophy.
e press reported that the hall was packed for
first lecture, and the reason for this is quite
ar. Chin Yueh-lin returned to teach Russell's
losophy on the occasion of the inauguration of
Hundred Schools and Hundred Flowers
movement, the purpose of which was to let the anti-Marxist critics express themselves freely, presumably so that the false Marxists would betray themselves among the real ones. It should be added that this purely opportunist liberalisation was of very short duration, since the government was taken aback by the number of critics who raised their heads everywhere. However, the naive individuals who took the government at its word have paid for it dearly. It would also have been quite extraordinary if Professor Chin Yueh-lin had retained his chair for any length of time.

Another professor of philosophy, and a specialist in Hegelianism, the famous Ho Lin, attempted to come to terms with the régime and apparently succeeded, for he is expounding Marxism as the supreme standard of truth, and uses Marxist slogans *ore rotundo*. He was recently paid the honour of being invited to take part in a delegation of Chinese philosophers who made a study tour of Russia. The result of this trip was that the questions treated by the philosophers of both countries were exactly the same, and how could it be otherwise when one group copies the other?

SO far we have been dealing with more or less sincere collaborators of the régime, for we cannot affirm with certainy that they have become authentic Marxists. The cases of P'an Tzu-nien and Cheng Hsin are quite different, for both were converts before the 'Liberation' and were recognised as such. P'an Tzu-nien, who had formerly translated various Western philosophical works for the Shanghai Commercial Press (among others, Bergson's *Temps et Espace*, hardly suspect of materialism) was finally converted to Marxism. Perhaps the credit for his conversion should go to his brother, P'an Han-nien, a prominent official of the Communist Party and former vice-mayor of Shanghai, who has since fallen into disfavour and was even thrown into prison two years ago. At any rate, from that time on P'an Tzu-nien has been an undisputed authority in the field of Marxist thought.

Parallel to this effort to win over the philosophers by force or inducement, whether idealist or not, there have been large-scale attacks on those recognised as irreconcilable enemies, who have refused to collaborate. Outstanding among these are Hu Shih and Liang Shu-ming.

Hu Shih has always been the object of virulent attacks by the Marxists, and being at the top of their blacklist, he had to go into exile in the United States before the communists arrived in Peking. When the latter came into power, Hu Shih became one of their favourite targets. He was criticised for his literary views as well as his philosophical position. In the realm of ideas, he was reproached for following the Nietzschean principle according to which the norm of righteousness is whatever oppresses the people. This is purely arbitrary criticism (not to mention the implied distortion of Nietzsche), for there is nothing in the work of Hu Shih to justify it. Another complaint against him which is rather better founded is his attachment to America and to American pragmatism. As a matter of fact, Hu Shih has persistently advocated Dewey's ideas in China, and is *persona gratissima* in the United States; his sin is therefore unforgivable. In 1954 a new pamphlet campaign was launched against him and the same accusations were repeated.

In 1955 it was the turn of Professor Liang Shu-ming to stand in the dock. He had not fled to America, but had remained in China and the violent campaign launched against him took a different turn. Actually, the attack on this man went far beyond his individual case, and it was no doubt intended, in liquidating him, to do away permanently with every form of idealism and to discourage any effort to deviate from the thought-control required of everyone. The fact is that Liang Shu-ming had attempted to adjust his thought to the new ideas, but his effort had been considered insufficient. When the attack against him was let loose, even those who held positions similar to his joined the chorus of his adversaries in order to floor him. In his most famous book, *The Cultures of the Orient and the Occident and their Philosophies*, published in 1921, Liang had tried to show that oriental culture, that is, Buddhist metaphysics and Confucian ethics, were the supreme ideal of every culture, and he supported his contentions by citing certain texts of contemporary occidental philosophy. This position was eventually more or less modified, but it was never abandoned. In his last book, *The Essence of Chinese Culture*, which appeared in 1949, he was imprudent enough to write, 'My views on Chinese culture have not varied in the course of the last 20 or 30 years; they have only been amended or corrected.' This statement wa quite audacious, being made when the communi armies were swarming over the north of Chin and he had to pay dearly for it. His attackers du up all the affirmations of idealism and anti-Mar ism they could find in his works, and it must b admitted that it was not a difficult task findin them. Fung Yu-lan and Ho Lin stooped to b rating their former colleague. What was the resu of the 21 long essays criticising the unfortunat Liang Shu-ming? We do not know, but we ca be sure that the fate of this man, who was onc the secretary-general of the Democratic Leagu is not an enviable one.

AFTER the extremely violent campaign against the unregenerate idealists symbolise by Hu Shih and Liang Shu-ming, there followed period of relaxation in 1957, which has come to b known as the movement of the Hundred Schoo and Flowers, and which putatively gave ever one permission to criticise the party freely. Th sudden loosening of the reins produced, for little while at least, a reversal of the situatio which would have been unthinkable earlie While in politics a campaign was carried ou against dogmatists and diehards, this liberalisin volte-face (which can be regarded as camouflag had curious consequences in the intellectu world. Thus Dewey's writings, which had bee subjected to the most bitter criticism, becam fashionable overnight. 'By request of the Mini try of Education, anti-Dewey essays comprisin one million characters were withdrawn befo publication. . . . Now it is permissible to sho Dewey's good sides, such as his opposition metaphysics, and it is no longer recommende that pragmatism be called an imperialist schoo Another example of this liberalism by decree wa as we have noted above, the teaching of Russell theories at the University of Peking, and if th first lecture was packed, it was no doubt becau the students were famished for theories other tha those of the Marxist canon.

The liberalism of the Hundred Schools an Flowers campaign did not last very long, for th three weeks of free speech opened the floodgat to such a torrent of suppressed grievances that t Communist Party was extremely disturbed. 'F the first time since 1949, it became publicly know what intolerable tyranny was exercised by t

nmunist Party, how it was feared and hated, how little place it held in the hearts of even e who held high and well-paid positions. It a catastrophic defeat.' The party had recourse iolent counter-measures, and on 9 June, 1957, ditorial in the *People's Daily*, the organ of the y's Central Committee, announced the imple- tation of the 'counter-criticism'; it was the itable purge. One may presume that the thou- ls of naive persons who had spoken too freely reason to regret it. As for the theoreticians philosophers who had come back into fashion, r triumph turned out to be quite ephemeral. umming up eight years of Chinese philosophy er the Marxist régime we find very little to w. There is of course no question of non- xist philosophies, which have disappeared entirely. The only interest left in them is the degree to which they provide material of a materialist slant. The new régime is occupied with more urgent tasks, and puts all its efforts into thought-control and the imposition of intellectual uniformity; it has no interest in speculation for its own sake. Non-party philosophers have had to toe the line. Some have submitted obsequiously, radically disavowing their previous works and fervently proclaiming their adherence to the Marxist cause, while others have preferred to keep silence and live in poverty rather than deny their inmost convictions. It goes without saying that the former have been showered with favour, without getting important positions, being more or less suspect of opportunism, while the latter have been ostracised or virulently attacked.

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THE SOVIET MODEL AND CHINESE CULTURE

J. P. McCarthy

IN writing of culture in present-day China, one must begin by noticing that the word in official jargon has a meaning very different from that given in the dictionary, and from the sense in which we propose to use it here. 'Socialist Culture' is a reality, which focuses on such themes as the Party programme, collectivisation, industrial production, counter-revolutionaries and the like. It would not seem to be impossible that genuine art and true literature should be inspired by such themes and yet, in fact, the Communist contribution to the arts in China has been almost negligible. Comparisons have been made between the nature and the influence of communism and those of the world religions; communism has been compared with Islam by Bertrand Russell and with Christianity by Berdyaev, with emphasis on their messianic theme of world salvation and the complete devotion to a supreme ideal. Yet fundamentally there is a direct contradiction between communism and any religion, even in their structural details and in the fruits which they produce. Nowhere is the contrast more evident than in the effects of communism and the great world religions on cultural life. The religions—and Islam not least—gave a great impetus to thought, literature, poetry, and the arts. This 'modern religion,' powerful in so many ways, has proved sterile in the cultural sphere. We have therefore to deal here with a paralysing influence descending on an ancient culture; on the other hand, confining our survey to the last two years, we find that the tradition, the cultivated taste, and the feeling for humanistic culture, driven underground or silenced though they may be, have survived.

With the triumph of the Communists in 1949, Russian experts poured into China, and Russian advisers were provided for every ministry. Though they behaved discreetly and remained unobtrusively in the background, they can hardly have been welcome to the average Chinese; but it might have been thought that in cultural circles they would be less unwelcome. Long before 1949 Dostoevsky and other great Russian writers had been eagerly read and appreciated; many Chinese intellectuals saw in the Russian revolution and the transformation of backward Russia a model that China should imitate; leading writers of the nineteen-twenties were only too ready to disown the heritage of Chinese philosophy and literature and to adopt the traditions of the West; the writers of the twenties and the professors in the westernised universities were for the most part leftist, though having abandoned their roots, they played with every philosophy from Aristotle to Dewey and Bertrand Russell. In the thirties, many of the writers went to Yenan and joined the Communist Party there; soon they began to chafe under Party discipline and 1942 saw what was to be the first of many purges designed to bring the writers completely under Party control; the Party had no use for writing that was not on the Party line. The advent of the Russians brought no change in the policy and soon writers and artists laid aside their pens and their brushes—'We felt paralysed,'[1] one of them was to say later. This paralysis of literary and artistic activity is not due simply to Marxism, for there had been a lively discussion among Chinese philosophers in the nineteen-twenties on the ideas of Marx; rather it was due to the unpredictable Party line, to over-rigid discipline, and to the universal fear which descended on the intelligentsia, as upon every other class, as purge succeeded purge. Writers ceased to write, artists ceased to paint, dramatists ceased to produce, and—most curiously—this leftist intelligentsia which had been so ready to abandon the traditions of China began to appreciate the noble heritage of their country which made them superior to the barbarians who had come from Russia to teach them.

Meanwhile the Russian model was followed when the universities were dismembered and re-

[1] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 23 May, 1956.

rganised; many professors were forbidden to each or were relegated to obscure posts; political ndoctrination and learning of Russian were nposed on everyone; translations of Russian ooks poured from the press; China discovered hat it is to be a cultural satellite. At first some f the professors made feeble protests, but they ere silenced: the Russians were always right. hus, by the end of 1955, Chinese arts and litera- ure had all but disappeared; on the other hand, we re told that from 1949 to the end of September, 955, the total number of translations of Russian terary works, classical and contemporary, mounted to 2,300; in all, 42 million copies were rinted.[2]

THE first sign of hope came at the beginning of 1956, when Chou En-lai addressed a Con- erence on the Problems of Intellectuals.[3] (The erm intellectual, in official parlance, includes even rimary school teachers, but Chou En-lai intro- uced a useful modification by addressing him- lf to 'high-grade intellectuals.') He showed an ppreciation of their problems of low income, oor housing, and lack of books, and promised leviation, even suggesting that some of them ight be taken into the Party; at the same time here was an ominous threat that the purge of their nks was to go on, to discover the 'backward ements'; all of them must learn the correct way f thinking and acting. Subsequently, a few prom- ent writers, dramatists, and professors were dmitted to the Party, with the unusual spectacle f a public ceremonial pledge-taking. In Febru- y, 1956, Khrushchev's famous speech to the 0th Soviet Party Congress was delivered; this, ith its dethronement of Stalin, who had been ified in China almost as much as in Russia, unned Peking; it was not recorded in the *eople's Daily*—usually quick to print news from Moscow—until many weeks later.[4] Even then, actions were slow and cautious and de-Stalin- ation was never allowed the latitude in Peking hat it was to receive elsewhere. In the middle of May, however, Lu Ting-yi, the Director of Pro- aganda, in a speech to a group of scientists, riters, and Party members, promised some re- laxation of discipline, taking as his text the couplet 'Harmonious Display of a Hundred Flowers, Clamorous Discussion of a Hundred Schools.'[5] He distinguished between contradictions among the people and the ideological struggle against counter-revolutionaries. The latter must go on, but among the people differences of opinion and replies to criticism might be permitted. From literature and the arts, only one thing was required—that they serve the workers, farmers, and soldiers. Socialist realism was the best form of art, but it was not the only form. In philosophy and the social sciences, the fight against idealism was correct, but this was not the whole of philosophy. These were revolutionary admissions, but more followed in the denunciation of 'dogmatism' in following the Russian lead; it was right to learn from Soviet Russia, but this must not be mechanical, servile imitation. Even Lu Ting-yi would scarcely have dared to say this, if it had not already been said by the Russian advisers themselves. Liberalism, very restrained liberalism, was in the air, and in the following months there was frequent talk of 'dogmatism' and slavish imitation of Russia, but the applications of the policy were few and cautious. The *People's Daily* did admit a columnist who satirised the shortcomings of the bureaucrats and other features of Peking life, in well-written, racy sketches.[6] Altogether the paper brightened up considerably, and the movement of relaxation could be expected to grow. At the end of October, Moscow published the Declaration which promised to revise Soviet relations with other Communist countries and on 1 November, 1956, a Chinese Declaration was published supporting the Polish and Hungarian demands for 'democracy, independence, and equality.'[7] There followed the events in Hungary, which led to a sudden reversal of Chinese demands; Russia's actions in Hungary were given full support.[8] Thereafter, Peking displayed the utmost caution, but at the end of the year the *People's Daily* again printed a demand for more freedom from Russian interference in internal affairs; however, the Soviet experts remained.

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[2] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 7 November, 1955.

[3] *People's Daily*, 30 January, 1956.

[4] *People's Daily*, 5 April, 1956.

[5] *People's Daily*, 11 June, 1956.

[6] *People's Daily*, July, August, 1956.

[7] *People's Daily*, 1 November, 1956.

[8] *People's Daily*, 5 November, 1956.

IN the spring of 1957, diplomatic exchanges were going on, aimed at repairing the fabric of the Communist bloc, but at the end of February and in March, Mao Tse-tung made two important speeches, which were to have far-reaching consequences. The text of the more important speech was not made public until the middle of June[9] when the free-speech period it was meant to initiate was already over—indeed the speech was never printed in the form in which it was delivered, but records of it were widely distributed. Between the speech and its implementation, there was also a long interval, but in the middle of May what came to be known as the 'Free-Speech Period' started. Meetings were organised of writers, scientists, doctors, journalists, etc., meetings within and without the Ministries, and all were invited to give their criticisms of the régime, the Party, and the officials. At first, naturally, there was hesitation—would their criticisms be held against them afterwards?—but soon courage or desperation got the upper hand and criticism developed into denunciation and obloquy directed at the Party and its methods, at Russia and its advisers. All this was freely and fully reported in the Press[10]—we shall give a few examples below when we deal with the individual arts. Among the students, who were naturally the most violent —even in the People's University of Peking, founded under Russian auspices—a recurrent cry was 'The Hungarians were right,' 'We should start a Hungarian movement,' evidence that Chinese subservience to Russia was a deeply felt grievance. The free-speech period ended on 8 June, and then began the long drawn out purge. This has once more crushed the yearnings for intellectual and cultural freedom, or rather it has driven them underground, for the free-speech period proved that eight years of intensive indoctrination and propaganda had not destroyed the ancient heritage of Chinese civilisation. We propose in what follows to deal, very briefly, with the fate of some of the arts during these two years as they struggled under the sombre Soviet shadow; science we must exclude, for the subject is too wide and its history too tortuous.

IN November, 1957, the Minister for Higher Education[11] summed up the history of higher education under the present régime as the history of the implantation of the Soviet Russian system. The age-old system of Chinese education has gone, and with it the universities founded in the last sixty years on the Western pattern. In their place, there has been established the People's University of Peking, a Soviet political university on Chinese soil, while numerous technical colleges have been founded, or adapted from the fragments of the dismembered universities. The titles of some of these, the Automobile and Tractor College, the Post and Cable College, the Water Conservancy College, make it clear that they aim at training technicians as opposed to technologists—men with the minimum of specialised training. The Minister said that it was not sufficient to learn Russian technology: students and professors must definitely take sides with the Russians against American-English 'capitalist' education. During the present (1957) academic year, 117 Russian professors have come to teach in China. Russian teaching material and translations of Soviet textbooks are used. In the People's University, special emphasis is laid on the study of political theory, or Marxism-Leninism. Apart from their teaching activity and their reform of the system, the Russian professors personally undertook the training in condensed courses of 700 young teachers for the People's University, and 2,000 professors for other schools, between 1952 and 1957.

The Chinese professors and their students were far from grateful. The professors came out during the free-speech period with such statements as 'formerly my feet were tied and my mouth was sealed,'[12] and 'In the past when we were intent on imitating Soviet Russia we descended to a blend of formalism and dogmatism. As we all know, the result was that everybody said the same thing and thought became petrified. We could quote the sacred books "as so-and-so said," and inevitably we became fossilised.' The professors were particularly galled by their young 'assistants,' whom they regarded as ignoramuses but who lorded it over them with their ready quotations from notes acquired at the People's University. Meanwhile the students, more vic

[9] *Peoples' Daily, etc.*, 19 June, 1957.

[10] Vernacular Press, passim, May, June, 1957.

[11] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 6 November, 1957.

[12] *People's Daily*, 16 May, 1957.

nt, had organised mass meetings, and by car-ons, posters, and news-sheets sought to organise 'Hungarian rising.' They were surprisingly nscious of the defects in their own education, d demanded the abandonment of the Russian stem. Then came the purge with its counter-cusations, and the Russian system was re-posed: 'The policy called "Learning the ad-nced experience of Soviet Russia" must not be estioned, nor even brought up for discussion.... here are people who want to learn from capita-st countries and disregard Soviet science and chnology, but this is a self-deception.'[13] Now elinquent professors and students are being spatched to the villages to work in the co-opera-ves—the collective farms—that they may learn rough labour to correct their thoughts. From anking University alone, for example, 1,500 ve been sent to the villages.

N pre-war China, as we have said, there was a welter of philosophies; now there is one only, d to this Chinese thinkers have not made any otable contribution, for they cautiously content emselves with re-echoing the views of Soviet riters. Mao Tse-tung himself has been hailed as theoretical thinker, but what one finds in his ork is a development of some selected themes om Lenin and their application to concrete olitical situations. Of this kind of philosophy, ere are certain examples; for instance the Philos-phy Supplement of the *Kuang Ming Daily*, in arch, 1957, had an article with the promising le: 'Opposition and Unity of Internal and xternal Causes,' which however turned out to concerned exclusively with the Hungarian cident.

More delicate is the question of the attitude to adopted towards the old Chinese philosophers om Confucius to Sun Yat-sen. Two confer-ces on the history of Chinese philosophy were ld during 1957, in January and May, the latter king place during the free-speech period. Dis-ssion was cramped by the necessity of paying lip-rvice to the principle enunciated by Zhdanov at the history of philosophy is 'the history of ruggle between materialism and idealism,' mplicated by Marx's dictum that all history is e history of class struggle. The young philos-phers, trained by the Russians, whether in Peking or Russia (every year about 1,000 Chinese students go to the USSR for education) had no difficulty; they were able at once to classify the old philosophers as materialists or idealist, white or black. The ignorance of these young men about Chinese literature and philosophy did not commend their views to the old professors. With great caution, and using Marxist jargon, these queried Zhdanov's definition, and in the May conference, a number of them ventured to say that many Chinese philosophers had not taken any stand either for materialism or idealism.[14] Similarly, they could find no sign of the class struggle in many Chinese philosophers. The question of the peculiarities of Chinese philosophy naturally came up for discussion in May, and with this seemingly innocuous subject the conference moved on to dangerous ground, since it is a communist axiom that their tenets are universally valid. The general view was that Chinese philosophers were practical men; they were concerned with politics and real life; Chinese prefer ideas which can be realised.

In the October Philosophy Supplement of the *Kuang Ming Daily*, the Party line is firmly re-asserted and the dictum of Zhdanov vindicated: The history of philosophy represents a clear and definite life-and-death struggle between Idealism and Materialism, and Fung Yu-lan, a philosopher who had ably argued against Zhdanov in the conferences, veered round again, accepted Zhdanov, and acknowledged his great debt to Soviet philosophy.[15]

In literature, as in philosophy, there have been difficulties in re-assessing ancient Chinese writings in the light of Marxist-Leninist canons; the principle that cultural life is part of the superstructure, determined by the economic life of the country, has presented insoluble problems. If economic life was feudal or capitalist, as current doctrine insists that it was, could any of the superstructure be good? And, if some of the superstructure was good, could the economic life be wholly bad, as theory requires? This was a purely Chinese question and Russian influence was not evident, although Russian Sinologues were quoted.[16] In the purges of the modern school of

[13] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 27 August, 1957.

[14] *Philosophical Research*, 1957, No. 3.

[15] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 27 October, 1957.

[16] *Historical Research*, August, 1955.

writers, associated with the names of Hu Shih and Hu Feng, again, the appeal was to Mao Tse-tung's 'Forum' speech of 1942 and the Chinese Communist Party appeared to be following the example rather than the dictate of Moscow. It was this modern school which had prepared the way for communism in China. Its acknowledged leader, Lu Hsun, who died in 1936, is highly honoured by the Communists, though many of his followers were purged. The result was that in recent years, Chinese writers have scarcely dared to write, the book-market has been dominated by translations from Russian, and the little Chinese writing that was done was either pure propaganda, hardly worthy of the name of literature, or else slavish imitation of Russian models. Most stage productions were translations from the Russian; the films shown were from Russia or Eastern Europe; the Chinese stage and the Chinese film studios could not find writers to supply them with plays or scripts.[17] In the most recent purge, several more writers of the modern school, Party members for twenty years and more, like Ting Ling, the woman novelist, have been expelled from the Party, for they failed to subscribe to the view that the one purpose of literature is to serve Party interests: had not Ting Ling in a novel written before the liberation described a Party official as other than a paragon of every virtue, in fact as a wicked man?

IN all this, one could easily overlook the part played by Russia, but it has been brought out by some recent events. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Chinese Magazine, *Literature*, had a special page entitled 'Gratitude for the Help given us by Soviet Russian Literature,' as well as several fulsome articles. It recalled that Chinese poets had imitated Russian modern poets so that 'their poems move within the range of politics.' At the same time the chairman of the Chinese Writers' Association sent congratulations to the Association's counterpart in Russia (actually he was in Moscow for the anniversary, on one of the cultural missions which come and go between the two countries). In his letter he wrote: 'Since the Autumn of 1956 anti-Marxist revisionist currents have appeared in the world: Some people have attacked Socialist Realism in literature and Soviet Russian literature. But they did so in vain. . . Chinese writers have always held Soviet Russian literature as their model and they have diligently studied its rich experience.'[18]

In fact events in China had characteristically followed events in Russia. The discipline of 'Socialist Realism' had been relaxed after the 20th Party Congress, but in August, 1957 Khrushchev had rebuked the writers for their aberrations and announced stronger Party leadership in literature. His article was reprinted in the *People's Daily* on 19 September, and the Chinese writers who had been questioning the universal validity of socialist realism found themselves under attack. One of the charges against them was that they had criticised Soviet literature. A former editor of *Literature* was quoted as saying: 'Soviet Russian literature is nothing but dogmatism,' and a young writer, brought up under the Party, as saying: 'Early Soviet literature was of high quality, but afterwards it degenerated.'

Historians, too, are being attacked. One of them had stated[19] that Marxist sociology had not developed since the death of Engels in 1895, a view which, as was immediately pointed out, ignored the work of Lenin and Stalin, not to mention Mao Tse-tung. Historians are now tackling the problem of periodisation, of determining when China passed through slavery to feudalism, through capitalism and finally reached socialism, to fit China into the Marxist picture. Accustomed to look to Russia for guidance they find that on this point the Russian Sinologues naturally look to them, but they dare not commit themselves to an opinion which may later be condemned as a deviation.

CHINESE painting is inseparably linked with Chinese calligraphy. The two use the same brush and delight in the same brush work. Chinese characters and Chinese pictures are alike symbolic and abstract and traditionally, in Chinese education, the young derive from calligraphy that discipline and training which in the West comes from the study of art. Now Peking has decided to jettison the characters—naturally after consultation with Russian experts—and

[17] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 28 April, 1956.

[18] *People's Daily*, 9 November, 1957.

[19] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 7 May, 1957.

among the many objections raised to this programme, one of the most potent is the loss to Chinese culture.

Chinese painting was completely neglected by the régime in its early years, and young artists were encouraged to use oils and water-colours instead of the Chinese materials and to imitate Russian 'socialist realism.' More recently, a blending of Western and Chinese art has been officially encouraged. In fact the West has influenced Chinese masters and, before the liberation, Matisse and Cézanne were known and studied, but now they are condemned as exponents of the decadent art of capitalism, and Western art has come to mean Russian art, too often a nineteenth-century naturalism verging on the photographic. This simply will not blend with Chinese art, which seeks to reproduce symbolically the vital rhythms of nature.

The initiation of the Hundred Flowers policy led to an exhibition of Chinese painting in 1956. The critic of the *Kuang Ming Daily*,[20] reviewing this, regretted that only 28 per cent of the pictures dealt with agrarian production and only ten per cent with industrial production! The fact that some of the young artists had been persuaded to introduce a tractor or an aeroplane into a traditional Chinese 'mountain-water' painting, (*i.e.* landscape) could only make the old masters throw up their hands in despair. This exhibition was followed by a Government decision to open two colleges of Chinese painting and one of these was inaugurated in May, 1957, during the free-speech period. At this time, the old masters were able to speak out their minds, and they did so in eloquent defence of their art and traditions. It was a gallant but useless gesture: they, too, are now attacked as 'rightists.'

The workers in ivory and jade are even more unfortunate, for their products are useful in the export drive and the Ministry for Foreign Trade demands vulgar figures, painted in crude colours, for these are popular in Russia. When they protested at the degradation of their art, they were told that it was intolerable that what the artists produce cannot be sold, and what the public wants, the artists will not produce.[21]

Russian music has suffered least from 'socialist realism,' and conservatoires have been set up in Peking and Shanghai where an excellent training is given in Western music by Russian masters. This is a transplantation to Chinese soil of something entirely foreign, but it is something good, and the Chinese readily appreciate it. Some transplantations are less happy: the song of the Volga boatmen sounds sadly thin when rendered by Chinese voices, and some of the songs of production composed in imitation of Russian models, which can be heard on the radio, are deplorable alike in composition and execution. On the other hand, one does sometimes hear a choir that is disciplined and well-trained, though much of the music is of the poorest.

At one time in China an interesting attempt was being made to adapt the traditional Chinese style to building with modern materials. Mistakes no doubt were made and there were extravagances, but the experiment produced some pleasing buildings. However, on 7 December, 1954, Khrushchev, in a speech to architects at Moscow, ridiculed the kind of architecture which he found in Russia. The speech was reproduced in the *People's Daily* on 13 January, 1955, and was accepted in China no less than in Russia as a norm that must be followed. However necessary it may have been in Russia, its effect in China was unfortunate, for it stopped short a movement that was full of promise. Since then, Chinese building has reverted to a fairly crude type of barrack-construction, another example of the unfortunate effects of Russian influence on the Chinese cultural scene.

[20] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 27 October, 1956.

[21] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 20 October, 1957.

The Dragon and the Pen

THE LITERARY SCENE

Cyril Birch

MARXIST writing in China can look back on a history of over thirty years. Few of the early products are still read, but such a story as *Light Before our Eyes*, for all its monotony, is strong with the flavour of the Communist life and dream of the late 1920's. Its author, Hu Yeh-pin, was shot as an agitator by the Nationalist police in 1931. His story is plainly idealised autobiography. The central figure, a young lecturer and propagandist, almost wears himself out in his attempts to organise crowd reaction to an 'imperialist' shooting incident, but ends in joyous anticipation of the blood which must soon flow in vengeance.

While Mao Tse-tung's work amongst the Hunanese peasants was left unsung, others like Hu Yeh-pin celebrated in literature the party's efforts to organise the city workers. But these writers were few in number, despite their vociferousness in the 1930 League of Left-Wing Writers and despite the efforts of later critics to include in their ranks many famous names, from Lu Hsün down, who, though sympathetic to the left, owed no allegiance to the Communist Party. The Communist writers formed in fact only one of many factions among the intellectuals. It was a time of creative ferment, astonishing in its volume and variety. In the conditions imposed by censorship, publication difficulties, and economic hardship, few writers could maintain themselves in isolation. What is now condemned as 'factionalism' was then the rule: and factions ranged from the extreme æstheticism of the *New Moon* school and its successors, through the independents of the *Third Person* group, to a plethora of groups committed to one form or another of social criticism.

The standard of creative work was steadily rising. An index could be found in the gap between even the best verse of, say, Kuo Mo-jo in the mid-20's, and the level of work a decade later by Pien Chih-lin, Tseng K'o-chia and others. Not all this later work is free from pretentiousness. Pien Chih-lin's short poem *The Organisation of Distance*, is provided with a footnote for almost each line, yet remains obscure. It contains allusions to Gibbon, to an item of astronomical news in the daily paper, an account of exploration in the Gobi, and a seventeenth-century Chinese short story. Cosmopolitanism had not much further to go. Yet the same poet's longer piece on Peking life, 'flying kites on a dust-heap' as the Japanese threatened war, must be counted as one of the best products of modern Chinese poetry.

Communist policy during the war imposed a geographical division on literary as on all other activities. The main body of writers continued to work in the Nationalist-controlled areas. Shanghai and Peking were replaced as cultural capitals by Hankow and Hong Kong, and later by remote Chungking. One of the tragic features of recent years is the disappearance from circulation of important work done in these wartime centres. Lao Sheh comes first to mind, a leading novelist who wrote as his masterpiece a million-word epic set in his native Peking under Japanese occupation. The book, *House of Four Generations*, was published in three parts, the last in 1948. But the people of Peking during the war had looked for deliverance towards Chiang in Chungking rather than Mao in Yenan. The People's Republic was established in 1949, and Lao Sheh's book, which reflects the wartime predominance of the Nationalists, has lain all but unnoticed from that date on.

The sizeable minority of writers who made their way into the so-called Communist Liberated Areas after 1937 were given a two-fold task. In addition to writing on their own account they were set to work on the training of new writers both at the Lu Hsün Academy in Yenan and in villages throughout the Areas. The peasant or soldier who could write, however crude and immature his work might be, was given every encouragement to produce verses for the wall-news-

aper, or patriotic playlets for performance by he village drama-group. In this way a great orpus of popular literature came into existence, eavened always by the work of the Communist ntellectuals. By 1942 Mao was able to assemble large body of writers, established or aspiring, o attend the discussions in Yenan which laid own directives for the production of a new mass terature.

Between that date and the establishment of the eople's Republic in 1949, Communist writers chieved many notable successes. Despite the asic premise that the prime function of a play, oem, or story was to serve as propaganda for the égime, several writers captured the breath of life n treating of the dark past, and carried conviction ven in their dreams of a glorious future. hao Shu-li, whose writing career had its birth in he Liberated Areas, is the outstanding fiction riter of the period. There is little of foreign in-uence about his work, but a strong reminder of he native tradition. His preference is always for he significant matter-of-fact as against the misty eneralisation. The opening vignette of his land-eform story, *The Ballads of Li Yu-ts'ai*, is a little em of stage-setting:

> There was a curious feature of this place Yen-chia-shan. At the western end of the village the houses were two-storied brick buildings. In the middle part they were only of one storey, and in the eastern part, by the village ash-tree, was a row of twenty or thirty cave-dwellings in the soil. The terrain of the village was level enough, but if you looked at the line made by the roofs of the houses, you would find a distinct slope running down from west to east. All the people who lived in the west part had the surname Yen. In the middle an assortment of surnames was mixed in with the Yen families; but all were natives of the region. Only the east end was in a special case. Half of the people there were pioneers from other parts of the country; the rest were local families of mixed surnames whose living had gone downhill. There were no more than three households with the surname Yen, and these had only moved into this part of the village after going broke and selling their property.

THE land-reform was a favourite source of material, and produced Stalin Prize novels like *The Sun Shines on the Sangkan River* (Ting Ling) and *The Hurricane* (Chou Li-po). The *yangko* play *White-haired Girl*, the long narrative poem *The Carter's Story* (T'ien Chien), and countless other works in all *genres* celebrated the more general theme of the new order in the countryside. Ts'ao Ming's *Prime Moving Force*, a novel centred on a power-station, was one of the more successful attempts to bring industrial life within the pale of literature. Nor were the military glories of the liberation armies allowed to go unrecorded. Old Chinese fiction offers an inexhaustible mine of battle narrative, and it is not surprising that the traditional element is strong in war novels like *Tales of the Heroes of Lü-liang* (Ma Feng and Hsi Jung). All of these works convey some modicum of sincerity, and they promised to stand as inspiring models for the writers of the People's Republic.

But whatever else went into the writing of the early 1950's, inspiration was not a conspicuous element. The very fact of overwhelming political victory had made the writers' task more difficult. Gone was the bad old system whose landlords and money-lenders, warlords and bureaucrats offered gleaming targets for passion or satire; and gone also was the easy dramatic *dénouement* by the act of liberation itself. The black villainy of the landlords of the old land-reform stories was now replaced by tones of grey as conservative peasants resisted the spread of co-operatives. The best stories, such as K'ang Cho's in the volume *Spring Sowing*, *Autumn Reaping*, made splendid propaganda, but they had far less of the quality of life than those of ten years earlier. The Korean war gave promise of new scope for old battle writers, but again the best work of Yang Ch'o and Liu Po-yü showed a falling-off from the level of interpretation of the Japanese war and the civil war which followed it. Only a handful of poets—Ai Ch'ing, Yen Chen—remained individually recognisable. Among the young poets there was evidence of genuine feeling and frequent happy simplicities of style, but such virtues had to be sifted patiently from a great mass of trite verbosity.

The explanation of this sad decline must be sought in the deliberate party policy of eliminating the independent status of intellectuals. The writer whose prestige did not result wholly from his party training was a potential menace. Pride of place, in priority of publication as in the

favour of critics, had to be given to the young and more malleable unknown. What in former days was frankly recognised as 'low-level' writing of mass appeal was now preferred above anything which bore the stamp of an individual personality. But in addition to such by-passing of the more talented writer, positive attacks were launched on his 'bourgeois mentality.' The process began, of course, well before 1949, with the 'down to the countryside' movement. Writers were instructed to 'make themselves one with the masses' (Mao's phrase), *i.e.* to submerge their individual personalities, by participating in labour either directly or through administrative or propaganda work. The movement was intensified in the 50's with a new intake of established writers. After enforced self-criticism and Marxist indoctrination, the road to acceptance in the new society was marked out via the fields, the factory bench, or the Korean front. Even so, traces of bourgeois idealism persisted and were ruthlessly eradicated in campaigns of which the most publicised was that which declared Hu Feng and some of his friends to be enemies of the people. It goes without saying that the writer who had suffered an attack of this kind had little hope of publishing any future work, whilst his past writings would disappear from circulation, even from the library shelf.

THROUGHOUT the years of these campaigns against bourgeois idealism an effective unofficial censorship was imposed by timid editors and the managers of publishing houses, each of which in its particular field has practically a monopoly. Through this mesh of control only the most ideologically secure of new works could penetrate—poems directly glorifying the achievements of industrialisation, biographies of model workers and Korean war heroes. The *genre* of the one-act play grew in popularity. It lent itself to the exposition of such minor problems of life in the new society as could quickly be solved by the correct application of the 'general line.' Thus, in the play *Saturday Afternoon at the Mill* (Ts'ui Teh-chih, 1955), a spinning-mill team-leader takes an action which will enhance his team's chances of victory in an emulation drive, but only at the expense of a rival team. His refusal to accept the criticism of a girl member of his team endangers the affection which is growing between the two, until at last he is brought to appreciate the need for solidarity throughout the whole mill and (a a good Communist should) to acknowledge hi error. The dramatic conflict provided by such situation can be neatly resolved within the scop of the one-act play; and even the most bigote party zealot could hardly find subversive element in its ideology.

In the face of such circumstances and such generally undistinguished level of literary pro duction, the established writers tended to with draw. It would be too much to speak in terms o a 'conspiracy of silence'; rather, some of the best known of writers were effectively immobilised b the commitments with which they were loaded Kuo Mo-jo, the President of the Writers' Union the Minister of Culture Mao Tun, Miss Ting Lin and others were side-tracked in this way fro their own creative concerns. Often they contente themselves with the re-issue, after suitable re vision, of work done in the 30's. This, after al was less uncomfortable than risking the kind o criticism that Hu Feng had suffered.

The new pattern of criticism was indeed a grav threat to the writer. Once his work had bee characterised as out of line, the pack were upo him. Within the space of a few weeks a doze magazines and the literary supplements of a sco of newspapers would carry denunciations remark able in the uniformity of their virulence. Suc campaigns have been waged not only in the fie of new creative writing, but in the most rarefie realms of literary scholarship. In the name 'revaluation of the national literary heritage' leading poet and scholar, Yü P'ing-po, w attacked, in 1954, in articles signed by almost eve important name in the world of letters. This *cau célèbre* of the *Dream of the Red Chamber* worth examining in some detail as an instance present retrogression in an important cultur sphere.

The *Dream of the Red Chamber* (Hung l meng) is the masterpiece of the tradition Chinese art of fiction. It is a novel of great leng and wide range, subtle in construction and e quisite in style. Against the background of t decline from wealth and power of an aristocra family comprising, masters and servants, so hundreds of persons, the principal scenes a played out by a group of young people. At t centre of all are the brilliant but perverse you scion of the line, Chia Pao-yü, and his t

ousins, Black Jade whom he loves and Gold harm whom he is constrained to marry. The uthor's method is eclectic, its elements including he dramatic and the panoramic, close realism and llegory, satire and mysticism.

Of such breadth and depth is this great work hat the study of it has developed into a separate ranch of criticism, which has its own fascinaing history. Three distinct phases are to be diserned. The scholars of the first, pre-revolutionary hase have been dismissed as 'riddle-mongers.' tarting from the premise that no Chinese of the ighteenth century could possibly have devoted ears of time and immense resources of thought nd skill to the production of a mere romance, he early critics zealously sought for the hidden neaning of the book. The boy Chia Pao-yü was aid to 'shadow' the first Manchu Emperor; Black ade represented this monarch's ill-fated consort. broader interpretation equated the 'red' of the itle with the meaning ('vermilion') of the surname f the native dynastic house, the Ming, which uccumbed to the Manchus. The girls of the story hen represented Chinese patriots, the boys their Manchu overlords. Synonyms, homonyms, puns nd allusions, 'riddle-characters'—all the paraphernalia of traditional literary games were pressed into service to support such interpretaions.

Phase two of 'Red Chamber criticism' began in 921 when Hu Shih put forward the claims of cientific scholarship. It is hard to credit, now, he exception that was taken to his first step—which was to identify the author. A study of the ife of this man, Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in, led inevitably o the conclusion that the novel was not just partly ut primarily autobiographical in nature. The iscovery soon sent stocks tumbling in the market or hidden meanings and made possible the beginnings of genuine appreciation of a masterpiece of ealism. The work of Hu Shih was carried forward with great strides by Yü P'ing-po and then, n 1953, by the appearance of a book (one-third he length of the novel itself) by a younger scholar, Chou Ju-ch'ang. At a time when many men of etters had already embraced Marxism, Hu Shih had lent support to the cause of liberalism in China by the medium of the Democratic League; Chou Ju-ch'ang was obliged therefore to abuse his mentor for subjectivism, inaccuracy, and for the use of inadequate evidence in support of wild hypotheses. Nevertheless, the new evidence presented in his book filled out in remarkable fashion the sketch Hu Shih had drawn of a man of breeding and culture, looking back from a lonely and poverty-stricken middle age to a youth cushioned by affection and pampered by opulence.

IT was no doubt the outspokenness of Chou Ju-ch'ang's denunciation of Hu Shih, coupled with a modicum of lip-service to the 'social significance' of the *Dream*, that saved him from becoming chief whipping-boy of the new and third phase of criticism. The post was reserved instead for the older scholar Yü P'ing-po, who published new findings in 1954. A critique by Li Hsi-fan was the signal for a massed broadside against Yü's bourgeois misinterpretation of 'the facts.' For six months, national and provincial dailies outshouted the literary monthlies in righteous indignation over this man who, inspired by the arch-reactionary Hu Shih, had belittled a masterpiece of popular tradition. A novel that had been stigmatised as the product of individual genius, we were now informed, was in fact nothing less than the expression of profound mass resentment of the feudal Manchu oppressors. The epithet 'enigmatic' had been used by Yü to conceal the failure which inevitably waits on bourgeois idealist processes of research. The conflict he discerned in the novel, between nostalgia for past glories and renunciation of the world and its pleasures, is not to be found there. On the contrary, we are assured that 'the prime function of the *Dream* is to induce the reader to affirm the reality of life, to stimulate him in his striving for love and happiness; certain pessimistic or negative tendencies which the author may occasionally reveal are of quite secondary importance.'

From the mass of outpourings of phase three we learn nothing else. But perhaps, now that the storm is spent, here and there a scholar may be feeling his way towards a formula which will enable him to publish under a Marxist trade-name the kind of scientific study which was just becoming possible when phase two came so abruptly to its end. Perhaps Chou Ju-ch'ang is indeed following the advice with which Li Hsi-fan concludes his critique, and rewriting from start to finish his three-hundred-thousand-word study.

TO return to the arena of creative writing: the influence of the political and cultural thaw in the USSR reinforced a growing awareness in China of the decline in standards. The outcome was a party blessing on liberalisation, conveyed by Mao's famous address on the text 'let the hundred flowers blossom together, let the hundred schools contend.' Attacks on petty-bourgeois ideology yielded ground to a reaffirmation of some of the values of the old intellectuals. Works directly functioning as propaganda for short-term policy, it was now recognised, had hindered that raising of literary standards which had once been desired. The pendulum was to be allowed to swing away from the extreme of formulistic writing, to move back (though not too far) in the direction of that expression of individual style which had so recently been ostracised. There was no overt recognition that the more thinking section of the reading public had their own rights and requirements; but that was a possible interpretation of the new line, and that was the interpretation that was drawn.

The response of writers to the new dispensation was immediate, electric, and heartening. A new kind of 'socialist realism' appeared in the *People's Literature* and kindred organs, a genuine realism which posed real problems and refrained from wishful thinking in their solution. Such a story as Wang Meng's *The Young Newcomer to the Organisation Section* (autumn 1956) would have been unthinkable a year previously. A school-teacher, young and eager to join in the service of his adored party, undertakes political work in a factory. The story traces the stages of his disillusionment in the face of tolerated inefficiency in the management, of cynicism and hypocrisy in the party ranks, of crusted dogmatism in the leadership. The theme of another story, *Beauty*, by Feng Ts'un (summer 1957), is romantic love, the Cinderella of the lean years. The action places the responsibility for the dilemma of its lovers fairly and squarely on the party, and falls little short of an accusation of inhumanity.

In poetry, again, there appeared work which in earlier years would have been castigated as 'escapist.' Nature poetry no longer had to masquerade as idylls of peasant life; even nostalgia made the return from its long exile. The purely personal found expression, with an irreducible minimum of public relevance, as in these verses by Fang Ping:

At my temples, against the black
I have found one grey hair,
The first faded petal,
The first frost on the leaf.

It seems a warning: Fang Ping!
What have you done for your country?
Seize tight the rein in your hands,
Hold back this wild horse, time!

The months and years like waves
Surging away behind me
And surging up to meet me,
Never for a second pausing.

The very vocabulary and texture of the poets' work broke free from the restraints imposed by the need for immediate intelligibility.

As is now well known, the unforeseen outburst of unease forced a rapid retreat from the liberalising position. The party's counter-plan was soon under way in the form of the 'anti-Rightist' movement. It is still in progress. The removal of Ting Ling from her pre-eminence of twenty years and more is only the most dramatic of its features. Its lesson is clear: the writers of Mao's China must re-learn the subtlety of past ages if their voice is to be heard through the cotton-wool wrapping of safe mediocrity.

RECTIFICATION OF ERROR AND THE ERROR OF RECTIFICATION

Theodore Hsi-en Chen

THE Chinese Communists have always been distrustful of the intellectuals brought up in the old 'bourgeois society,' believing that the interests of the proletarian revolution can be best served by a 'proletarian intelligentsia,' and since they came to power in 1949, they have adopted various measures to produce a 'new-type intelligentsia' drawn from the working or peasant class and firmly grounded in proletarian ideology. This, however, is a very slow process, and the intelligentsia produced by the new schools is entirely inadequate not only in number but also because their short-term courses of study could not provide anything more than the most rudimentary training. For the higher positions which require long training, the Communists still have no choice but to rely on the service of the older intellectuals.

While practical necessity compelled the Communists to try to win over and absorb the intellectuals, ideological considerations dictated 'reform' and 'remoulding' before they could be of real service to the proletarian revolution, and this dual policy has always been explicitly expressed.

'Reform' meant that the intellectuals must submit to intensive political indoctrination to make them faithful followers of Marxism-Leninism and the Communist Party. It meant that they must make a clean break with their past, not only in political ideology and general outlook, but in their academic pursuits too. They must give up the 'bourgeois knowledge' and theories they had learned either in 'pre-liberation' China or in Western countries. They were to turn from the Soviet Union.'

The policy of reforming the intellectuals paralysed intellectual life in China. Scholars rushed to hurried translations of Soviet books and quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and these were bandied about in the classroom, in forums, in speeches, and in published articles.

In the social sciences the effects were stultifying. The entire field of study was reduced to a superficial exposition of Marxism-Leninism and an uncritical recapitulation of the views expressed by leading Chinese Communists and Soviet theoreticians. History, sociology, and economics were re-written, while studies to which many years of patient scholarly effort had been devoted were abandoned. Frustration and restlessness were widespread but unexpressed.

SUCH was the general situation that confronted the Chinese Communists in 1956 and made them realise the need of some change of policy, or at least a change of tactics, in dealing with the intellectuals; if their ambitious economic programmes, which required the active service of all educated people and the whole-hearted support of all the higher intellectuals in the country, were to make headway, some way had to be found to overcome the negative attitude of the intellectuals and to enlist their services. Discussion of the problem began in the latter part of 1956 and culminated in a special conference of Communist Party representatives from all over the country convened by the Central Committee in January, 1957, for the express purpose of examining 'the question of intellectuals.' The highlight of the conference was a speech by Premier Chou En-lai, officially stating that the Communists were now ready to adopt new measures to remove the prevalent dissatisfaction of the intellectuals and to induce them to identify themselves with the new state.

Among China's higher intellectuals, he said, some forty per cent could be considered as supporters of the government and another forty per cent 'generally complete the tasks assigned to them, but are not actively politically.' 'Of the rest,' he continued, 'over ten per cent are backward intellectuals who lack political consciousness and ideologically oppose socialism, while less than 10 per cent are counter-revolutionaries

or some other bad elements.' Chou's figures are probably too optimistic, but even if they were accurate, the Communists could count on the loyal service of only forty per cent of China's all-too-few intellectuals.

Chou admitted that the situation was a result of 'certain irrational features in our present employment and treatment of intellectuals,' and promised a number of remedial measures. Material inducements were offered to the intellectuals: better housing conditions, higher salaries, more equipment, fewer political activities in order to allow more time for scholarly pursuits. On their side, Communists were to correct their officious and disdainful attitudes in dealing with the intellectuals and to show more confidence in them. He wanted a twelve-year plan by which China would try to keep abreast of the most advanced developments in science and other fields of knowledge.

The intellectuals, however, had been dissatisfied not with material conditions only. They had been irritated by the 'thought reform' and by the rigid regimentation of all intellectual activities. They had not been permitted to explore any areas of thought and knowledge beyond the confines of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet learning. It was to relieve this sense of frustration that the Communist leaders advanced as their slogan the classical expression 'Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools contend.' The term 'hundred schools' had been used to describe the schools of thought which sprang up in what was called the 'classical age of China' from about the sixth century to the third century B.C., a most creative period in Chinese thought and literature. The phrase recalls a heritage which Chinese intellectuals are proud to claim.

The policy was announced for the first time when Mao Tse-tung addressed the Supreme State Conference on 2 May, 1956. The text of Mao's address was not published, but a week later Ch'ien Chun-jui, deputy director of the Second Office of the State Council, referring to Mao's speech, said:

> To raise the level of our science and technology, we must, in matters of scholarship, thoroughly carry out the policy of free discussion and 'letting a hundred schools contend.' We not only must learn the advanced scientific techniques of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies; we must also learn the advanced scientific techniques of the capitalist countries, especially those of the United States, Britain, and France. . . .Of course, the Soviet Union is our big brother and we must first of all learn from the Soviet Union. This must be firm and not open to question.[1]

A fuller explanation of the new policy was made by Lu Ting-yi, Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a fortnight later. He hailed the new policy as the harbinger of a 'luxuriant development of literature, art, and science' and an opportunity for 'freedom of independent thinking, freedom of debate, freedom of creative work, freedom to criticise, to express and maintain one's own views,' but added that the so-called freedom of the capitalist countries would not be permitted. It would be unthinkable, he said, to grant any freedom to counter-revolutionaries and 'enemies of the people.' The new freedom would be granted only to 'the people,' and to those who supported socialism and loved the fatherland.

It was clear that the new policy meant no change in goals, but merely a change in the methods of attaining them. It was these, and not the goals themselves, that intellectuals were now permitted to discuss.

THE declaration of the new policy did not arouse any great enthusiasm among the intellectuals. They were not sure how much freedom was really being granted and they knew from experience that it was wiser to play safe. No one attempted any 'blossoming' or 'contending'. The Communists took pains to reassure them and invited them to attend forums to express their views. Instead they asked questions. What was the scope of permissible 'contending'? Did one have to belong to a 'school' in order to have the freedom to 'contend?' Was Marxism-Leninism to be treated as one of the contending schools or was it the school above all contending schools? Should the purpose of 'contending' always be to expose the inadequacies of a

[1] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, (Peking: *People's Daily*), 11 May, 195

schools of thought other than Marxism-Leninism? Would it be permissible to criticise Marxism-Leninism? What were the subjects which were not open to discussion?

Such questions marked the wary reactions in 1956. Even then, some of the die-hard elements of the Communist Party were objecting to the policy of relaxation and cautioning against the infiltration of dangerous anti-socialist ideas in the guise of the contending schools. This made the intellectuals even more hesitant to respond to the call for service. Meanwhile, their restlessness had spread to students, among whom disturbances and strikes broke out.

It was at this juncture that Mao Tse-tung stepped into the picture to throw his weight on the side of some degree of liberalisation. In his famous speech on 'contradictions among the people' on 27 February, 1957, he reaffirmed the hundred flowers policy; he frankly admitted that tensions—'contradictions'—existed among the people but he declared that these must be resolved by patient methods of 'education and persuasion' rather by the crude methods of suppression and coercion. While counter-revolutionary elements must be wiped out without mercy, for the 'people' and those who were not opposed to the proletarian-socialist revolution, he advocated the use of 'democratic methods of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education.' As to the intellectuals, 'they must continue to remould themselves. . . . (and) acquire a proletarian, Communist world outlook,' but this could be accomplished only by 'methods of discussion, criticism, and reasoning.'[2]

Even after Mao's speech, the intellectuals were still sceptical, still afraid of reprisals if they should really accept the invitation to discuss and criticise freely. To assuage such fears, the Communists organised more forums to encourage 'free discussion'; the Communist Party declared that it was eager to hear the criticisms of non-Communists for the benefit of its 'rectification campaign,' and gradually, the intellectuals were emboldened to express what had lain hidden in their minds and hearts for seven years.

[2] Mao's speech was published in the *Jen Min Jih Pao* on 19 June, 1957. The English translation was published by the *New York Times*, 19 June, 1957; it also appears in the supplement to *People's China*, 1 July, 1957.

The full story of the short but glorious month of resplendent 'blossoming' in May-June of 1957 cannot be told here. The intellectuals hurled bold and incisive criticisms against the Communist Party. The Communists had asked the intellectuals to criticise the methods of Communist leadership so that they might be able to rectify their mistakes and thereby exercise their leadership more effectively. To their great consternation, the intellectuals did not confine themselves to a discussion of the methods. Outspoken critics attacked the Communist Party and repudiated its leadership. They demanded a relaxation of Communist control. They questioned the goals of the socialist revolution. After one month of 'blossoming' and 'contending,' the Communists decided that things had gone too far. They launched their counter-attack against what they now called the 'Rightists.'

To understand the frustrations revealed in the short 'blossoming' season and the anti-Rightist campaign that followed, we may leave aside the criticisms directed against the political system and the Communist monopoly of state power, and summarise the non-political criticisms of the intellectuals.

ONE of the most frequent complaints of the intellectuals was that the Communist cadres treated them with disdain. Scholars had been denied the respect they had traditionally enjoyed in Chinese society. The cadres ordered the intellectuals around and assigned to them routine clerical tasks which left little time for their professional activities. In making their complaints, a number of intellectuals used the classical expression that a scholar would rather accept death than humiliation. In the colleges and universities, in government offices and in industry, experienced and highly qualified intellectuals who did not belong to the Communist Party had to take orders from uneducated or less experienced young men who were members of the Communist Party. In their professional work, even in matters of scientific findings and technological improvements, intellectuals were constantly being hampered or over-ruled by cadres whose thinking was dominated by Marxist dogmas and clichés and who maintained that politics must be the guiding consideration in all matters.

The intellectuals were extremely critical of the system of Party commissioners in schools and colleges. In every educational institution supreme authority was vested in the Party commissioners, who represented the 'leadership of the Communist Party' and saw to it that every phase of the educational programme conformed with Party directives. They made the decisions in regard to faculty appointments and promotions as well as student admission and graduation. They chose the students or faculty members who were to be given opportunities for further study at home or abroad. Since they were the symbol of 'Party leadership' they were beyond criticism. To question any of their actions was to invite the charge of insubordination or opposition to the leadership of the Communist Party.

A number of intellectuals boldly asserted that Marxism-Leninism could not be the unerring guide for China's development. They criticised the doctrinairism which applied its dogmas without painstaking study of the actual conditions in China. A professor of history went even further. The Marx-Engels interpretation of the social sciences, he said, was stuck at the level it had reached on the death of Engels in 1895, and consequently the Marxist school failed to develop any new understanding of human history or new theories of the social sciences after 1895. From this analysis the intrepid professor concluded that Marxism could not be accepted as the last word in the social sciences.[3]

Economists urged more attention to the study of China's economic problems, and elaborated the dangers of following dogmas divorced from the actual conditions in China. Historians pleaded for a broader view of history. Even after the proclamation of the hundred flowers policy, historical research was limited to five topics designated by the Party leadership, and all of them concerned the demarcation of historical periods according to the Marxist point of view.[4]

Social scientists argued that there was much in the social sciences of the capitalist countries that was worth careful study. They lamented that the exclusive exaltation of Marxism-Leninism in recent years had practically killed the social sciences, and that many social scientists had been forced to abandon their fields of specialisation.[5] The courses they had taught had been ruled out of the curriculum because they were not compatible with the new ideology or not offered by the Soviet universities. One of them reported that there were few scholars remaining in the fields of sociology, political science, and law, and that no scholar was now engaged in research on population problems, social thought, or other important topics of sociological significance. He pleaded for a restoration of the social sciences to the college curriculum and for a study of the 'advanced thought' of capitalist countries in sociology, politics, international relations, international law, and other disciplines. Others pointed out the fallacy of treating the contemporary policies and decrees of the government as objective laws and of mistaking the interpretation and exposition of government policies for social science study. At the same time, they proposed that social scientists should be given the opportunity of study and research on current problems and of making recommendations to the government to guide its policy-making.

IN his February, 1957 speech, Mao Tse-tung had made a distinction between 'fragrant flowers' and 'poisonous weeds.' Fragrant flowers were ideas put forth to further the cause of the proletarian-socialist revolution, but ideas that obstructed the progress of socialism and endangered the leadership of the Communist Party must be recognised as poisonous weeds, to be uprooted and destroyed as soon as detected. Now the critics who had made scathing attacks on the Communist régime were denounced as Rightists spreading poisonous weeds, and a nation-wide campaign was launched against them.

The authorities realised that the attitude of Party members and cadres toward intellectuals had alienated them and caused deep resentment, and on this they were prepared to make some concessions; still anxious to enlist the services of the intellectuals, they were ready to accord better

[3] Statement of Lei Hai-tsung in *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 22 April, 1957.

[4] Article by Chien Po-tsan in *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 20 April, 1957.

[5] Examples of such views of social scientists may be found in forum reports published by the *Jen Min Jih Pao* on 21 and 22 April, 1957.

reatment so long as they were assured that the ntellectuals would support the programme of ne Party and state. But to criticisms of the state ower and the Party's supremacy they did not ntend to make any concessions. They would ot relax their control of education, because the eadership of the Communist Party was essential o all phases of the revolution, and education was ertainly one of its major phases.

The criticism of Marxism-Leninism as unsuitble for China was, of course, unacceptable to ne Communists. They were especially incensed ver the statement that the Marxist school had eveloped no new ideas since the death of Engels. hey had always glorified Lenin as the man who reatively adapted Marxism to the age of imperilism and they hailed the October revolution in Russia as the turning point in modern history. hey had learned Marxism from Lenin and other oviet leaders and they believed that a large art of the Marxism-Leninism they embraced onsisted in the new developments and new nterpretations of the twentieth century.

Finally, the Communists declared themselves nalterably opposed to any attempt to restore he 'capitalist social sciences'; they felt that it as necessary to meet this challenge directly. mong the Rightists whom the Communists et out to chastise were some of the most promnent social scientists of China. The Communists harged that the Rightists were trying to overhrow socialism and to re-establish the capitalist ystem. Those who urged the study of capitalist ocial sciences were attacked as Rightists ngaged in political intrigue, for their proposal o restore the capitalist social sciences was really n attempt to revive the capitalist ideology. heir suggestion of entrusting the social scientists ith research on social problems to serve as a asis of government policy was considered xtremely dangerous because state policy would hen be guided by reactionaries wedded to the apitalist ideology.

Communist and pro-Communist writers took ains to point out that capitalist social sciences ere neither objective nor scientific. They rgued that the social sciences could not escape heir 'party character' and their 'class character.' ust as the capitalist social sciences served the nterests of the capitalist class, so the proletarian ocial sciences must serve the proletarian class. No interpretation of human affairs could be considered valid except from the standpoint of the class struggle. Capitalist social sciences could not be scientific because they ignored the laws of social development so clearly expounded in Marxism.

WHAT so far have been the net results of the 'hundred-flowers hundred-schools' policy? China's intellectuals have made a definite gain in the material conditions of work and living. They are not required to undertake so many political tasks and they are now able to devote more time to their professional activities.

The scientists have been given expanded laboratory and library facilities. They have access to scientific journals and equipment from the capitalist countries. They must accept the leadership of the Communist Party, of course, but they have been partially freed from the constant interference of uninformed cadres in purely technical matters.

The social scientists, on the other hand, now enjoy less rather than more freedom. The Communists are today even more explicit in their insistence that the social sciences must be purged of their bourgeois character, and a special drive has been launched to root out the Rightists among the social scientists. The works of Fei Hsiao-túng, Ch'en Ta, Wu Ching-ch'ao, and others have been denounced as anti-scientific and reactionary. In a conference to oppose the Rightists in philosophy and the social sciences, Kuo Mo-jo, president of the Academy of Sciences, stated that there were four major tasks confronting the intellectuals: the defence of Marxism-Leninism, unwavering support of the Chinese Communist Party, the advancement of learning, and the thought reform of intellectuals, 'especially the philosophers and the social scientists.'

The intellectuals must still submit to thought reform. They must continue to provide evidence that they have been cleansed of all unproletarian ideologies and that they accept and support the programme of the Communist Party. As far as the freedom of departing from the prescribed limits of Marxism-Leninism is concerned, there is in some ways even less than before, because the anti-Rightist campaign has killed any hope of such freedom.

The Past Made to Measure

HISTORY UNDER CHAIRMAN MAO

Joseph R. Levenson

THERE is a theory abroad—partly sentimental (China is 'forever China,' the cliché has it) and partly sceptical of a dynamic potential in Chinese society—that the Chinese Communist is not really a new man. Part of a dominant bureaucracy in a centralised state committed to public works, and with a set of Classics to swear by, he plays the same rôle, allegedly, that Confucianists played for centuries. One might seem to support this by adducing the dedication of Confucianists and Communists alike to the study of history. But the central concern of Marxist historical thinking, of course, is with lineal development through stages, while Confucian thinking was typically concerned not with process but permanence, with illustration of the fixed ideals of the Confucian moral universe. The Communist idea of progress is both a break with conventional Confucian conceptions and a means of explaining the break.

In other words, to put it flatly, traditional Chinese civilisation has not been renewed in modern times but unraveled; the intelligentsia, though rejecting its Confucian heritage, has naturally denied any inference that Chinese history is running dry or has simply been diverted into the western stream; and many have, therefore, developed a taste for Communist views on history which, without implying an impossible loyalty to outmoded systems, still provide for continuity with the Chinese past, and for development parallel to western history, not mere static inferiority. Communist historical premises are developmental. It is not the Communist dictatorship which established these premises in China, but the particular appeal of the premises in China which helped to establish the dictatorship.

That is why periodisation on universal Marxist lines seems the favourite task of Communist historians today. In monographs, in the three main periodicals (Peking monthlies) devoted to problems of teaching history, and in the scholarly journals, of which *Li-shih yen-chiu* (*Historical Research*) is by far the most important, problems of setting the limits of primitive, slave, feudal, and capitalist periods predominate. In December, 1956, a Peking National University seminar examined a new book by Shang Yueh, *Essentials of Chinese History*. The discussion centred on various views on the transition from slave to feudal society and from feudal to capitalist. That these topics should be singled out in discussing a book of that title shows what such a group considers to be the stuff of Chinese history.

Paradoxically, this passion for equating Chinese history with the West's by periodisation, and thus denying to China any highly individual character, is combined with the insistence that all the transitions are essentially Chinese phenomena. These historians would not have us suppose that foreign conquest in the second millenium B.C. ushered in the slave society of the Shang era, nor that Chou conquerors brought in a feudalism not potentially present in Shang. Most important, it must not be thought that capitalism depended on the incursions of the modern West. The 'seeds of capitalism' question is raked over and over again with constant quoting of Mao's ruling (in *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, 1939) that indigenous capitalism began to grow before the Opium War, that a Chinese capitalism would still have emerged had there been no influence of foreign capitalism. Late Ming—early Ch'ing (16th—19th centuries) weaving, mining, and shipbuilding are mentioned as characteristic, according to Marx, of burgeoning capitalism.

Porcelain-making and other handicrafts, overseas trade, urbanisation, division of labour, etc. come frequently under review, and early Ch'ing intellectuals of relatively unorthodox views, like Yen Yuan, Li Kung, and the textual critics of the 'Han Learning,' are said to reflect the rise of new proto-capitalist social forces. Chinese history *on its own* develops in a way not just its own, that

s to say, Chinese communist historians first look or parallels to Western historical phenomena feudal, capitalist, etc.), and having found (or nvented) them, go on to prove that they are ssentially indigenous to China. This is the basic Communist historical statement, with equal veight on subject and predicate, which together stablish the equivalence of China and Europe.

CONTROVERSY can and does take place on the issue of whether slave society was Shang only, or Shang and Hsia before it (Hsia, interestingly enough, being the Confucian-traditional 'first dynasty,' though not yet identified archæological), or Shang and its successor, Western Chou, or even on through Eastern Chou and Ch'in and Han. Apparently it is not essential to agree even with the great Fan Wen-lan or Kuo Mo-jo, challenged specifically by individuals and by the History Department of Sun Yat-sen University, that slave society began or ended just here or there. Chien Po-tsan, a most eminent Communist historian, grants that there may be a question as to when this or that historical stage existed; a critic takes him at his word, and rejects his findings of a slave basis for Han agriculture. But when Chien goes on to say that there can be no question of *whether* a stage existed, no one writing under Communist auspices seems to demur. 'Slave society is a stage which human society must pass through' (this from a 1957 article on the social character of Western Chou). And in a 1955-6 polemic on Han society, slave or feudal, it was unequivocally emphasised that a slave-feudal sequence, however differently it might be dated, was not itself in dispute.

Parallel Chinese and western histories, with the same dynamic principle (though of course with short-run disparities) are an article of faith which the current literature employs but will not argue. Liang Sou-ming, a founder of the Democratic League and long-time theorist of comparative cultures, reaffirmed his non-Marxist beliefs in 1951 and boldly insisted that Chinese history was *sui generis*, classless, not feudal from Han to modern times. After the first wave of denunciation he wrote a *Reply to Some of My Critics*, pointing out that the issues seemed frozen: 'Shen, for instance, after bringing up the topic as to whether old China was a feudal society, started by asserting that it was a feudal society, and continued with such casual phrases as, "it being well known to all" . . . .' Liang had caught the tone exactly. In the many disparaging articles that followed, the attack was entirely *ad hominem*. The closest anyone came to discussing his thesis on feudalism was to call him, on the strength of it, a feudal survival himself.

As late as 1940 the 'Asiatic mode of production' theory, emphasising the bureaucracy as the ruling class, was bruited about in Chinese Communist circles. But this theory, which also denies the feudal character of the bulk of Chinese history (regarded as static rather than in process), appears to be undiscussable today. The nearest thing to a hint about it in the files of the periodical *Li-shih yen-chiu* is in a brief note, in small print, on the Leyden 'Conference of Junior Sinologues,' 1955. Chien Po-tsan, the note says, made a formal refutation of the bureaucratic thesis. Obviously, at an international meeting, outside the hot-house, one may have to expose one's feudal tenet to others. But home in China—only a single flower may grow.

'Feudalism' is the only permitted social label for the long period stretching from ancient down to modern times—Mao says some three thousand years, directly from Chou and Ch'in. And yet, while it is a matter of strict discipline to invoke the term, its definition is remarkably loose. It must be the connotation of process (with the European parallel) which the Communists seek in the term, for feudalism is qualified so broadly, with stages within the stage, that it hardly serves any analytic purpose at all. It conveys almost nothing of specific social character.

The characterisation, 'feudal,' for Mao's three thousand years, does not imply the homogeneity that one might expect. Mao may say 'feudal from Chou and Ch'in,' and others like Yang P'ei-chih repeat it, but only the adjective—*not* the actual Communist social description—links these eras, Chou and Ch'in, together. For the famous 'first Emperor' of Ch'in, in 221 B.C., consolidated the state which (in other hands) gave such novel scope to Confucian bureaucracy. Mao knows it, others know it, they actually describe these eras as vastly different, and only an *a priori* assumption makes them paste the feudal label over the cracks.

Everything is feudal for a long time, but for Mao and his epigoni, the pre-Ch'in feudal

period is aristocratic-autonomous, and the post-Ch'in feudal period is autocratic-centralised. Somewhere under this verbiage there is a clear sense of essential transformation. 'From the time that Ch'in Shih Huang united China, it was a unified feudal state' (Fan Wen-lan). And what had 'Lord Shang' accomplished, the famous minister of the Ch'in state in the fourth century B.C., before Ch'in won the Empire? He had 'broken the economic influence of the hereditary ruling class' (Yang Kuan); he represented a 'stage in the establishment of the *chün-hsien* system' (Hou Wai-lu), a stage, that is, of rationalised local government by centrally appointed officials, no longer by regional magnates. Fan Wen-lan describes Wu-ti, the great Han autocrat who built on the achievements of Ch'in, in terms that would seem to exhaust the vocabulary of qualitative change—he unifies the country, reduces the feudal lords, fixes the *chün-hsien* administrative system, organises vast public works, standardises weights and measures, the script and the system of laws. And yet all this centralisation, hardly feudal in implication if the term means anything at all, still adds up to 'feudalism.' For here Fan explicitly disavows analogy with the West. In Europe, it is early capitalism that he sees leading to centralised monarchies. But with the strongest rose-coloured glass he can hardly discern a Chinese capitalism this side of eighteen centuries, so the Ch'in-Han Empire must be feudal, 'representing the landlord-class.' Or—the reason why it is feudal is that, being feudal, it stands for the landed interest, which (everything else aside) makes it qualify as feudal. Or, once more—if it is pre-capitalist and post-slave, what else can it be but feudal?

WHEN Communist historians shift their sights to relatively recent times, the air of scientific detachment in their discussions of feudalism tends to be dispelled by the passion of involvement, and 'feudal' becomes an epithet. The short span of history since the Opium War has stages assigned to it, too, by many historians, most of them using the classic text-book topics—Opium War, Taiping Rebellion, Sino-Japanese War, Reform Movement, Boxer Rising, 1911, May Fourth .... —as markers, with appropriate references to foreign aggression, people's movements, feudal survivals, democratic revolutions, old and new style, and the like.

But periodisation on this shrunken modern scall has quite another character from that of the oven all periodisation. It is not assumed, for instance, that there must be western counterparts to th modern Chinese sub-stages. And similarly, whil in the grand design both China and the Wes are allotted an epoch of capitalism, the 'last stag of capitalism,' or imperialism, is the West's alone with China no more than a victim. Though ther is considerable talk of rising bourgeoisie an nascent proletariat, Communist historians wrin little proof of parallel development from moder times.

Yet, despite this different approach to moder history, which is an understandably special an sensitive area, the interest of historians is th same. With feudalism a Chinese blemish rathe than a ubiquitous type of society, with imperia lism a western crime rather than a universal stage one can still concoct out of these ingredients (an a Marxist flair) a sense of China's equivalenc with the West.

What was it in modern history that had pu Chinese confidence in jeopardy? Clearly, th crisis grew out of the subjugation of the literati" China, which was political and economic in th beginning and came to be intellectual as well Intransigent traditionalism could not survive, an no eclectic apologetics could mask the Confucia subjection to foreign standards of value. Wher new ideas had once had to face tests of compati bility with received tradition, now Chinese tradi tion faced tests of compatibility with ideas tha were independently persuasive.

But the tradition was Confucian—or, in th Communist lexicon, feudal. One way out of th impasse for a Chinese intellectual might be to cu himself away from the doomed tradition b calling it a class, and not a national phenomenon and calling the nation a 'people's China,' quit uncommitted to the feudal culture of landlords thus remaining emotionally uninvolved in it debacle. So much for one side of the western Confucian imbalance.

Yet the other side, carrying the preponderanc of western intellectual influence, had to be righted In itself, the simple abandoning of Confucianism by an anti-feudal 'people' could never restore th equilibrium required for self-respect. There was however, a still point in the centre. For the West instead of being left in solitary eminence, could b

scored off as imperialist, and the last century of Chinese history, with all its invasions and revolutions, could be considered dialectically.

Anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, between a rejected Confucian China and a resisted modern West, the Communists find themselves in synthesis. Historically, the iconoclastic May Fourth movement of 1919 remains a great tradition, but one hears it said that its revolutionary thought must be distinguished from its reactionary thought, such as Hu Shih's and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei's ideas—ideas, that is, of liberal intellectuals, whose anti-traditional critiques (acceptable enough in themselves, perhaps, to their former colleagues in the movement) might be represented as a mere surrender to western 'cultural aggression,' the corollary of imperialism in the Communist view of the world. Anti-feudalism is not enough. One has to round it out with an anti-imperialist complement.

And in fact, the red thread running through the whole Communist version of modern history is the charge that feudal China and foreign imperialism inevitably come together, each a support for the other against the Chinese people rising up against both of them. These 'twin enemies' ride with all the Communist historians, who write of the 1860's, 'Foreign capitalism and the feudal landlord power, which was represented by Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-t'ang, joined forces to press down the Chinese people'; or of the 1900's, 'The Ch'ing government and imperialism had a tight alliance; imperialism and feudalism heavily oppressed the Chinese people,' and, 'The abortiveness of the anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism of 1911 marked the area of the revolution's failure.' These simplifications from run-of-the-mill historians can be easily matched in the modern studies of Fan Wen-lan or Hua Kang. They permeate all the introductions to the new, rich, generally admirable multi-volume collections of modern source materials—on the Opium War, Taiping and Nien and Moslem rebellions, French and Japanese wars, Reform Movement, Boxers, revolution of 1911, with the westernisation movement, Peiyang warlords, and May Fourth still to come. (Most of them have been reviewed in detail in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, XVII, I, November, 1957).

THUS, social protest and patriotism belong together, residing in the people, for the feudal oppressors are at first inept and then reluctant in the fight against foreign pressures. When the imperialists outrage Chinese nationalism, and the feudalists connive at the outrage, their common foe, the people, stands for absolute morality. Under the spell of this conception, Communist historians often depart from Marxist historical relativism. That is, while there is plenty of Communist emphasis on the historical limitations of the Taipings (allegations, for instance, of internal corruption and eventual 'separation from the masses,' all for the lack of a proletariat), there is also a vast, less technical literature, where the Taipings figure as 'our side.' The same holds true for Li Tzu-ch'eng (the 'bandit Li' of the older accounts of the fall of Ming) and other leaders of anti-dynastic risings.

This variant of Communist historical insight, wherein the people is seen as eternally poised against the anti-people, brings certain motifs into prominence. Feudal China is literati-China, or the China of literary expression, while people's China is the China of material culture—anyway, the theme of material cultural history is highly proper for the new intelligentsia. For the latter, whom the death of Confucianism orphaned, seeks another line of ancestry in the non-literati past. Marxist historicism, which likewise softens the Confucian bereavement, also confirms by its very premises the rightness of this object of research. The materialist assumptions of the periodisers accord well with a bias against the former governing classes, the builders of the 'superstructure,' Confucianism. Against the latter's literary emphasis, Communist historians weigh in very heavily with studies of tangible things—of artifacts from the obviously fascinating archæological excavations, of the history of Chinese military weapons, of even something so homely (but clearly not inconsequential) as the use of manure in the Shang period.

It is perhaps this respect for the hard material relics of the historical past which recently permitted a generous tribute to the memory of Wang Kuo-wei. Wang, a great archæologist and epigraphist nostalgically faithful to the Ch'ing imperial house, had drowned himself in despair in 1927, in K'un-ming Lake in the Imperial Palace grounds. He might very easily qualify for the

contemptuous 'feudal' dismissal today. Yet, with only a graceful reference to Wang's 'early death,' and no allusion to his state of mind before it, a Communist critic mourned the loss to the world of scholarship.

If material culture is a congenial theme, as a standing reproof to the 'idealism' which Communists freely diagnose as the literati's defect, natural science has this and more to recommend it. Ancient Chinese inventions or suggestions of the future, like versions of the compass, seismograph, distance-measurement gauge, and armillary sphere, have been proudly emphasised as national achievements. The lore of Chinese medicine is especially combed for the enrichment of western medical science. At an earlier day in the Communist movement, before its victory and identification with all China dictated a certain delicacy in dealing with the Chinese past, Taoism had been excoriated as superstition, as a code of mere escapism (by the Communists' favourite, Lu Hsün, for one). But lately its affinities with proto-science occupy historians, as in the place of Taoist alchemy in metallurgy. This is a people's tradition in the course of construction. For science, so little esteemed in the Confucian official tradition, was 'people's' by default.

INDEED, the particular effect of victory on Communist assessments of the Chinese record is something to ponder. Not only 'people' but certified literati, great names to long generations of Confucianists, are taken into the Communist pantheon, at least for a visit. Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 'Grand Historian' of Han China and the whole great tradition, is praised for realism (a highly legitimising quality in Communist judgments) and given outstanding bibliographical attention; Ssu-ma Kuang of the Sung, once consigned by Communists to the dust-heap of orthodox historians, comes back in 1957 as 'surpassingly great,' one who had the crucial realisation that history is a matter of objective facts. Even K'ang Yu-wei, the 'modern sage' of a reform Confucianism, who as a constitutional monarchist was a radical in the 1890's and then remained a monarchist, like Wang Kuo-wei, until his own death in 1925—even K'ang, assailed by Sun Yat-sen as a reformist diversionary before 1911 and written off as dead by most republicans well before his time, has been forgiven his tie with counter-revolution and accepted (for his Confucian version of social stages) as a 'progressive.' What has happened, perhaps, is that the conclusive and patent collapse of the old order has released its foes from some of the compulsion to attack, to see the famous figures of the past as living spokesmen for a still obstructive Confucian order. With the virtual end of that struggle, and also by virtue of the theory of stages, Ssu-ma Kuang and at least some others of his traditional stature can be relativised, as it were, into their own times and redeemed from absolute censure.

For the near-contemporary scene, not many brands are plucked from the burning like K'ang Yu-wei. The polemical note sounds louder than the broadly theoretical in studies of the Republican era, when Communists are themselves involved in the action or at the very least are struggling to be born. For the more recent non-cooperative non-Communists, the Liang Sou-ming treatment is general. As for earlier figures like the some-time strong man and would-be emperor, Yuan Shih-k'ai, his death in 1916, some years before he could possibly be insufferable to Communists, does him no good. Though no Buddhists, Communists take him to be reincarnated as Chiang K'ai-shek, and it is more than doubtful that the attitude reflected in Ch'en Po-ta's early tribute (1946), *Introducing the Thief of the Nation, Yuan Shih-k'ai*, will ever be superseded.

As a matter of fact, studies of recent history seem remarkably few. There is an official history of the Communist party, and independent ventures into this territory are probably not encouraged. On the subject of the Kuomintang, there is a sporadic literature on the follies of the Nanking government, popular anti-tax battles, and the like, but it is possible that the Communists wish to play down merely anti-Kuomintang muck-raking, such as a reformist Liberal might undertake. Turning from domestic opponents to foreign, Communist historians seem more interested in blackening the United States than Japan or Great Britain, and they reach into the past for any likely ammunition. The editors of the Opium War source materials collection, while forced by the nature of the documents to give Britain its lion's share of opprobrium, insist that America had a hand in this aggression. The same point is made in the sister publication on the Sino-Japanese war. A book that appeared last year entitled, *Battles*

the Masses Before the Revolution of 1911, dealing with post-Boxer 'people's patriotic struggles' while 'the Ch'ing government sells the nation'), dwells lovingly on the 'anti-American patriotic movement,' the boycott of 1905. And the ideas of Hu Shih, indicted as a reactionary idealist in his approach to world history, are traced back to William James, 'creator of American imperialist pragmatism,' and to John Dewey, who allegedly dispensed a pluralistic idealism to counter the Marxist monistic materialism.

COMMUNIST publications on foreign history do not go much farther than this sort of reference to essentially Chinese concerns. A Szechuan University history group studies American China policy, 1945-1950, and American capitalist class use of scholars' writings on the 'China question' (it does, however, also investigate the 'capitalist historians' slanted misconstruction of the North American war of independence'). The Chinese obsession with anti-imperialism, and the centennial year of 1957, resulted in several articles and translations concerning the Indian Mutiny, and foreign policy exigencies keep green the grand old subject of Sino-Indian contacts; though, characteristically, the purely religious story is varied with the less-developed (for good reason) and more congenial subject of commercial interchange. The twentieth-century Russian revolutions naturally claim attention. Contemporary Japanese research on China is all embracing, but there is little reciprocation, limited to Sino-Japanese relations and radicalism in Japan. Really absorbed in Chinese periodisation, Communist historians keep their occasional treatments of such miscellaneous problems as ancient Babylonian society, medieval European taxation, and the industrial revolution in England very close to home.

Home, they say, is where the heart is, and the hearts and emotions of Chinese historians are very much engaged. Mao has laid down the law for China's modern history: imperialism invaded China, opposed Chinese independence, obstructed the development of indigenous capitalism. All the rest is commentary. But where the mainland historians are so committed, outsiders, too, must comment. It is possible to hold that so many Chinese feel so strongly about the autonomous generation of the modern values they prize because, actually, such autonomy is in doubt. One may contend that Chinese Communism has come to the fore precisely because of the foreign invasions—which broke the older civilisation and set off the drive for compensation—and not in spite of them, in the wake of inevitable historical progress.

ECONOMICS IN CHINA

I. In the Universities

E. Stuart Kirby

MARXIAN economics, including the economic interpretation of history, is absolutely basic and essential to the Communist state; and no one can be an active and explicit Communist unless he is indoctrinated accordingly with it. These two subjects are therefore very broadly propagated or utilised in Communist China. They figure almost universally in the time systematically given to indoctrination in schools at all levels (and of all kinds, including institutes, night schools, etc.), and in every kind of social, organisational, or institutional entity. Trade unions, clubs, places of employment, etc., all hold numerous meetings, in which this indoctrination is a main element, and run numerous 'voluntary' activities also comprising this element (the individual may withhold his participation, but becomes a marked man if he does so). Even

in the field of recreation (radio, Parks of Culture and Rest, etc.) this is a feature.

But all this is at a low level, predominantly that of very generalised formulations of the broadest aspects of Marxism—Leninism and Maoism, with constant reinterpretation (or at least rephrasing) according to the changing pattern of current events. While the basis is broad, the structure—it may surprise readers to learn—is not high. In fact, the number of students taking Economics in specialised higher educational institutions in China dedicated especially to that field, has actually *declined*, and so has the enrolment in institutions of that category of students taking Political Science and Law. So, less surprisingly perhaps, has the enrolment in Fine Arts. Whereas the numbers in Science, Arts, Engineering, Agriculture, Medicine, and Teachers' Training have greatly increased.

Enrolment in Specialised Higher Educational Institutions

Type of Institution	*No. of Institutions*	*No. of Students* (000's) 1949-50	1955-56
Engineering	48	30.3	109.6
Economics & Finance	5	19.4	11.4
Medicine	27	15.2	36.5
Teachers' Training	53	12.0	60.7
Arts	(a)	11.8	18.9
Agriculture & Forestry	31	10.4	21.3
Political Science & Law	5	7.3	4.8
Natural Science	(a)	7.0	20.0
Fine Arts	16	2.8	2.2
Physical Culture	6	0.3	2.3
TOTALS	224	116.5	287.7

(Note (a) : 15 institutions offer Arts and Science together).

In addition, there are 15 'comprehensive' universities giving the whole range of subjects in both sciences and humanities. China is embarking on the path of 'pushing' science, on which Russia is now producing results which are in some respects very striking. Economics and Economic History are taught more restrictedly and elementarily, on the scale and at the level required for (a) general indoctrination among the broad public, (b) special indoctrination and skills among the selected *cadres* (professional Communist administrators), (c) ability to understand, keep up with, formulate, explain and justify the frequent swings and turns of policy imposed from above by the top leadership, and (d) justification of the essential and eternal truth and universal applicability in all times and places of Marxism—Leninism and Maoism.

A considerable amount of research is carried on; mainly under (d) above, and to a lesser extent under (c). The question of research hardly arises under (a) and (b), though there is stress on the need to multiply what are ingenuously called 'correct examples,' *i.e.* cases in economic history and theory supporting orthodox Marxist interpretations in general, and the Party line of the moment in particular.

'Operation rewrite' is of course an important industry in China, as in other Communist countries. There was a colossal 'burning of the books' at the outset; *e.g.* at Swatow alone, not a metropolitan intellectual centre, 300,000 volumes with 'vestiges of feudal culture' were burnt. Soviet Russian textbooks were subsequently made available in very large numbers, and at prices so low as to represent dumping. Later some of the 'burnt' texts were reinstated (mostly in edited versions), and the use of English for reading and study was to some extent also reinstated, but the primacy of Russian has been much pressed.[1] But from 70 to 90% of the staff at research institutes are unable to read documents in English and 50% cannot read Russian easily.[2]

'Operation replace,' we may say, preceded 'operation rewrite.' But the latter, the process of revising and reinterpreting all past history and doctrine (including the suppression of evidence tending not to fit the orthodox interpretation) began at an early stage, and has gone forward rather energetically. The attempt begun in the

[1] Cf. R. F. Simpson, 'Education in Mainland China,' in *Phi Delta Kappa* (Indiana), December, 1957, on which the present text has drawn freely at various points.

[2] *Kuangming Daily* (Peking), 22 March, 1957.

early years of the Communist régime, to force the whole interpretation and handling of the economic history of China into a strictly Marxian mould, is still being vigorously pursued by constant reiteration of the main assertions on which it depends, in an output now quite prolific. 'Research,' in this sense, has gone forward of late in corresponding quantity, and its quality has been somewhat improved—though there is abundant and trenchant Communist criticism of its qualitative shortcomings, while its academic standard is low.

Higher-level research (thus defined) is concentrated in the Academia Sinica. The Academy of Sciences began in 1949 with 17 institutes, expanded by 1956 to no less than 57. But of 279 books published by this Academy till late in 1956, as many as 271 were translations from the Russian. The Academia Sinica, in respect of Economics and Economic History, has published since 1954 a journal in Chinese, *Economic Research* (*Chingchi Yen-chiu*), a Chinese counterpart to the Russian *Voprosy Ekonomiki*.

The Communist system inhibits economic research in the true sense of the term; and it inhibits such learning, in the true sense, as is a necessary condition of real research. The teaching methods follow very closely—it is not too much to say slavishly—those of the USSR. Teaching research and guidance sections have been set up, which are the main organs for the bureaucratic-political control of the process. These work closely to, and strictly impose, the directions and syllabuses prescribed by the Ministry of Higher Education. Each course in higher educational institutions 'follows a unified teaching plan formulated and promulgated by the Ministry of Higher Education, and each course of study likewise follows a definite and unified set of teaching outlines prepared by the Ministry.'[3]

'The teaching procedure is for the professor or lecturer to give a formal lecture to a large audience with the teaching assistants present. After this the teaching assistants take the students in smaller groups and help them to clarify problems and work examples. With theoretical courses such as those on Marxism-Leninism, philosophy, and political economy the students are given certain assignments in reference books and are required to give an oral report to the group. Certain students act as principal speakers, with others supplementing their reports. This seminar method, as it is called, concludes with a general summing up by the staff member.'[4]

Bearing in mind the setting of the society in which it occurs—in which every individual's fate hangs narrowly on the constant fear of denunciation for heresy and political error—it is easy to see that this is, in the microcosm of the classroom, just what happens on the more macrocosmic scale of general life outside. The staff member is in charge, of course, and will sum up with an evaluation praising all that has been said which is consonant with the ruling orthodoxy, and denouncing and correcting all that is not. All the faculty members concerned are present at the 'line-setting' lectures, and will meet as a group or 'fraction' to thrash out the results, 'clarify' and 'rectify' each others' errors and shortcomings, as well as those of the students. Party 'control committees' dominate these and all other activities in educational institutions; which are also liable to be enfiladed, on their own level, with a cross-fire of criticism from any other organisations (trade unions, approved societies, etc.) which are moved to join in this great and many-sided 'dialectic.' The latter organisations are themselves similarly placed, and similarly controlled by the party caucuses.

The examination system is on closely similar lines. Periodic tests and examinations are given, but they are usually conducted orally, before a joint panel of judges and jury (the guiding party cadres and the teachers). Cadre members of the committee include representatives of the 'masses,' *i.e.* workers, janitors, porters, etc. in the institution concerned or from proletarian organisations outside.

The group of teaching members of the staff of Hong Kong University which visited one or two Mainland Universities at the end of 1955 (of which the present writer was a member) was told that this was the system of examination. Candidates are called individually before an examining committee, including the teachers concerned, a student representative or representatives, and a representative or representatives of the 'workers' (*i.e.* non-academic staff) of the University. The candidate was then given a list of 4 or 5 problems

[3] *Students in Mainland China*, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong.

[4] Simpson, *loc. cit.*

of which he had to answer any one verbally (using diagrams, etc., if desired), and justify his answers. Requests to be furnished with copies of the sets of problems were not granted, and, in the field of the social sciences at any rate, expressed wishes to meet and talk with students were not met. Nor were requests to receive copies of University calendars, prospectuses, curricula, etc. It was stated that these were in the hands of the Ministry of Higher Education in Peking.

It is to be emphasised that all this refers especially to the field of the social sciences. Obviously, these represent the controversial political ground on which the régime is most sensitive and, we may say, most totalitarian. Relatively 'neutral' subjects (*e.g.* marine biology or physics) appear to be conducted on lines more like those to which we are accustomed in the West; and in those fields the Chinese professorate and staffs are much more unconstrained and forthcoming to foreign visitors, and in the exchange of publications and correspondence abroad.

One other aspect should be mentioned. A number of foreign visitors have been to China before, during and after the 'Hundred Flowers' period; and the flow continues. Some of them are not Communist supporters. They might have some influence on Chinese minds. But very few of them are economists or economic historians and fewer still have relevant standards of comparison—viz. pre-Communist China, or non-Communist China. The most notable success, in this field of studies, by a foreign visitor, in airing mildly critical views in China, has been that of Mr. Nicholas Kaldor of Cambridge. He lectured at Peking University in May, 1956, by invitation, on the theme that the prognostications of Keynes were more accurate than those of Marx. This lecture was well attended and given an accurate running translation on the spot by one of his old students.

II. In the Soviet Mirror

(The following extracts are translated from an article by V. Karymov in the February, 1958, issue of Voprosy Ekonomiki entitled: The struggle against the rightists in the field of economic science in China.)

THE struggle against the right wing bourgeois elements, which developed in China more than six months ago, represents in its content a socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts, a necessary continuation of the socialist revolution in the field of the relations of production, accomplished in the main in 1955-1956. . . .

The rightist elements, which began an intense fight against socialist construction, and against the Chinese Communist Party, have put themselves into the position of enemies of the people, enemies of socialism, who dreamed of turning the country back on to the capitalist road of development. The ideological offensive of the reactionary elements of the bourgeoisie is one of the most important links in the plan for the restoration of capitalism in China . . . . The first object of fierce attacks by the rightists was the essence of Marxism-Leninism: the teaching about the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . . In slandering the political régime of People's China and the socialist system, Chang Po-chun asserted that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a forcing ground for the 'three evils' of bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism. Another rightist 'theoretician,' Chen Chen-han, wrote: 'Although one cannot say that the socialist system gives rise to bureaucratism, nevertheless they are closely linked . . . . In order to get rid of bureaucratism, it is necessary to liquidate the moving force of socialism, socialist property' . . .

An important part in the plans of the reactionary bloc of the plotters, Chang Po-chun and Lo Lun-tsi, was assigned to economic science. 'It was through their directives—said the editorial of *Chingchi Yen-chiu*—that a group of professors headed by Chen Chen-han (Peking University) prepared its programmatic document under the title 'Our reflections on the present situation in the field of economic science.' This, a kind of *credo* of the rightist bourgeois economists, is part of the broad political programme of the reactionary bloc of Chang Po-chun—Lo Lun-tsi, a programme of struggle against the Communist Party, against the Socialist régime in China'. . . .

The rightists revise Marxist-Leninist political

economy on the pretext of fighting dogmatism, of improvement and renovation, and of filling in the 'blank spots' which allegedly appeared in Marxist economic theory after the death of Lenin. According to Chen Chen-han and his followers the whole of the Marxist-Leninist political economy of socialism is, in fact, such a 'blank spot.' In their 'Reflections' they wrote: 'The theory of the political economy of socialism does not exist. This chapter is essentially empty . . . . The classics of Marxism have not shown us any absolute laws of socialist construction. Because of this we are moving blindly, fumbling, and only imitating the Soviet model. Our economic policy was wallowing in subjectivism and does not follow any objective laws; we do not even know what objective laws we have to follow . . . . Our economic planning represents a mixture of dogmatism and empiricism'. . . .

Speaking about 'serious errors which are harmful to the national economy,' and which allegedly have been committed, the rightists link them with 'an obvious gap between the practice of economic construction and economic theory.' In connection with this the rightist bourgeois professors bring up the question 'of a critical use of bourgeois economic science.' Their logic is simple. The economic organism of People's China was seriously ill, and this was due to Marxist-Leninist economic theory, which could not serve as a theoretical compass in the economics of the state as 'it ceased to be a science . . . . and became a code of dogmas or canons, and Marxist political economists became monks busy only with mechanical learning of these canons' . . . . The rightists regard it as necessary and useful for Marxist economists to collaborate with bourgeois professors. According to them bourgeois political economy should fill the gaps in Marxism, should help in solving the concrete economic problems with which Marxist-Leninist political economy and Marxist scientists are unable to cope . . . .

The real intentions of the rightists, as the Chinese press shows, are revealed in their attempts to dismiss Marxist-Leninist political economy as 'useless for practical purposes,' to revive bourgeois economic theories and to replace Marxism-Leninism by Keynesianism . . . . They also deal with other aspects of political economy. Marxist population theory was the object of their fierce attacks. In this they used as a weapon the neo-Malthusian theories of the main rightist 'specialists' in this field: Fei Hsiao-tung, U Ching-chao, Chen Ta, Li Ching-chan.

In his articles 'Some remarks on sociology' and 'What sociology is about,' Fei Hsiao-tung tries to 'demonstrate' the impossibility of building socialism in China because of China's 'great overpopulation.' He asserts that the population of China is too big and the capital accumulation for industrialisation extraordinarily small, since almost the whole surplus product goes to individual consumption. Consequently 'building socialism in China is like building a castle of sand.'

The Chinese Marxist scientists have resolutely criticised this Neo-Malthusian trash. A substantial, deeply argumentative article by comrade Li Pu in *Jen Min Jih Pao* (14 October, 1957) was devoted to exposing anti-Marxist theories of population. He shows that the rightists deliberately launch the question of population. 'They try to show that the question of population is the basic contradiction, and that unless it is solved the building of socialism in China is just a waste of time, a Utopia' . . . .

In his 'Reflections' Chen Chen-han and his followers accuse the Party of incompetence in the administration of the economy, of bureaucratism, of a tendency to put a wall between the Party and non-party scientists, of intolerance towards the bourgeois scientists who came over to the Marxist-Leninist position. Such a policy, he says, 'has a harmful effect on economic construction, closes all the avenues for the creative development of science, and creates an intolerable situation of sectarianism in science' . . . .

Notwithstanding all the attempts of the rightist bourgeois elements to discredit Marxist-Leninist theory and the successes of socialist construction, the 600 million people of China are united as never before, and are rallying ever closer around their own Communist Party which is leading them to new victories.

POPULATION POLICIES IN RUSSIA AND CHINA

Trends and Prospects

Leopold Labedz

THE Communist régimes—embracing more than one third of mankind—have been faced with many paradoxes in attempting to devise suitable population policies; their efforts provide a fascinating chapter in the doctrinal manipulations used to justify changes in a 'scientific ideology' faced with an intractable reality.

In the first volume of *Das Kapital* Marx wrote that 'every specific historic mode of production has its own special laws of population.' He related 'relative surplus population' to the capitalist mode of production, but said almost nothing about population movements in a socialist society. Under capitalism, overpopulation resulted from the discrepancy between the rate of increase of variable capital—the source of labour demand—and of the working population. By continually increasing the number of workers, natural fertility helped to depress the wage-earners' standard of living. The social aspect of reproductive behaviour was reduced to the economic question of the relation between the subsistence level and 'the cost of production of additional workers.' Marx had two principal objections to Malthus' theory: that it was a-historical, 'an eternal law of nature' rooted in biology and not history; and that its implications were an apologia for the *status quo*, justifying the position of the ruling class and depriving the proletariat of the possibility of basically changing its situation. Marx's own analysis seemed to imply that relative overpopulation would disappear together with the capitalist mode of production, but he left open the question of population growth in a socialist society; he never actually dismissed the possibility of natural increase outstripping the rate of economic growth under socialism—a proposition attributed to him by Stalinist demographers. These demographers maintained that overpopulation was a myth concocted to conceal the capitalist causes of poverty, and that it was impossible in a socialist country, although in 1881 Engels had written to Kautsky: 'If at some stage communist society finds itself obliged to regulate the production of human beings, just as it has already come to regulate the production of things it will be precisely this society, and this society alone, which can carry it out without difficulty.' But Engels did not discuss how the growth of population could be accelerated or limited.

Population problems turned out to be quite different from what Marx and Engels imagined. In the capitalist countries they were analysing Malthusian fears proved indeed to be groundless in fact a Soviet textbook on demography asserted that the capitalist countries were heading 'towards a catastrophe in the reproduction of population towards depopulation, *i.e.* the extinction of population.' In socialist countries population trends were affected less by the nationalisation of the means of production than by their development. The 'socialist transformation' did not emerge from the 'womb of capitalism'; it involved forcible industrialisation and the aggrandisement of state power. Thus, in economically backward countries, population policies had to be adjusted to these two objectives through an appropriate exercise in Marxist exegesis. Whether the Marxist canon actually provided sufficient leeway for diametrically opposed interpretations was a minor matter.

When Communist rule was established in Russia, the social structure and demographic situation of the country were different from Marxist notions of the preconditions of socialist transformation, and Marxist theory itself was vague about the factors influencing population trends. The Soviet rulers did not realise what these factors were, or how they could be affected by state action, or indeed whether state action was called for. Soviet family and birth control policies were not dictated by demographic considerations. In the early years policy was still influenced by ideology (mainly derived from Engels) and by the liberal attitude to sex of part of

e Russian intelligentsia. Early Soviet theories edicted the disappearance of the family as the onomic and educational unit of society, and, entually, as a legal entity. In 1919 Alexandra llontai asserted that 'the family ceases to be a cessity for its members as well as for the state,' d early Soviet legislation reflected the ideologi- l climate of the time. It tended to remove the straints put on marriage and to weaken the nily. The first Soviet marriage law (1918) did t completely do away with the 'useless mire of divorce case,' as advocated by Engels, and a licial decision was still necessary unless both rties wanted a divorce; but in 1926 this pro- ion was dropped and divorce made possible at e will of either party by the mere dispatch of a st card. In Lenin's words, 'It is impossible to be socialist and a democrat without immediately manding complete freedom of divorce.' How- r, it is likely that these measures had very little mographic effect, for there is no necessary rrelation between marriage indices and the th rate,[1] and the peasant population, still dominant, was probably little affected. There re other potent factors at work breaking the rural family. The special character of the al scene was recognised in the early Soviet le, which treated *krestyanski dvor* (the peasant household) as a legal entity for inheritance rposes.

THE early Soviet attitude to birth control was anti-natalist in effect, though not in intention. ortion was legal and free of charge; a decree of November, 1920, admitted it as a necessary edient, since it recognised that repressive asures would not eliminate illegal abortions, ich were even more harmful to the woman's lth. The alternative proposed at that time was more children, but more effective contra- tive measures.

t is difficult to assess the demographic conse- nces of these policies because of the scarcity statistical evidence. It is very likely they did ress the Soviet birth rate to some extent, ugh it is impossible to say how much.[2] Birth control was largely an urban practice, but it is rural fertility that is more important for the birth rate in a predominantly peasant country. Between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the first Five Year Plan the birth rate was at a fairly high level (45.0 per 1000 in 1923, 44.0 in 1926, 42.0 in 1928); it was the high mortality rates that mainly affected the natural rate of increase at that time. During the Civil War and immediately afterwards it was very high because of direct war losses, famines, and epidemics; from 1924 it became stabilised at around 20.0 per thousand.

After 1928 it was not legalised abortion that upset the demographic situation in Russia, which showed a marked decline in the birth rate, but forced industrialisation and collectivisation. The immediate demographic results of the harsh measures initiated by Stalin (liquidation of the kulaks as a class, forced migration to the towns, and the lowering of consumption levels) are not known because the birth and death rates between 1930 and 1935 are impossible to assess with any degree of accuracy. It is clear, however, that the long term population trend in Russia is not a concomitant of socialism or any other 'ism,' but of industrialisation. It has the same demographic characteristics as most other countries that have undergone the process: a decrease in fertility (from 50.0 in 1900 and 42.0 in 1928 to 25.0 in 1953), and in mortality (from 33.0 in 1900 and 18.0 in 1928 to 9.0 in 1953). The operative social factors were urban development, the changing character of the family, the extension of mass education, the new status of women, increased social and occupational mobility, etc.

However, Soviet industrialisation had a demographic background different from that of other countries. In Britain, for instance, between 1781 and 1840 the birth rate fell by only 1.0 per thousand (from 37.7 to 36.6); population grew largely as a result of lower death rates. In France, between 1830 and 1900, the birth rate dropped by 9.0 per thousand (from 31.0 to 22.0). Soviet industrialisation came after a big population increase (of 80 million, or 130% between 1860 and 1914) but was itself accompanied by a sharp downward trend. However, it was carried through in that stage of the demographic cycle which denoted a favourable age-structure.

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[1] In France it is negative. Cf. P. Gemaehling, 'Démo- hie et structures familiales' in *Sociologie Comparée Famille Contemporaine* (Paris, 1955), p. 55.

[2] Cf. F. Lorimer, *Population of the Soviet Union* neva, 1945), pp. 126-128.

While it is hard to direct long-term population trends through deliberate demographic policy, short-term trends can be influenced. As the state became more and more totalitarian, there was an increasing possibility of controlling the relations between the sexes in the interests of the state. All the anti-Utopian writers, from Zamyatin through Huxley to Orwell, have realised the potentialities of the totalitarian state in this connection. But this regulating power still has its limits. Moreover, doctrinal inhibitions created a certain time-lag in Russia and China between the realisation of the need for control and its implementation. In Russia a pro-natalist population policy was introduced only in 1936, and in China an anti-natalist policy has been gradually promoted since 1954, gaining real impetus only in 1957. In each case it took 5 to 8 years for the Communist leaders to become aware of the incompatibility of their aims and practices.

THE first Five Year Plan assumed an annual increase of population of 3 to 3¼ million, the total to reach 160 million by 1930. The second Five Year Plan envisaged a population of over 180 million in 1938. It must have dawned on the Soviet leaders in the 30's that the increase was not keeping pace with their expectations (that their own policy was responsible for this was immaterial). With the country in the throes of its industrial revolution, which was proceeding at an unprecedented rate (and at an unprecedented social and economic cost), the manpower problem became a decisive factor in the expanding Soviet economy. The growing Nazi menace made military manpower another crucial consideration; together they overrode ideological commitments. There was a public 'discussion' of the issue in the press (the only one ever allowed by Stalin), which revealed general dismay about the new policy, but it was nevertheless implemented in the decree of 27 June, 1936. This decree abolished legal abortion and imposed certain restrictions on divorce. This reversal of policy was summarised by the Soviet specialist on family law, G. M. Sverdlov, who stated that marriage and the family were no longer 'the private concern of individuals, but . . . . of the nation as a whole.' He explained that 'the socialist state supports the family as its own effective bulwark. In strengthening the family it strengthens itself, increases its might, its power.' The expert on the sociolog of the family, S. Volfson, withdrew his earlie claim that 'socialism leads to the extinction c the family,' and asserted that, on the contrary, grew stronger under socialism.

The new policy was dictated partly by non demographic considerations which are beyon the scope of this article, but the de-legalisatio of abortion *was* primarily a demographi measure. The previous argument about th ineffectiveness of repressive measures in th sphere was quietly shelved. The immediat effect on the birth rate was fairly striking, fc it rose by 6.0 per thousand. But after 1937/3 the birth rate dropped to its previous level an continued to decline, despite new measures t boost it. The decree of 8 July, 1944 was designe to encourage large families by the award c bonuses starting with the third child, the Mothe hood Medal for five children, the Order of th Glory of Motherhood for seven, and the tit Mother Heroine for ten offspring.[3] At the sam time, a bachelor's tax, similar to Mussolini decree of 19 December, 1926, was introduced t discourage childlessness. Single men were taxe until the age of 60 (the limit had been 50 i Fascist Italy). Only registered marriages wer considered legal, divorce was made more difficu by an increase in legal fees and the creation c procedural obstacles.

The very intensive Soviet pro-natalist propa ganda was of course reflected in demograph theory, which 'reinterpreted' Marx in such a wa that the very idea of birth control becam anathema. (This eventually led to the strang alliance of Soviet and Catholic demographers a the Rome Population Congress of 1954 Neo-Malthusianism became a satanic essence i demography, as Trotskyism, Titoism, and Re isionism had been in politics. The policy wa summarised by Beriya on the 34th anniversary c the Bolshevik revolution: 'Whereas in th capitalist camp the imperialist cannibals a busy inventing various "scientific" means c exterminating the flower of humanity an

[3] Between 1944 and 1951, 33,000 mothers had won t title (*Pravda*, 1 June, 1951). 'According to data availab in spring, 1955, the number of mothers . . . who have fi or more children exceeded 4½ million' (G. M. Sverdl 'Changes in Family Relations in the USSR,' in *Tra actions of the Third World Congress of Sociology* (Amst dam, 1956), Vol. IV, p. 55).

ducing the number of births, with us—as omrade Stalin said—the most valuable capital man and the main concern of the state is the elfare and happiness of men.'

And yet this human capital was used most astefully. In place of the 'reserve army of the nemployed' Stalin had his own 'reserve army of e employed,' millions strong, in the concenation camps—a factor which worked against s pro-natalist policy directly through increased ortality, and indirectly through reduced fertility. o relevant demographic data was released, t from the meagre Soviet statistics available e demographic consequences of the terror and e inhuman pace of industrialisation can be inrred. The expectations of the early Five Year ans were not fulfilled and the projected popuion failed to materialise. In 1933 Stalin claimed a opulation of 168 million, but the 1937 census id to be suppressed (and the directors of the ensus Bureau executed) because of the discrepcy between the 'planned' and the actual opulation. Only in 1939 was 170 million ached, when a new census disclosed that the opulation was over 10 million less than expected.

War losses, direct and indirect, made the eatest drain on Soviet population resources. oviet military doctrine and 'human wave' intry tactics aggravated the losses inflicted by e Germans. Estimates of this demographic ficit vary from 25 to 40 million; in any case ey must have been very high. When a opulation figure was finally produced in 1956 it ain revealed a discrepancy, this time between e actual total of 200 million, and Western timates, which were almost 10% higher.

The familiar Russian tag, *Liudei u nas mnogo, udei u nas khvatit* (We are numerous, we have ough people) was contradicted by Soviet opulation policy. Furthermore, here as elsehere, the short-term results were contrary to the pected long-term advantages. In so far as it was ccessful, Stalin's pre-war pro-natalist drive creased the infant dependency ratio, which ter hampered the war effort by the burden it nposed on the national economy. On the other nd, the relative deficit in labour supply (resultg from the war impact on the birth rate) in the th Five Year Plan might have appeared earlier if the age groups born in 1937/38 had not been exceptionally numerous.

After the war the birth rate stabilised at a lower level—in the twenties the average was about 40.0 per thousand, in the thirties about 35.0, in the post-war decade about 26.0. The rate of natural increase was affected mainly by the reduced mortality rate, particularly among infants, resulting from improved medical services—it was about 200 in 1925, 145 in 1940, and fell to 48 in 1948. The variation of the birth rate independently of official population policy may perhaps have influenced the Soviet rulers to reverse their attitude to abortion. While the official line remained strictly pro-natalist, abortion was again legalised by decree on 17 August, 1954. Perhaps it was realised that abortion is only one factor among many reflecting the people's attitude to birth control; the deeper causes were to be sought in the process of industrialisation and the state's own social policy. The large-scale employment of women, appalling urban housing conditions, and other similar factors were more fundamental in depressing the birth rate. Roughly, the greater the employment of women, the lower the birth rate in modern societies, and the Soviet drive for increased production drew more and more women into its labour force, thereby contributing to the fertility decrease. In 1929 women constituted 27% of the total labour force, in 1940 47%. In agriculture it reached 60%, and had been higher during the war. The percentage of women employed in the USSR is now twice as high as in the United States. Thus it is not surprising that the Soviet pro-natalist policy ran into difficulties. The state can more easily control the rate of investment than the birth rate; while the means of production are public, the means of reproduction are still private, and compulsory deliveries are easier to achieve in agriculture than in obstetrics. It is a fallacy to assert that the population will multiply as material conditions improve; it may or may not, and in any case the consumption level was not raised but lowered during the Soviet industrial revolution. It is also wrong to claim, as Soviet demographers do, that the key to the problem lies in 'the analysis of the relations of production.' Demographic problems are much more complicated than that, and their doctrinal simplification has not contributed to their solution in the USSR.

WHEN the Communists took over China they inherited an immense population and Stalinist demographic theories. If population density presented a formidable obstacle to the proclaimed goal of industrialising China in order to make it a first-class world military power, the Soviet attitude towards population problems could only make them more acute in a country where they were so different.

The Chinese social, economic, and demographic background was dissimilar in many important respects. Judged by Marxist criteria of maturity, China was even less ready for 'socialist transformation' than Russia was after the revolution. In China over 80% of the population also consisted of peasants, and there had been a big increase in population; but there was an even lower level of literacy and fewer skilled workers and technical personnel. The balance between population and resources was also more unfavourable. In China there was less than half an acre of cultivated land per capita, in comparison with over two acres in Russia (where agriculture is less intensive). The level of economic development was lower; China was producing less than 4 lbs. of steel per capita, and Russia 64 lbs. at the beginning of their respective first Five Year Plans. And finally China was in an earlier phase of the population cycle: its birth, death, and infant mortality rates were very high, and the low rate of natural increase was likely to rise in the first stage of industrialisation, because of a fall in the death rate, without anything like a corresponding drop in the birth rate. The problem was made more acute by the fact that population growth can result simply from better standards of hygiene and medical progress, even without corresponding economic progress. 'No more flies in China' means in effect 'more babies in China.' For a population living near the subsistence level the removal of Malthusian checks was likely to affect the death rate first. The natural calamities accounting for the high death rate in China (such as floods and droughts resulting in famines) were now to be counteracted by an effective central administration, improved flood control, transport, food distribution, and health services.

All this meant that China had much greater initial handicaps than Russia in getting over the economic 'hump' on its road to rapid industrialisation, and that population problems were likely to be the biggest single stumbling bloc Economic growth had to contend with a risin rate of natural increase at a very high level c population density. The Chinese birth rate fc 1930-1935 was estimated at 40.0 per thousanc and the death rate at 34 per thousand. The corre ponding figures given in the census results pub lished in June, 1954 were 37.0 and 17.0, *i.e.* th death rate had been halved and the rate of natura increase had risen from 6.0 to 20.0 per thousanc

The rough economic definition of industria revolution given by Professor Arthur Lewis is tha it is 'a process by which a community is converte from being a 5% to being a 12% saver.' It has bee estimated that with a population increase of 2% per year this rate of investment would give litt more than a 1% increase in per capita income But in China higher goals were envisaged. How ever, at the Chinese level of income an increas in the proportion of dependent children coul only make a high investment rate from interna sources much more difficult. The aim of investin 25% of the national income (as in the Sovie industrial revolution) would make the social an political costs of the process even greater. would hardly have been practicable even had th rate of natural population increase not risen; was even less practicable with the populatio growing by more than 12 million a year. Eve though the concepts of 'population optimum and 'optimum rate of population growth' ar notoriously vague, there is a connection betwee the rate of natural increase and the rate of econc mic development. Both the static and the dynami aspects of the problem looked different in Russi at the beginning of the era of planned industria isation from what they did in China, where shor term considerations should have been of muc greater importance. China could neither afford t bother about long-term relative labour shortage nor did it need to do so.

Yet despite all these important differences i local background, the Chinese Communists too over from the Russians the 'anti-Malthusia fervour developed in response to Soviet industria isation demands. They swallowed it whole, wit out realising that the problems they had to fac were not the same. At first they thought tha 'strength lies in numbers,' and claimed grea power status on this ground, a claim supporte by the peculiar nature of the Korean war. But

present age there is no simple or direct re-
ion between population size and national
ver. Large populations can be a source of
ional weakness, for in the twentieth century
werful nations have to be industrialised as well
big.[4]

may or may not have been rational for
Khrushchev to call for a population of 300
lion Soviet citizens to strengthen the state, but
re was no reason for Mao to be jubilant when
first census in the history of China disclosed
t there were more than 600 million Chinese,
million on the mainland. If these figures are
rect the number of inhabitants on the main-
d itself would by now have increased to no less
n 640 million. Official exultation was not yet
dified by second thoughts but was expressed in
ely Stalinist demographic terms: the 600
lion were hailed as the 'great force for socialist
onstruction . . . . the most precious of all the
egories of capital' (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, 1 Novem-
, 1954). The occasion was used to attack again
nkrupt Malthusian theories of population'
l the economic lackeys of imperialism who
pagate them.

Historical factors partly explain this readiness
indentify the strength of the state with the
nber of its inhabitants. Both Confucius and
ncius wanted a larger population to meet the
ds of the state. This was at a time of compara-
ly sparse population density, but the attitude
sisted in popular mores and folkways because
was in accord with the social structure and the
ds of agriculture, and created the specifically
inese cultural pattern which had endured for
turies and in part explains the Chinese popula-
n problem. As a Chinese demographer put it:
griculture needs the family, the family is in
our of ancestor worship, ancestor worship
ourages numerous children to perpetuate the
ily tree as well as to facilitate land cultivation.'[5]
e state planners upheld in their own doctrinaire
y the ancient Chinese peasant proverb: If you
planning for one year, sow grain; if you are
planning for ten years, plant trees; but when you are planning for a hundred years, grow men.

As in Russia, however, there was no positive state population policy in the early years. The Marxist attitude to demographic problems had in the meantime undergone a significant change in Russia and the new doctrine was accepted in China, but it operated in passive rather than active ways. Vociferous anti-Malthusianism was accepted as a part of ideology, but a positive pro-natalist policy was not applied. There were no Orders of the Glory of Motherhood. The ideological attitude was expressed rather in the absence of institutions for instruction in birth control, and in their official discouragement. Otherwise, as in Russia in the twenties, the social measures and policies introduced by the new régime tended not only to lower the death rate through stabilisation and economic rehabilitation, but also indirectly to push down the birth rate through breaking up the traditional structure of the Chinese family. There is no way of estimating the effect of land reform on rural fertility and mortality rates. The short-lived stability of the countryside came to an end with collectivisation, which has been enforced much sooner in China than in Russia. More obvious are the probable consequences of marriage reform. The marriage law that came into force in May, 1950, was certainly one of the most revolutionary social acts undertaken by the Communist government. Its aim was to bring about a complete change in the more traditional aspects of family relations and in the status of women. This process was already well under way in the towns before the Communists took power,[6] but as it spreads to the countryside it is bound to affect the rural fertility rate, just as it has probably already affected urban reproduction. As regards divorce, the law is patterned on recent rather than early Soviet legislation.

WHEN the period of immediate post-revolutionary change was over and the state proceeded to rapid industrialisation, it also worked out a more active population policy. In both Russia and China the change came some years after the beginning of the planning era. In both cases a more direct intervention in family

Cf. F. W. Notestein, *New Compass of the World* ndon, 1948), p. 429; Kingsley Davis, 'The Demo-hic Foundations of National Power' in *Freedom and trol in Modern Society*, ed. M. Berger (New York,), p. 206.

Ta Chen, *Population in Modern China* (Chicago, 1946), 3.

[6] Cf. O. Lang, *Chinese Family and Society* (New Haven, 1946).

life necessitated an ideological revision camouflaged as ideological continuity, but the dialectical somersault was made in opposite directions. In Russia it was intended to raise the birth rate, in China to lower it.

The immediate stimulus in both cases was probably provided by the realisation of the gap between the plan for economic development and the population figures. In China the results of the census upset all previous calculations based on a population figure of 475 million. The new information provided by the census made it necessary to revise all previous assumptions on the ratio of population to resources. The industrial five year plan, the agricultural twelve year plan, and the planned extension of education had to be reassessed in the light of the new knowledge, in which the rate of natural increase took pride of place.

It is understandable that the Communist rulers should begin to change their attitude towards family limitation. In the twenties Stalin adopted the policy of 'superindustrialisation' after having accused the Left Opposition of wanting to promote it; in the fifties, while attacking the Chinese 'Rightists' for neo-Malthusianism, Mao adopts the policy of birth control. In 1954, following the Soviet legalisation of abortion, a similar act was passed in Peking, the restrictions attached to it being subsequently eased. Articles encouraging the practice of birth control began to appear in Chinese journals. The tone of the campaign offers a strange contrast with a similar campaign in Russia twenty years earlier, directed to opposite ends.

Thus while *Pravda* (28 May, 1935) had discovered that 'the holy instinct of motherhood has once more come into its own,' and that (7 June, 1935) 'every girl must be treasured not only as a textile worker, a bold parachute jumper, or an engineer, but as a future mother. The mother of one child must be treasured as the future mother of eight,' Professor Wu Chieh-ping of the China Union Medical College poured cold water on such sentiments and tried to counteract the idea that *coitus interruptus* was physiologically harmful (*Chung Kuo Ching Nien Pao*, 2 November, 1957).

The official movement to encourage birth control has been gaining momentum steadily since 1954. After delays suggesting behind-the-scenes inhibitions, the Minister of Health 6 August, 1956, issued instructions to all hea offices to spread knowledge about birth cont techniques. Some steps had been taken bef this to spread information about and to increa supplies of contraceptives, and restrictions sterilisation were reduced.

The time had come to give the campaign official blessing at the highest level, and this w done by Mao in his celebrated speech of February, 1957. In the published version merely referred to 'the fact that we have population of 600 million, that this is an object fact, and that this is our asset,' and urged 'wh ever arrangements are suitable and possible the particular time and place and after cons tation with all those concerned. On no accou should we .... go around grumbling that the are too many people.' But in a version of speech circulating in Warsaw and reported the *New York Times* correspondent there, M Tse-tung was much more explicit. He is said have referred in great detail to the difficulties economic development and educational expansi arising from the rapid population increase, a strongly advocated family limitation. Ma speech was followed by an editorial in *Jen-m Jih-pao* (5 March, 1957) stating frankly th economic development cannot keep pace with population growth of more than 13 million a ye and therefore birth control should be wid used and marriages postponed until the age of (in the marriage law the age limit for marria was put at 20 for men and 18 for women).

On 8 March, 1957 a birth control exhibiti was opened in Peking and an intensive campai for family limitation followed throughout Chi More and more articles dealt with the topic, th titles indicating the purpose behind the 'Educate workers and employees in birth contro 'Why we must reduce the urban populatio 'What are the consequences of too many births 'Spread birth control propaganda to all corne and so on.

THUS, after a long delay, China decided adopt a policy of birth limitation, as ot countries such as Japan and India, under simi demographic pressure, had done earlier. Simi problems suggest similar solutions, regardless differences in the political background, and

deological smoke-screen cannot conceal this. But the decision contradicted Soviet practice and he Soviet interpretation of Marxist theory ccepted as orthodox in China. If they were not o lose face, the Chinese communists had to ustify the change theoretically.

As at every major swerve of the party line, a ialectical turnabout was carried through by the ppropriate manipulation of canonical texts; ome were forgotten, and others were suddenly emembered. As previously in Russia, the nechanism of the ideological 'feed-back' was sed to advocate an exactly opposite course in the ame of the same sacred scriptures. In the past, Marx's hostility to Malthus had been exploited in he USSR to build a case against birth control as uch. The Soviet Encyclopædia attacked it as an xample of capitalist corruption: 'In capitalist ountries women resort to abortion for many ocial and economic reasons, such as the difficult economic situation of the working masses, and especially of women in contemporary capitalist society . . . . In capitalist families the tendency to eave the heirs an undivided inheritance causes he artificial limitation of offspring to one or two hildren. The bourgeois state tries in every way o conceal the real reasons for the widespread practice of artificial abortion.'

Such texts had now to be handled carefully in China, and different ones used instead to provide an ideological basis for the propagation, on a scale never attempted in any 'capitalist country,' of what had hitherto been regarded as the corrupt capitalist practice of restricting births. One quotation from Lenin, buried and forgotten for over twenty years in the Soviet Union, has now been unearthed in China and used again and again :

Communist opposition to neo-Malthusianism, he said, 'in no way interferes with our demanding the complete abolition of all laws against abortion, or the dissemination of medical works on safety measures, etc. . . . Freedom of medical propaganda and the safeguarding of the elementary democratic rights of the citizen is one thing; the social teaching of neo-Malthusianism is something else' (*Sochineniya*, 19, p. 206).

The discrepancy between the new practice and the old orthodoxy must have been noticed quickly, for the theoretical organ of the party hastened to reassure the doubtful: 'There are some people who, having come across articles on methods of birth control in newspapers and magazines in our country, are inclined to say gleefully: "Look! The Communists too need Malthus no less than they need Marx" ' (*Hsueh-hsi*, 2 October, 1955). These sceptics were told firmly that birth control and neo-Malthusianism have nothing in common: 'The publicity given by some newspapers and magazines to methods of birth control is necessary as well as proper. This has nothing at all in common with Malthus . . . . We should resolutely refute and continue to expose the deceptive nature of this reactionary and fallacious doctrine.'

The birth control campaign is gaining momentum despite all previous arguments that restrictions on the growth of population are a sign of social decay. However, notwithstanding the elaborate doctrinal casuistry used to maintain a facade of uniformity, the simple fact remains that the same 'ideological superstructure' is being employed to exhort the Russians to have more children and the Chinese to have fewer.

The policy divergence was bound to occur if the population explosion was to be controlled. The factors which once produced Maoism as a distinct form of tactics in the Communist struggle for power underlie the present attempt to deal with rural fertility. What is remarkable is the length of time necessary for minds laced in a doctrinal straitjacket to arrive at a solution consonant with the goals pursued: the discarding of Leninist tactics based on the urban workers in the first case, and of Stalinist pro-natalist shibboleths in the second. Doctrinal rigidity delayed the realisation that, despite many common features, each case of industrialisation also has many characteristics peculiar to itself, of which the demographic background is one.

TO what extent is population control likely to succeed?

In Russia the overall effect of Soviet population policies was at the most a marginal factor counterbalancing political and economic policies. Russia is over the economic 'hump' industrially, and is likely to have a favourable demographic development in the near future. It has a relatively young population, and it is probable that, barring major political upheavals, the trend in infant and old age dependency will be fairly smooth.

In China the situation is quite different. It has only started on the road to industrialisation, and since it has a different demographic background[7] it may encounter special difficulties which could slow down its rate of development to a level lower than that of the corresponding period in the Soviet Union. The outcome depends partly on the success of the anti-natalist drive. It is difficult to assess the chances of its overall effect. In the immediate future the improvement in public health is more likely to reduce the death rate than the birth control campaign is to reduce the birth rate. But the effects of changes in the Chinese countryside, in family structure, in the position of women, and in Confucian attitudes, may be considerably more potent in reducing fertility. Similar anti-natalist measures taken in other countries provide only a very limited basis for comparison. Japan, where the birth rate dropped by 43% after the war, had already passed through almost a century of industrialisation and a slow decline in fertility. In India it is still too early to judge.

On the other hand the totalitarian state has very powerful means to bring anti-natalist pressures to bear. The campaign is unprecedented in its scope and intensity, and its probable effect cannot be judged by the relative failure of Soviet pro-natalist policies. Although this time the campaign may run counter to religious and cultural customs, it is in line with the social changes now taking place, and with the economic interests of the individuals and families concerned. At any rate it seems a reasonable conclusion that if economic development continues as assumed, birth rate will begin to decline in the industrialising area and among the more educated groups of the population, but that the overall decline will be slow.[8]

Population policies can be judged by different criteria. The long and short term goals often clash, and the choice involves value judgment. But many factual questions remain unaffected, and these were in the past either misunderstood or not understood at all by the Communists. Gradually, however, the questions penetrate their consciousness, as a result of which the various 'national roads to communism' are likely to take into account more and more the possibilities of population control. Uniformity of ideology is thus further undermined. We already have different industrial policies in Russia and Yugoslavia, different agricultural policies in Russia and Poland, and different population policies in Russia and China. 'Polycentric communism,' however, is not necessarily a weaker communism. It is in fact becoming less vulnerable to the degree to which it recognises specifically local conditions of social change, and tries to adjust itself to them. The unique position of the Party, possessing the monopoly of power, remains the cardinal feature of the régime. It may pursue different policies in different countries according to local conditions, and it is better to recognise that the flexibility of its ideological criteria (which makes it intellectually ridiculous) constitutes its political strength, not its weakness. It is only when mental rigidity prevents it from recognising political and social realities that it endangers its own position. But in this it is not unique.

[7] The demographic background is not even mentioned in the analysis of the Chinese situation given by a Soviet specialist: Ya. S. Kumachenko, *Peculiarities of the Transition Period in the Chinese People's Republic* (Moscow, 1958).

[8] Cf. I. B. Tauber, 'Population Policies in Communist China,' *Population Index*, October, 1956.

GEORG LUKACS: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

II. Sensibility and Alienation

*Morris Watnick**

IN leaving the shelter of the neo-Kantian system, Lukacs was not alone. Its structure of compartmentalised sciences and relativised values began to crumble with the first shock of war, making way for a renewed quest for a more 'total' system of ultimate truth. Many found it, for example, in the phenomenology of Husserl; Lukacs, on the other hand, was among those who re-discovered Hegel.

The result was a perceptible shift of emphasis in his literary work. His well known *Theorie des Romans* (1916), the first product of his renewed interest in Hegel, was an attempt to account for the evolution of literary forms in terms of a Hegelian typology. Another study, also published during the war, was no less characteristically Hegelian in making the object of æsthetics 'the infinite totality of truths.'[1] Still, the purely Hegelian phase of his development, even if crucial in dispelling much of his neo-Kantianism, was hardly more than a brief interlude. With the study of Hegel came a renewed and consuming interest in Marx—not Marx the economist or sociologist in the strict sense, but a Marx whom he now came to see, 'through Hegelian spectacles,' as a dialectician of universal scope. Thus, there was very little of the philosophical materialist of the Leninist stripe in Lukacs even after he became a Marxist. What engrossed him most were Marx's early philosophical writings, where he found a sociological equivalent for his own æsthetic humanism, coupled with a dialectic of social action more suited to his new Hegelian outlook than anything he could find in his earlier vitalistic intuitionism. Yet, significantly enough, these were the very writings most slighted in Marxist literature of the time and nowhere so conspicuously neglected, perhaps, as in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.

Just why Lukacs' Marxism should have induced him to join the newly organised Hungarian Communist Party is not clear, particularly since he had considerable misgivings about Bela Kun's leadership and policies. His own autobiographical memoir, written many years later partly as an *apologia pro vita sua*, speaks obscurely of his growing awareness of 'the imperialist character of the war' and of the impression made on him by the writings of the Hungarian syndicalist, Erwin Szabo. More probably, the deciding factor was the wave of revolutionary fervour set in motion by the Russian revolution. Be that as it may, we have his own word for it that when he joined the party in December, 1918, it was without any semblance of Leninist indoctrination; of Lenin's wartime writings he knew next to nothing, and, to make matters worse, he had shown a special partiality for Rosa Luxemburg in what little reading he had done of pertinent contemporary literature.[2] In short, Lukacs had all the makings of a 'deviationist' from the very moment that he became a Communist.

At first, this did not matter. All the newly formed Communist parties of Western and Central Europe were made up of left socialists, crypto-syndicalists, and neophytes of every description, and the Hungarian party was no exception. Besides, Bela Kun could make good use of influential intellectuals in the critical days ahead. Lukacs was therefore admitted to the party, along with others of similar persuasion (among them Landler, Rudas, Revai, Fogarasi, Keraly, and Gabor), and even made Commissar of Education and Culture in the brief period of Communist dictatorship that followed in 1919. After the Kun régime was overthrown, he escaped to Vienna, where he was to spend the next ten years, a political victim within the Communist movement of his own reputation as one of the most challenging Marxists of our age. In fact, it was the publication in 1923 of his *Geschichte und*

* The first part of Mr. Watnick's essay was published in *Soviet Survey*, No. 23.

[1] G. von Lukacs, 'Die Subjekt-Objekt Beziehung in der Asthetik,' *Logos*, Bd. VIII, Heft 1 (1917), pp. 1-39.

[2] G. Lukacs, 'Mein Weg zu Marx,' *op. cit.*, p. 228.

Klassenbewusstsein, the book responsible for that distinction, which stigmatised him as one of the most formidable of 'deviationists' in the movement and sealed his defeat as a rival of Bela Kun for the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party.

THE feud between the Lukacs faction in Vienna and the Kun-Rakosi group in Moscow erupted in full force the moment they found themselves in exile, with the outcome at first far from certain. In 1920, for example, Lenin took Lukacs and Kun alike to task for holding the 'left sectarian' views he had so recently castigated in others.[3] Still, the very presence of Kun and his faction in Moscow and their deft adaptations to every shift in line gave them a distinct advantage in the contest for Comintern endorsement. What finally decided the issue in Kun's favour, however, was the inopportune publication of Lukacs' book in 1923, just as the Comintern began a drive to 'bolshevise' its 'national sections,' *i.e.* purge or 'discipline' opposition groups, particularly in western and central Europe.

Unorthodox as it doubtless was, Lukacs' book instantly became a symbol of everything the policy of 'bolshevisation' was intended to stamp out. To tolerate 'deviations' of a purely doctrinal kind was to invite defiance of Comintern decisions on matters of more immediate political concern, particularly if they encouraged the impression that there was a basic difference between 'West European Communism' and 'Russian Bolshevism.' What began, then, as a matter of Comintern *realpolitik* quickly became a paroxysm of militant orthodoxy as well, venting itself on anyone who did not stand foursquare on the Leninist version of Marxism. Lukacs' book was as if made to order for that purpose but Lukacs was not the sole offender; he was closely followed by Karl Korsch in Germany, whose *Marxismus und Philosophie*[4] shared many of Lukacs' views, and by Antonio Graziadei in Italy, who dared to challenge the relevance of the labour theory of value to the economics of exploitation.[5]

Doctrinal disputes among Communists have seldom shown much regard for the amenities but the campaign against Lukacs nevertheless established something of a record for calculated ferocity. To find a parallel to the barrage of dogmatic casuistry and personal vilification visited on him in the months following the publication of his book, one would have to recall the fanaticism of theological disputes long forgotten. The stock criticisms of the book—what they came to can be postponed for later discussion—were echoed and re-echoed in the pages of virtually every important Communist publication, until 'Lukacsism' became a term of abuse in party vocabulary. The longest and most vitriolic diatribe was indited by Ladislaus Rudas,[6] a close associate of his before he fell into disfavour and his life-long opponent thereafter. Kun, needless to say, made most of the occasion to rush into print with a denunciation of 'attempts undertaken in German literature to revise dialectical materialism or, to put it more accurately, to emasculate (it) by expunging materialism.'[7] In Germany, *Die Rote Fahne* (20 and 27 May, 1923) even went so far as to cite these 'revisions' as a warning to Communists against the dangers of studying Hegel—the very reverse, incidentally, of what Lenin had once urged. In the Soviet Union the battle against Lukacs on the 'philosophical front' was joined by the party's leading philosophers, among them A. M. Deborin, I. Luppol, G. Bammel, and I. Weinstein, all intent on 'exposing' Lukacs' book as a 'deviation' from the tenets of Marxism-Leninism.[8]

THE uproar over Lukacs reached its climax at the fifth congress of the Comintern in 1924. Bukharin confined his remarks to a brief reference

[3] For Lenin's remarks, see *Sochineniya*, 3rd ed., Vol. XXV, pp. 291-293. The views attacked by Lenin were published in *Kommunismus*, a journal then edited by Lukacs in Vienna.

[4] Originally published in *Grünberg's Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. XI (1923), pp. 52-121, and later, as a separate study under the same title, Leipzig, 1930.

[5] A. Graziadei, *Preis und Mehrpreis in der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft*, German tr., Berlin, 1923.

[6] L. Rudas, 'Orthodoxer Marxismus?' *Arbeiterliteratur* (Vienna), September 1924, pp. 493-517; and 'Die Klassenbewusstseinstheorie von Lukacs,' *ibid.*, October 1924, pp. 669-697, and December 1924, pp. 1064-89.

[7] B. Kun, 'Die Propaganda des Leninismus,' *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, April 1924, p. 19.

[8] *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, March, June-July, and October-November 1924; *Pravda*, 25 July, 1924, *Pechat i Revoliutsia*, 1924, 6, pp. 23-33.

leploring the 'relapses into the old Hegelianism,'[9] eaving it to the less scrupulous Zinoviev to blurt ut the full political meaning of the episode:

> If we.... are going to pay more than lip service to Leninism .... we must not let this extreme left tendency grow up into a theoretical revisionism .... spreading and becoming an international phenomenon. Comrade Graziadei .... published a book .... attacking Marxism. This theoretical revisionism cannot be allowed to pass with impunity. Neither will we tolerate our Hungarian comrade Lukacs, doing the same in the domain of philosophy and sociology .... We have a similar tendency in the German party. Comrade Graziadei is a professor; Korsch is also a professor. (Interruption: 'Lukacs is also a professor!') If we get a few more of these professors spinning out their Marxist theories, we shall be lost. We cannot tolerate .... theoretical revisionism of this kind in our Communist International.[10]

To all intents and purposes, this was enough to ut an end to Lukacs' political career, almost for ood; ousted from the central committee of the Hungarian party and from his editorship of *Kommunismus* in Vienna, it was not until the ecent Hungarian uprising more than thirty years ater that he could again play an active if brief art in politics.

Intellectually, however, the real pathos of ukacs' survival as a Communist first began with is political *dénouement*. It is quite doubtful, to ay the least, whether the orthodox case against is book in 1923-24 modified his views in any ssential respect. Certainly, one could discern nany of the arguments of *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* in much that he was to write luring the next thirty years, even if they were lisingenuously brought into line with the structure of orthodox doctrine to make them less btrusive.[11] If anything, he has been least diffident of all about his continuing commitment to the Hegelian dimension of Marxist thought—the very 'deviation' for which he was castigated most severely of all in 1923-24.[12] Yet, for all his talents as a polemicist, he could not bring himself to defend his book, either then or at any time since. In this self-imposed silence, Lukacs did not succumb to any failure of nerve; the only way to account for his behaviour is to assume that, because of an overriding sense of party discipline, he preferred to act out the rôle to which the logic of his book implicitly committed him in any case—a logic that hypostasised the party as the institutionalised will and expression of proletarian class consciousness and thereby endowed it with a superior view of 'total' reality. In other words, the book contains a built-in veto, as it were, on its own defence against party criticism, thus giving Lukacs' silence at the time a melancholy consistency all its own.

WHAT mitigated the commitment for close to a decade was that it did not require anything more than silence. Neither in Vienna, where he lived until 1929, nor in Berlin the year following, did Lukacs once recant his 'deviation' in public. This was in striking contrast to his zeal as a party stalwart in other respects; he could match expletives against Trotsky, for example, with the most seasoned professionals in Moscow.[13] It was only on his return to Berlin, after working in Moscow for a year (1930-31) on the staff of the Marx-Engels Institute, that his mood became increasingly apologetic, until it finally produced a sequel to the events of 1923-24 far more disconcerting than his silence during the intervening decade.

The biographic memoir he wrote just before Hitler came to power was still the subdued plea of one extenuating his past rather than an indict-

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[9] *Fifth Congress of the Communist International: Abridged Report* (published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, n.d.), p. 132.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[11] A favourite target of Lukacs' critics in 1924, to take ne example, was his assignment of an active rôle to human onsciousness well beyond the 'reflection' doctrine found n Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. In all his ubsequent works of literary criticism, however, conciousness retains its dialectical, transforming rôle. For an example of how Lukacs approaches the problem in his more recent work, see his *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Asthetik* (Berlin, 1956), pp. 57-59. But in arguing for a less 'mechanistic' doctrine of consciousness than the one held by his critics in 1923-24, Lukacs could later invoke the support of Lenin's more sophisticated wartime studies in philosophy, which were not made public until 1929.

[12] Lukacs' most ambitious recent attempt to rehabilitate the Hegelian derivation of original Marxism is his *Der junge Hegel* (Zürich, 1948).

[13] See his review of Max Eastman's '*Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution*,' *Die Internationale* (Berlin), March 1927, pp. 189-190.

ment, and might even be read, in part, as a subtle re-affirmation of views he professed to disavow.[14] As such, it was a mild foretaste of what was to come a year later when Lukacs had taken refuge in the Soviet Union. Addressing the philosophical section of the Communist Academy, he performed one of the most abject acts of self-degradation on record, repudiating not only his book but his entire intellectual past as well, and, in doing so, spared no words to convince his audience of his complete orthodoxy:

> The mistakes into which I fell in my book, *History and Class Consciousness*, are completely in line with these deviations [*i.e.* those attacked in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*—MW]. . . . I began as a student of Simmel and Max Weber (I was then under the influence of the German philosophical tendencies, the *Geisteswissenschaften*) and developed, philosophically speaking, from subjective idealism to objectivism, from Kant to Hegel. At the same time, the philosophy of syndicalism (Sorel) had a great influence on my development; it strengthened my inclinations towards romantic anti-capitalism. In the crisis of my entire world-outlook, brought on by the World War and the Russian Revolution of 1917, these syndicalist leanings were strengthened still more by my having been under the personal influence of the most important proponent of syndicalism in Hungary, Erwin Szabo. Thus, I entered the Communist Party of Hungary in 1918 with a world-outlook that was distinctly syndicalist and idealist. Despite the experience of the Hungarian revolution, I found myself immersed in the ultra-left syndicalist opposition to the line of the Comintern (1920-21) . . . .
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> The book I published in 1923 . . . . was a philosophical summation of these tendencies . . . . This could be shown in detail in all the problems treated in my book, beginning with philosophical problems and culminating in the definition of class consciousness and the theory of crises. In the course of my practical party work and in familiarising myself with the works of Lenin and Stalin, these idealist props of my world-outlook lost more and more of their security. Although I did not permit a republication of my book (which was sold out by that time), nevertheless I first came to full appreciation of these philosophical problems during my visit to the Soviet Union in 1930-31, especially through the philosophical discussion in progress at that time. Practical work in the Communist Party of Germany, direct ideological struggle . . . against the Social Fascists and Fascist ideology have all the more strengthened my conviction that in the intellectual sphere, *the front of idealism is the front of Fascist counter-revolution and its accomplices, the Social Fascists*. Every concession to idealism, however insignificant, spells *danger* to the proletarian revolution. Thus, I understood not only the *theoretical falsity* but also the *practical danger* of the book I wrote twelve years ago and fought unremittingly in the German mass movement against this and every other idealist tendency. My exile from Fascist Germany can only change the locale . . . of this struggle; its intensity will but increase with its absorption of Leninism . . . . With the help of the Comintern, of the All-Union Communist Party and of its leader, Comrade Stalin, the sections of the Comintern will struggle . . . . for that iron ideological implacability and refusal to compromise with all deviations from Marxism-Leninism which the All-Union Communist Party . . . . achieved long ago . . . . Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* has been and remains the banner under which this struggle is carried forward on the intellectual front.[15]

To many who heard him at the time, Lukacs' outburst of self-recrimination must have come as a painful reminder of recent developments in the Soviet intellectual world. His was the latest in a long succession of recantations by leading philosophers in the Soviet Union since 1931, and because it came from a foreigner already notorious for his unrepentant 'deviationism,' it was all the more symptomatic of how thoroughly Stalin

[14] See his 'Mein Weg zu Marx,' *op. cit.*, pp. 225-231.

[15] G. Lukacs, 'Znacheniye 'Materializma i Empiriokritsizma' dlya bolshevizatsii kommunisticheskikh partii' ('The Significance of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* for the Bolshevization of Communist Parties'), *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, 4, July-August 1934, pp. 143-148. The excerpts given in the text above are from pp. 143 and 147-148.

had eradicated all traces of independent philosophical thought from Soviet Marxism. That they could once count themselves among Lukacs' severest critics was not a secondary consideration.

In this respect, Lukacs enjoyed a considerable psychological advantage over his Soviet philosopher-audience—the advantage of one who had accepted the prospect of a personal recantation as a foregone necessity when he chose the Soviet Union as his place of refuge in 1933. Lukacs, to repeat, had spent a year in the Soviet Union during the critical months (1930-31) when Stalin moved to substitute a coded state dogma for contending schools of Marxist thought. He could remember the resolution of 25 January, 1931, in which the central committee of the party condemned both the 'mechanists' and the 'emergentists,' then the principal schools of Marxist philosophy, as crypto-political 'deviations.' Nor could he have forgotten the spectacle of one Soviet philosopher after another recanting his 'errors,' or, as he preferred to describe it in his own recantation, 'the philosophical discussion in progress at the time.[16]

PRESUMABLY, then, Lukacs knew what was in store for him when he returned to the Soviet Union in 1933 and discounted it accordingly. But discounted on what terms? One answer—necessarily speculative as any answer to such a question must be—is that he had already partly discounted it in the price of self-censorship he had had to pay in the preceding decade for his commitment to the Communist cause. Having acquiesced in the consequences of 'bolshevisation,' he could find it all the easier to come to terms with the requirements of Stalinisation—sufficiently, at least, to face the ordeal of a public recantation.

Still, Lukacs' behaviour has always been too much the corollary of a highly articulated political and philosophical ethos to be entirely or even largely the product of a self-propelling psychological chain-reaction. His acquiescence in the ban on his book may have prepared him pyschologically for the indignity of a public 'self-criticism,' but it does not explain why he made it the occasion for traducing his intellectual past so indiscriminately when a briefer, *pro forma* recantation would have served the purpose just as well; nor does it account for the next two decades of unfailing panegyrics to Stalinism that made him the despair of his most devoted admirers, particularly those who were aware of their tongue-in-cheek character. Fear may have been one of the reasons, to be sure—particularly during the period of the purges—but what of the recantation that preceded his flight to the Soviet Union? And how, again, could fear alone have produced so violent a reaction to his own past? The easy explanation that his political conduct was a case of sheer opportunism, pure and simple, is the least satisfactory of all; for all his feints and accommodations, there has been enough selfless purpose in his career to belie that description.

But if it was neither opportunism nor fear, how then account for the Stalinism of a man who was never really a Stalinist at heart or, at least, never in the sense that he favoured actual Stalinist policies? Perhaps the most helpful clue we have is the impression given by his very recantation of 1934; it is truly the *mea culpa* of a man labouring under a sense of guilt for his own intellectual past and intent on exorcising the memory of it, particularly the part that reminded him of Dilthey, Simmel, and Weber. Significantly, these names had inspired no such feeling of guilt in 1924, all the jibes of his orthodox critics notwithstanding. What made them so unpardonable ten years later was not any change in the attitude of official ideologues in Moscow, but the shock produced by Hitler's rise to power in Germany—a shock violent enough to induce a Manichean debauch in Lukacs about the very past he knew so much better. Where others would point to the elusive practical ambiguities of many an intellectual tradition—witness Marxism itself as an example—he now insisted that, 'Every concession to idealism, however insignificant, spells danger to the proletarian revolution,' or, as he was to put it more generally two decades later, 'There is no such thing as an 'innocent' world outlook.'[17]

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[16] For an account of the regimentation of Soviet philosophy, see I. M. Bochenski, *Der Sowjetrussische Dialektische Materialismus* (Bern, 1950), pp. 48-53.

[17] G. Lukacs, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft: der Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler* (Berlin, 1955), p. 6. It might be added that this volume is largely an elaborate gloss on his recantation of 1934.

Accordingly, if Lukacs were taken literally, the *Geisteswissenschaften* of his youth now became the seed-bed of Hitlerism merely by virtue of the fact that his teachers had conducted their studies along 'idealist' lines, *i.e.* based their methodology on the intuitive understanding of human action and social goals. And since he was so much part of that intellectual world, he too shared the guilt of his teachers for the spell later cast by the Nazi mystique of irrationalism, intuitionism, etc.

AGAINST any such explanation of his behaviour, it may be argued, of course, that since his Marxism was still greatly influenced by the ideas of his teachers, it must have occurred to him at the very least that his own case and that of countless others vitiated his entire line of argument. But even if this were so, it would have no bearing on his sense of guilt; what is being suggested here is that Lukacs was not really repudiating the influence of the *Geisteswissenschaften* on his own thought, but only their source, not the brain child but its paternity. In other words, his guilt feeling was of the ambivalent kind (as guilt feelings frequently are), caused by the shock of recalling that he shared the same teachers with many of the spokesmen for Nazism, and by a frantic compulsion, therefore, to disavow them.

The same shock, moreover, which precipitated the repudiation of his own past, taken in conjunction with his hope for the future, would also help to account for his attitude towards Stalinism. Apart from all else, the impact of the shock was so great because the triumph of Nazism represented a rupture in the unity and continuity of European culture, one of the most urgent and sustained concerns of Lukacs' thought. Since the capitalist West, in his view, already found itself in a quagmire of cultural decadence, the Soviet Union stood as the sole remaining hope for nourishing and transmitting that culture to the future.

To anyone who took all this for granted, as Lukacs did in the face of much that he was to observe to the contrary, it was almost second nature to accept Stalinism as merely a passing historical episode and to rationalise any compromises with it as a price that had to be paid for a Soviet culture that would one day act as the West's better half.[18] That the price might com high for himself and for the society in which h was to live until the end of the war, was purely a instrumental consideration in his humanisti calculus; the 'essential life' in the 'hierarchy o lives,' to recall his anti-naturalistic cast of mind could only be achieved at the tragic sacrifice o life 'on the empirical plane.'

Superficially, all this might suggest that Lukacs Stalinism was as though patterned on the mode of Rubashov's capitulation. Actually, the resem blance is more apparent than real. Rubashov wa an 'ideal type,' drawn to articulate the grim logica implications of Communist doctrine for thos who reason from its premises alone. Rubashov' capitulation therefore had to be a single act o *ex post* reflection after all real alternatives o action had been eliminated. What makes Lukacs subservience to Stalinism so much more tragi was that it came by successive stages, in each o which he could still choose between alternativ courses of action. In his case, therefore, it was no the disembodied logic of the doctrine alone tha dictated the choices, but a doctrine mediated i experience through successive responses whic failed to give human and social costs their due even as means to an end.

THE fate of his book was a small part of th cost he slighted. The attacks of 1923-24 wer enough to put a quietus to all further discussion and, apart from an occasional disparaging refer ence, Communist literature has in effect sup pressed the book by a conspiracy of silence, broke only recently by renewed attacks on Lukacs fo his rôle in the Hungarian uprising. And again much as though the compulsion to forget the pas could not be satisfied, Lukacs has been the fore most accessory to the suppression of his ow book. Sometimes one finds him ignoring th book entirely, even if his argument suffers fro

[18] His faith in the redemptive value of Soviet culture wa to be shaken considerably by what he could see of it at fir hand, but its underlying assumption—the thesis tha Russian culture is an integral part of the larger Europea tradition—was one he still defended against those in th West who questioned it immediately after the war. See th text of his speech and his replies to Jaspers, de Rougemon and others, Rencontres Internationales de Geneve, *L'Esp Européen* (Neuchatel, 1946), pp. 165-194. Ironically, he d not have to wait long to see the Soviet régime bending eve effort to sever all cultural ties with the West, as if to brin about the very cleavage he denied.

›mission;[19] more often, however, he has given self to a regimen of recurrent self-flagellation. 938, to cite one of many such instances, he again denounced his book as 'reactionary irtue of its idealism, its faulty interpretation e theory of reflection, its denial of the dialectic ature.'[20] And most recently, when Merleau-ty reviewed the philosophical issues raised by ook in 1923, his study was enough to provoke Lukacs to a heated protest against what he called the 'treachery and falsification' of Merleau-Ponty's attempt to resuscitate a book 'forgotten for good reason.'[21] This last episode epitomises the status of *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* today; virtually proscribed to orthodox Communists, it has survived largely because it is best remembered by others as a major work of Marxism purged from the collective memory of the Communist movement and—to the added discomfiture of its author—as a precursor of the sociology of knowledge.

Karl Mannheim's early development owed more to cs than is generally appreciated, many of his basic ories of analysis being taken from Lukacs' treatment e problem of ideology. Lukacs thus defeats his own ose when he tries, as he did in one of his most recent s, to suppress his own rôle as the connecting link be- Weber and Mannheim. See his *Zerstörung der unft*, pp. 474-506.

. G. Lukacs, *Essays über Realismus* (Berlin, 1948), p. 158.

[21] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Les Aventures de la Dialectique* (Paris, 1955), Ch. II. Lukacs' letter of protest is reprinted in the French Communist reply to Merleau-Ponty's book, *Mésaventures de L'Anti-Marxisme* (Paris, 1956), pp. 158-159.

HE NATIONALITIES UNDER KHRUSHCHEV

ins and Losses

Walter Kolarz

)VIET nationalities policy has been in a state of flux since Stalin's death. The Soviet rulers e recognised as wrong much which was done the long years of Stalinist rule, but these ngs are considered only as accidental dis- ons of a policy which is fundamentally ect and just. They are anti-Leninist devi- ns from the Leninist policy. Propaganda he Khrushchev period is based on the claim under the collective leadership the Soviet mmunist Party returns to the tradition of in and to the ideas of 'proletarian inter- onalism.'

he slogans 'Back to Lenin' and 'Long live etarian internationalism' indicate the extent the limits of the new concept of the nation- es question, and they also suggest the ultimate e of the practical changes envisaged by the mlin. 'Back to Lenin' implies a defence of policy of annexation of non-Russian terri- es pursued in the early years of the Soviet régime. Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Khiva, and Bokhara were all victims of the Lenin period. Only the military weakness of Leninist Russia prevented the extension of these conquests to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The régime of Stalin's successors, based on Leninism and 'proletarian internationalism,' leaves room therefore for rearrangements, adjustments, abandonment of excesses, but not for fundamental changes in the field of nationalities policy.

And yet the situation cannot be seen only in terms of an essentially unyielding ideology. Stalin's successors are practical people and opportunists. Their day to day approach is more elastic than Stalin's was, and they are more alive to the problems of national antagonism. They appear to realise that the abstract super-national Soviet man and Soviet patriot, detached from every prejudice, if he exists at all, is not the rule but the exception. People are still Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Georgians, and not amorphous

Soviet citizens. So they were under Stalin, but he prevented them from expressing their national individuality. The post-Stalin régime has not the power to do so. The less perfect totalitarian system with which it operates leaves a number of significant loopholes. The nationalities still have no power to change the status quo, but at least they are able to see their situation in a more truthful light. Figures and facts are published allowing them to obtain a picture of their own relative and absolute weight in the Soviet state, as well as of the discrimination and injustices to which they have been, and still are, subjected. It is not yet the full diagnosis but it is a beginning. As the diagnosis has started, the régime must try to satisfy certain grievances by making some change in the structure of the Soviet system and the status of the individual republics and nationalities.

THE most significant alteration concerns the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, the RSFSR. Under the Stalin régime the Great Russian people enjoyed privileged treatment. All questions of culture, language, and history were decided from the point of view of the Great Russians. All other nationalities of the USSR were in duty bound to recognise the leading rôle of the Great Russians and to pay tribute to their achievements, past and present. The exalted position of the Great Russian people had in one sense an adverse effect on the RSFSR; since the whole of the Soviet Union was a Great Russian living space, there seemed to be no point in devoting particular attention to the Russian Soviet Republic.

Since 1953 the emphasis has clearly shifted from the Russian people to the Russian state. The idea that the Russians are the 'elder brother' of the other nationalities of the Soviet Union has not been abandoned, but it is no longer put forward with the same provocative insistence as before. It is no longer necessary to denounce one's own national history and culture and extol the Russian instead. Certainly, there is acknowledgment of the leading rôle of the Russians but there is no longer the servility towards things Russian which Stalin tried to inculcate.

If the Russian people has been slightly demoted the prestige of the Russian Federation has be greatly enhanced. In the first place, the RSFS received the lion's share of the decentralise industrial enterprises, coal-mines, and oil-we of the Soviet Union. The bulk of Soviet industri undertakings are now not only geographical located in the RSFSR but are also administere by RSFSR authorities. This alone gives both t party organisation and the government of t Russian Federation a new significance. T apparatus of the Central Committee of the Sovi Communist Party was also reorganised. The d partments of the Central Committee were divide into two; one is now responsible for the RSFS alone and the second for the other fourte Republics. This is not only a clear indication the primus-inter-pares position which the RSFS occupies, but has also a certain practical sign ficance. It makes it virtually impossible for a no Russian to have any say in questions concernin the Russian Federation, whilst a Russian ma still be the best choice to head a Centr Committee department responsible for the fou teen non-Russian Republics, most of which hav large Russian minorities. Moreover, there is no a special Bureau of the Central Committee i charge of RSFSR affairs, and directed b Khrushchev himself.

As to the government of the RSFSR, it ha definitely been up-graded. In December, 195 its direction was entrusted for the first tim for many years to a full member of the Sovie party presidium. There have been other signs o the RSFSR acquiring a distinct political individ uality. For instance, since 1 July, 1956, th Russian party organisation and the RSFS government have been publishing the dail newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, which in point o circulation is almost on a par with *Izvestiya*, th mouthpiece of the central government. Ther are also separate RSFSR organisations fo writers, composers, journalists, and sportsme Furthermore, the RSFSR receives its place i history; it is treated as the successor-state t Tsarist Russia, perhaps to a greater extent tha the USSR. The non-Russian nationalities of th RSFSR have recently been encouraged to pledg their loyalty not only to the Union as a whole bu also to the Russian Federation, whose represent tives were much in evidence during the celebra tions organised in Bashkiria, Kabarda, and th

vo Cherkess provinces during 1957, on the ccasion of the quater-centenary of the sub-ission of these territories to the Muscovite Tsar.

THE Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR have shared to a certain degree in the promo-on of their mother-country. For instance, a sys-matic attempt is being made to provide them ith universities even if the necessary pre-requisites r their foundation are lacking. Since roughly ie time of the Twentieth Party Congress new niversities have been founded in Nalchik Kabarda), Makhach Kala (Daghestan), Saransk Mordovia), and Yakutsk. Another concession local feelings has been the retreat from the so-lled 'doubled' newspapers. These are news-apers written in a minority language but entirely anslated from a Russian original. This type of ewspaper was encouraged during the Stalin riod, for it greatly facilitated official direction thought. On the other hand it was unpopular nong the local national intelligentsia, whose rôle as reduced to that of translators. In Daghestan, ch doubled newspapers were introduced in 1951 the four principal local languages; they were olished in 1957. Local political figures and riters victimised during the Stalin era were re-abilitated. Although our knowledge of the matter very incomplete, it would appear from an up-date history of Kabarda that the rehabilitations the Autonomous Republics—and the same plies to those in the fully-fledged Soviet epublics—concern the national communists but clude ordinary 'bourgeois nationalists' (*Istoriya abardy*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 228, 307).

It is perhaps a merit of the post-Stalin régime at it no longer glosses over the question of similation and Russification. Indeed, the uestion is discussed with brutal frankness, at ast in learned Soviet journals. The attitude hich can be deduced from these statements on e problem of assimilation is markedly different om that which Soviet propaganda has tried for ong time to present. Previously it was thought at the slogan 'National in form, socialist in ntent' was universally applicable. Now it is plied to the larger ethnic groups only. For the naller ones cultural development will be ussian in form, socialist in content.' For stance, it was disclosed that the Koryaks, one the largest nationalities of the Far North, were receiving school education in Russian only, as teaching of Koryak had turned out to be impracticable (*Sovetskaya Etnografiya* 1957, 6, p.52). For the small peoples of the Altai there is equally little chance to preserve their national characteristics, not even for the largest of them, the Khakassians, who in 1926 numbered 52,000. In 1955 Professor Potapov, deputy director of the Leningrad Institute of Ethnology, admitted that the Khakassians would not be able to develop into a socialist nation. Not only were they a minority in the Khakassian Autonomous Province as a whole but also in each of its eight districts. Only in three of them are compact groups of Khakassians left; in the others they live in the midst of a predominantly Russian population (*Voprosy Istorii*, 1955, 10, p. 6).

THERE are, however, certain nationalities which have been able to improve their status under the post-Stalin régime, namely the pariah nations of the Stalin period, the Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Kalmuks, and Karachay. These people were rehabilitated not so much as a result of a revision in Soviet nationalities policy but as an unavoidable sequel to the reform of the Soviet penal system and the post-Stalin amnesties. There were other reasons, too, which prompted a change of Soviet policy towards the outlawed peoples, for instance the demoralising effect of their plight on other Soviet nationalities, and its adverse repercussions on Soviet prestige abroad.

The collective rehabilitations led in the case of five peoples to the re-establishment of some form of territorial autonomy; in the case of the Germans and Crimean Tatars they meant the end of the restrictions to which these peoples were subjected at their places of banishment as well as their re-emergence as ethnographic entities. The Russian Germans—of whom there are still between 750,000 and 1,000,000—were provided with two newspapers in their mother-tongue, *Neues Leben* and *Arbeit*, published in Moscow and Barnaul respectively, as well as with radio transmissions in the German language. They have also been able to engage in religious activities—Catholic, Lutheran, and Mennonite—though still on a reduced scale. Less is known of the much smaller group of the Crimean Tatars, but at least the total silence about them has been

broken, and some literary journals, above all *Druzhba Narodov* and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, have again registered their existence. But although both the Saratov Province, where the Volga Germans had their homes, and the Crimea are still short of agricultural manpower, there is as yet no question of resettling the previous inhabitants of the two areas. Perhaps the authorities fear that the political implications of a resettlement may outweigh its economic advantages.

The resettlement of the five nationalities of the Northern Caucasus has turned out to be difficult enough. The Soviet authorities wanted to take the credit for righting a wrong, but they also wanted this to happen without much damage to the Soviet economy and without any undue strain on the budget. Resettlement was therefore to be implemented in stages; that of the Chechens and Ingush was to be spread over four years, to protect the interests of the factories and state-farms of Kazakhstan where the two peoples worked. For the Chechens and Ingush, on the other hand, the return to their homeland was the only thing that mattered; so they ignored official schedules and repatriation plans, and left Kazakhstan on their own initiative. Although only 100,000 Chechens and Ingush were supposed to be repatriated in 1957, in fact 200,000 went back to their ancestral homes in the Caucasus. The attempt to delay repatriation for reasons of economic expediency was defeated.

The pariah peoples of the Soviet Union also include the Jews, in the sense that they too are denied the fulfilment of even such national aspirations as are compatible with the Soviet system. The Jews, after their sufferings in the last years of Stalinist rule, have enjoyed only a limited rehabilitation on a purely personal basis. The rights of a national and cultural group are withheld. Recent Soviet statistics have revealed the tremendous scientific contribution of the Soviet Jews, who in 1955 supplied ten per cent of all scientific workers of the USSR (*Kulturnoe Stroitelstvo*, Moscow, 1956, p. 254). This contribution is accepted as the service of foreign legionaries is, without any contractual obligation apart from that of individual payment.

Nor has the régime encouraged further Jewish settlement in the 'Jewish Autonomous Province' (Birobijan) in the Far East, despite its anxiety to promote the colonisation of Siberia. The so-called Jewish province continues to vegeta
According to the last available data (April, 19
it has only 157,000 inhabitants, of whom seve
per cent live in towns and urban settleme
(V. G. Udovenko, *Dalnii Vostok*, Moscow, 19
p. 150). An up-to-date ethnographic map
Siberia marks the Jews of Birobijan with th
tiny spots in the midst of a sea of Russian a
Ukrainian settlers (*Karta Narodov Sibiri*, Mosc
1956).

Gypsies are also among the underprivileg
peoples of the Soviet Union, under Khrushch
even more than under Stalin. A decree passed
5 October, 1956 threatened all Gypsies in Rus
with exile and forced labour unless they w
prepared to abandon their free nomadic
(*Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta*, 16 Octob
1956).

On the other hand, there is a small peo
whose pariah status has been abolished
reasons as utilitarian as those for which Jews a
Gypsies still remain underprivileged. This peo
is the Gagauz, of whom there are 120,000 in
southern districts of the Moldavian So
Republic. A decree of July, 1957 bestowed
them a written literary language and thus
beginnings of a national culture (*Sovetsk*
Moldaviya, 31 July, 1957). An official comm
on this event paid tribute to the Gagauz achie
ments in livestock breeding, which indeed
outstanding and well-known not only in M
davia but in the Soviet Union as a whole (*So*
skaya Moldaviya, 26 September, 1957). This
part explains the gesture towards the Gaga
which contradicts Soviet practice towards ma
other small nationalities, who are usua
persuaded to adopt the language and culture
another larger nation, preferably those of
Great Russians.

UNDER Stalin two of the sixteen So
Republics had a predominantly Russ
population, the RSFSR and the so-cal
Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic. Khrushch
ended this anomaly of having two Russ
Republics, one officially Russian and one ca
ouflaged as non-Russian. On the strength o
law dated 16 July, 1956, Karelo-Finland
incorporated into the Russian Federation as
Karelian ASSR. O. V. Kuusinen, the Presid
of Karelo-Finland, speaking in the Supre

oviet in favour of the law, stated that three-uarters of the population of the Republic ere Russians and members of other non-local ationalities. The local people—Finns, Kare-ans, and Vepsians—accounted for one quarter nly (*Leningradskaya Pravda*, 17 July, 1956); the w that did away with 'Karelo-Finland' put an d to a propagandist absurdity to which the Soviet lers had stubbornly adhered for sixteen years.

On the other hand, Khrushchev gave further pport to another anomaly of Soviet nation-lities policy by making it even more anomalous -namely, the existence in Soviet Asia of what is fficially the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, lthough it has a predominantly European opulation. Kazakhstan is the principal scene f Khrushchev's most daring experiment—the rgin soil plan. This is primarily an attempt to olve Russia's grain problem, but at the same time has had a tremendous impact, both direct and ndirect, on Soviet nationalities policy. It has rought an influx of European settlers into the ountry and implies the inevitable end of a azakh Kazakhstan and the emergence of a ulti-national and Europeanised Kazakhstan ept together by a Russian-speaking officialdom nd the Russian *lingua franca*. It was symbolical at the launching of the virgin soil project early n 1954 was accompanied by the dismissal of the azakh party secretary Zhumabey Shayakhmetov, ho could not be trusted to implement a policy of uropean colonisation. Since then the party secre-riat has changed hands several times but it has ever been put in charge of a non-European. At wer levels things are the same. Only three of azakhstan's fifteen Provinces are under party iefs of Kazakh nationality. Among the chair-en of Kazakhstan's eight regional Councils of ational Economy five are Russians and three re Kazakhs (*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 6 June, 957). Only one third of the pupils in Kazakh-an's schools—500,000 out of 1,500,000—ceive their education in the Kazakh language G. S. Partaliev, *Gosudarstvo v borbe za razvitie tsialisticheskoi kultury v Kazakhstane*, Alma ta, 1957, p. 53).

The prospect of Kazakhstan losing more and ore of its original national character has rovoked discontent among Kazakh intellect-als, given expression in the Kazakh communist ewspaper of the Kokchetav Province (*Kok-chetau Pravdasy*) and *Kazakh Adebiety*, the organ of the Kazakh Writers' Union (*Kommunist Kazakhstana*, 1957, 7, pp. 15/21). Their griev-ances might be summarised as follows :

1. European officials posted to Kazakhstan should be able to converse in the Kazakh language.
2. The Kazakh language should not be over-burdened with Russian words, otherwise it might lose its national character.
3. The attitude of official disapproval towards all Kazakh writers and bards of the pre-revolu-tionary period must be revised.

Although these demands are innocent enough and of a purely defensive nature, they were received with considerable irritation in official Soviet circles. The board of the Kazakhstan Union of Writers was said to be influenced by backward, unhealthy, and harmful views, and its chairman, Gabiden Mustafin, was removed from his post in the winter of 1956/57 for ex-ercising insufficient ideological control (*Izvestiya*, 22 March, 1957). Indeed, the economic importance of Kazakhstan for the Soviet Union as a whole is such that all local opposition must be brushed aside. For Khrushchev Kazakhstan means not only more bread but safer bread. Kazakh bread comes largely from an inter-national army of state-farm labourers working under reliable directors, whilst Ukrainian bread is supplied by unreliable Ukrainian collective farmers. It was both an economic and a political triumph for Khrushchev when he could announce in the middle of 1956 that Kazakhstan had out-stripped the Ukraine as grain producer, thus taking second place after the RSFSR. 'I think that the Ukraine will find it difficult to rise higher than third place,' he added (Tass report, 29 July, 1956). Although his forecast was disproved by the developments of 1957, when Kazakhstan's harvest was inferior to that of the Ukraine, it is nevertheless significant that Khrushchev wishes the Ukraine to be beaten by Kazakhstan.

UNDER the 'collective leaders' the Ukraine has benefited from a number of concessions. More Ukrainians were appointed to leading positions in Moscow and fewer Russians were left in key positions in the Ukraine. The 'elder brother' theory was modified to please the

Ukrainians and was in part superseded by the ideology of Russian-Ukrainian friendship, the friendship of two equal and great Slav peoples. Various poets who had been severely criticised in Stalin's time, for instance Vladimir Sosyura (author of the much-attacked poem '*I love the Ukraine*'), were restored to an honourable position. If already dead, like I. K. Mykytenko, they were posthumously feted and their works republished. Even the publication of a special Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopædia has now been authorised for 1959, although the first attempt to print such a Ukrainian standard work of reference was associated with the nationalist deviation of Mykola Skrypnik, who committed suicide in 1934.

It is clear that as a result of these concessions the Ukrainians have ceased to be just one of the 'peoples of the Soviet Union.' They are now in a class of their own; but although more attention is paid to Ukrainian national aspirations in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic itself, the millions of Ukrainians scattered over other parts of the Soviet Union, in the North Caucasus region, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Siberia, and the Far East, enjoy no national and cultural rights. No Ukrainian newspaper or journal is published anywhere in the RSFSR, although as many as 250 Russian newspapers are printed locally in the Ukraine. This problem of the Ukrainian diaspora is bound to become topical again as Ukrainian nationalism is strengthened both by the concessions of the Moscow government and by happenings on the Western fringes of the Ukrainian area of settlement.

Events in Poland and Hungary hamper the consolidation of Soviet rule in the Ukraine, especially in her seven Western Provinces which before the Second World War belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. The Hungarian and Polish Revolutions revived the wish for more far-reaching political changes in the Ukraine than Moscow is willing to grant and they have also encouraged the two ideological opponents of communism—nationalism and religion. This can be gathered from the Soviet press itself, which since the Hungarian October Revolution and Gomulka's coming to power in Poland has paid increased attention to anti-religious and anti-nationalist propaganda in the Western border regions. In fact, there has been propaganda not only by wor but also by deeds. For instance, in Octob 1957 four Ukrainian nationalists were execut for crimes they were alleged to have committ during the war and in the immediate post-w period (*Pravda Ukrainy*, 29 October, 195 No doubt this was calculated to discredit t nationalist movement and to deter people fro supporting it. A particularly significant featu of the anti-religious campaign in the Weste Ukraine are the repeated attacks on the Vatic and the Uniate Church which, though denied legal existence, continues to be popular with t Ukrainian masses of Galicia (*e.g.* 'Komu Sluzh Katolicheskaya Tserkov—Whom does t Catholic Church serve?', *Pravda Ukrain* 12 October, 1957, and *Molodoy Kommuni* 1957, 9, p. 75).

IF the Ukrainians have improved their positio compared with Stalin's time, the Georgia provide the example of a nation which has be down-graded. According to the Soviet census 1939 the Georgians formed only 1.44 per cent the total population of the USSR, but the real weight in the Soviet state was much greate They occupied many important positions in t central party and state apparatus, quite apa from Stalin and Beriya. In 1944, Georgia w allowed to annex certain territories along h northern border, namely the bulk of the form Autonomous Province of Karachay, with i former capital Klukhori, and a slice of t Chechen-Ingush ASSR. The Moscow gover ment also authorised the Georgians to p forward extensive territorial claims again Turkey. In Georgia itself, the Georgians we permitted to indulge in a kind of pocket-size national imperialism directed against vario national minority groups. With Stalin's death a Beriya's disgrace the situation changed radicall The Georgians posted outside Georgia we either arrested or sent back to their home countr The annexed territories were again taken aw from the Georgians, although they had alread started to colonise them. Instead of connivi at the discrimination against the minor nationalities, Moscow now began to champi them against the Georgians. Educational faci ties were again restored to the Abkhazians a the Armenians living in Georgia, who had be

eprived of schools throughout the post-war eriod.

The rise and fall of the Georgians in the USSR nnot be considered without mentioning the range and contradictory part which the ersonality of Stalin played in the destinies of the eorgian people. From the beginning Stalin ade himself notorious as an arch-enemy of nuine Georgian national aspirations. This he obably remained to the very end. Nevertheless, e so-called fight against the personality cult came mixed up with anti-Georgian prejudices, d de-Stalinisation was therefore interpreted in eorgia as an essentially anti-Georgian move. he pro-Stalin demonstrations in Tiflis in March, 56, which closely followed the Twentieth ongress of the Soviet Communist Party, had erefore a national Georgian character and for is reason were severely repressed. However, the remlin did learn its lesson. It allowed the eorgian communists to carry on with the Stalin lt, as it were privately and irrespective of the lings observed in other parts of the Soviet nion. Moreover, two prominent Georgian mmunists were again appointed to important sitions in Moscow. In February, 1957, ikhail Georgadze, a Georgian party official, came secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme viet of the USSR, and in June of the same year e Georgian party secretary, Mzhavanadze, as made a candidate member of the party esidium.

The other two Republics of Soviet Transucasia—Armenia and Azerbaijan—have never sed the same grave problems to the Soviet régime Georgia, and this has held true for the postalin period. And yet in Armenia there have been ch manifestations of nationalism as the riots ich occurred in the Erivan Stadium in October, 55. Some months after this incident another curred in connection with the arrival in Erivan May, 1956 of the French Foreign Minister ristian Pineau. On this occasion a number of menian women loudly manifested their wish be taken back to France, whence they had immigrated into Armenia. Another group of immigrants sent a letter to President Eisenwer asking him to permit them to return to the ited States. The appeal was handed to a mber of an American party visiting Armenia *airenik Weekly*, Boston, 2 August, 1956). The 85,000 Armenians who were lured to Russia in the early post-war years are in general the most disaffected element in Soviet Armenia.

The Armenian communists allege that it is enemies abroad who are behind all the malicious criticism and intellectual ferment in the country. 'We have no right,' said the party secretary Sarkisov, 'to overlook the hostile propaganda of enemies. It penetrates from abroad through all kinds of channels and can become a particular kind of "ideological trap" for people insufficiently tempered from an ideological and political point of view' (*Partiinaya Zhizn*, April, 1957, p. 29). The Armenian communists have tried to meet the discontent in various ways. National communists were to be appeased by the spectacular rehabilitation of the writer Egishe Charents, which assumed the form of a national celebration. Religious-minded people were to be won over by the elevated status granted to the Armenian Patriarch Vazgen I, who, since his election in October, 1955, enjoys the special consideration of the authorities.

The post-Stalin régime was more lucky in Azerbaijan than in either of the two other Transcaucasian Republics. The arrest and execution of Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, for twenty years the ruler of Azerbaijan, made it comparatively easy to turn over a new leaf and to carry out a particularly sweeping rehabilitation of past purge victims. A recent measure by the Azerbaijani communists likely to please the local people was the introduction of an amendment to the constitution, proclaiming Azerbaijani Turkish the official language of the country (*Bakinskii Rabochii*, 24 August, 1956). This may not have any practical significance, as the Russian language will continue to be widely used in the country, but it is the kind of gesture which usually satisfies local national pride.

THERE is no doubt that since Stalin's death the Soviet Republics of Central Asia have improved their status within the USSR. The new men in the Kremlin, anxious to broaden the basis of their régime, wanted collaborators rather than gauleiters in Central Asia. They have also re-assessed the importance of the Central Asian Republics for a more active Soviet policy in Asia. These republics could be useful if Soviet Russia wished to impress

on the new Asian nations that she was not a European empire extending into Asia but the world's only Euro-Asian state. There was nothing new in this idea; in fact, it goes back to Lenin, but in the years of Stalin's isolationism it had fallen into oblivion. So for both internal and external reasons the post-Stalin Kremlin has given to the Asian communists of the Soviet Union a new sense of their importance and mission and has heightened their self-respect. It has also involuntarily improved their bargaining position vis-a-vis the centre.

This does not apply to an equal extent to all parts of Soviet Central Asia, a term which, as the Soviets use it, comprises Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizia. Especially at a time of change and transition like the present, the term 'Soviet Central Asia' must be broken down to acquire more definite political meaning. Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks must be considered first. The Uzbeks are more numerous than Tajiks, Turkmenians, and Kirghiz put together; they are the largest non-Slav people of the USSR. Every foreigner visiting Central Asia is bound to visit Tashkent, their capital, even if he goes nowhere else. Changes in Soviet Central Asia were bound to affect first of all the position of the Uzbeks.

There are indeed changes in Uzbekistan. The régime has gone far in rehabilitating Uzbek writers and Uzbek communist politicians victimised during the Stalin era. Most of the rehabilitations were announced at the 'Congress of the Intelligentsia of Uzbekistan' held in October, 1956. This impressive gathering of 1,200 delegates was in itself a remarkable new initiative. In summoning it the authorities recognised that the Uzbek intellectuals form a distinct social group with special grievances of its own. The Uzbek party secretary Mukhitdinov, addressing the congress, admitted that there was discontent and lack of confidence among the intellectuals—allegedly the result of the evil doings of hostile elements, careerists and demagogues (*Pravda Vostoka*, 13 October, 1956). To pacify the intellectual elite Mukhitdinov promised that the charge of nationalism would no longer be made arbitrarily, and wherever false accusations had been put forward in the past, they would be corrected. The régime was still somewhat hesitant as to how far the rehabilitations could go without shaking the whole Soviet system. F instance, in the case of Akmal Ikramov, the fi party secretary of Uzbekistan, executed March, 1938 together with Bukharin and Ryk no more than an investigation was at first pro ised. The rehabilitation itself was announced late as the end of 1957 (*Pravda Vostok* 28 December, 1957). To secure the loyalty of t Uzbek intelligentsia certain steps were also tak to enhance the status of the Uzbek langua which is now taught from the third form, even Uzbekistan's Russian schools (*Pravda Vosto* 31 August, 1957).

The Soviet central authorities continue attach more importance to Tajikistan and Ta national aspirations than to either Kirghizia Turkmenistan. As the only Iranian people Soviet Central Asia, and as the one closest India, the Tajiks must obviously occupy a spec place in Soviet policy towards non-commun Asia. Of all central Asian republics, Tajikist shows the lowest degree of Russian cultu penetration, and it is the least likely to be swam ed by Russian colonists. In Turkmenistan a Kirghizia that 'Russian danger' is very re especially in the latter where half of all scho children are attending Russian schools (*Kulturn Stroitelstvo*, Moscow, 1956, p. 187). It is t prospect of Kirghizia becoming another Kazak stan—a country predominantly European with an Asian name—which has made Kirg national opposition particularly vocal. Kirg intellectuals have put up a brave fight against wholesale condemnation of *Manas*, the gr Kirghiz national epic, and have generally fended their literary treasures against encroac ments by the authorities. It was from Kirghi that a protest reached the Moscow *Litera Gazette* against measuring Russian and n Russian literature by different yardsticks. Russi folklore epics, so the authors of the protest sa could be religious or reactionary in content, they were still honoured at the present ti Kirghiz poets, on the other hand, have of been denounced as 'pan-Islamists' simply beca they started their poems with 'To the Glory of Great Allah' (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 21 Ju 1956).

This issue of the national cultural heritage a especially of the national epics is one on wh even orthodox communists can give in very eas

The suppression or near-suppression of these epics, after World War II, was only a short-term excess and not even an essential part of Stalinist policy. In fact the 'rehabilitation' of both the Kirghiz epic *Manas* and the Mongol epic *Geser* started during the last months of Stalin's lifetime. In both cases special conferences were summoned which proclaimed that the epics had on the whole a genuinely national character and were therefore worthy of being preserved and published (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 1 January, 1953, *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 1955, 1, p. 189).

THE instances we have given of changes in Soviet nationalities policy have shown perhaps that there are very considerable potentialities for a retreat from the oppressive and centralist Stalinist régime, without the Soviet system being jeopardised or the Leninist ideology abandoned. Stalin's successors have made use of these potentialities for a withdrawal to new positions in matters of national culture and language and also in regard to the rights to be granted to the various local communist groups, the governments and party committees of the various Soviet Republics. However, every retreat involves a risk for the retreating forces. Khrushchev's concessions may not satisfy the national aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Union, but they may embolden the critics. In the long run the régime may therefore be faced with the dilemma of either reducing resistance by a return to oppressive methods, or of recognising a Ukrainian, Uzbek, Georgian, and Armenian national communism.

(*The Baltic States have been omitted for reasons of space; it is hoped to deal with them in a later article.*)

Looking Back on an Epoch

'DOCTOR ZHIVAGO' AND THE SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA

Max Hayward

PASTERNAK has invited a comparison between the hero of his novel, Dr. Yurii Zhivago, and Turgenev's Rudin. This is scarcely meant to be more than a rough analogy. It is true that Zhivago is not unlike Rudin in temperament. Ineffectual and lacking in will he drifts into situations not of his own making or is thrust into them, feebly protesting. His few attempts at resolute action are like the futile gestures of Rudin, but even less heroic.

However, this temperamental affinity with Rudin does not enable one to conclude that Zhivago is a Soviet version of the pre-revolutionary 'superfluous man.' The frustrated intellectual of Soviet times was a victim of very different circumstances and he is perhaps best described by the term *izgoi* popularised by Ilya Ehrenburg at the end of the twenties in his novel *The Second Day*. *Izgoi* is an old Russian word for the social outcast, for the person who has lost his place in society because he has forfeited or been dispossessed of the attribute which entitled him to his particular status in it, *e.g.*—a prince without land, or a bankrupt merchant, or an illiterate priest's son.

After the October Revolution the intellectuals —the word is here used not in the narrowly professional sense—found that, like the bourgeoisie, they had been dispossessed. But whereas the bourgeoisie had only lost its property, the intellectuals had lost the right to be themselves. Before the Revolution, even at the worst times, they had had some status as originators or purveyors of ideas—however powerless they may have been to apply them; but now this status was denied them in principle and, as time went on, more and more effectively withdrawn from them in practice. It was open to them, of course, to find a place in the new society through technical collaboration—by working as doctors, engineers,

and so on, but for many even this was impossible. Unless they emigrated physically, they became spiritual emigrés in their own country.

This is the case of Dr. Zhivago. As a brilliant doctor he could easily have assured himself a position in the new society, but rather than forgo his birthright as a free-thinking intellectual, he prefers to become a social outcast.

His non-acceptance of the Revolution (after a brief initial enthusiasm for it) is not based on political hostility. It is not the political and social programme of the Bolsheviks that he rejects: it is rather their basic assumptions about man, life, and history. He finds these assumptions so preposterous that he scarcely bothers to refute them with detailed arguments.

His objection to Marxism, or indeed to any doctrine claiming to provide a total explanation of the historical process and a programme for the transformation of society, is that life is far too complicated and mysterious to be embraced by any theory or system.

No such system, he says, can claim to be 'scientific,' least of all Marxism, which, as he puts it, is not 'self-possessed or balanced enough to be a science.' What exasperates him most of all is the arrogance of revolutionary fanatics who believe that with this theory they can re-shape life at will. To one of these he says:

> When I hear people talking of re-shaping life it makes me lose all self-control and I fall into despair. Reshaping life! People who can say that have never understood the least thing about life. They have never felt its breath, its heart—however much they may have seen or done. They look on it as a lump of raw material which has to be processed by them and ennobled by their touch. But life is never just a substance, a material to be moulded. Life is the principle of self-renewal—it is constantly renewing and remaking and changing and transfiguring itself. It is infinitely beyond your or my dull-witted theories about it.

He does not accept the Marxist ethic and believes that nothing can be gained by violence—people must be attracted to good by good. Nor does he approve of the Marxist view of history. His views here are akin to those of Tolstoy in the epilogue to *War and Peace:* nobody 'makes' history, it grows invisibly and imperceptibly like grass and the process is inscrutable and unpredictable. Napoleons, Kings, Robespierres, and revolutionaries may be its 'organic agents' but they are not its prime movers.

He is scornful of many other items in the Marxist creed. The idea that mankind may be neatly divided into 'classes,' and that among these classes only the proletariat is instinctively virtuous and 'progressive,' appears ludicrous to him. During the Civil War when he is abducted by partisans and made to serve them as a doctor, he comes across a certain Pamfil Palykh who is held up as a model proletarian in the partisan camp. He is, in fact, a brutal and half-crazed monster. This is the comment on him and his type:

> When at the beginning of the Revolution it was feared that, as in 1905, the upheaval might be an abortive event in the history of the educated few and leave the deeper layers of society untouched, everything possible was done to spread propaganda among the people so as to stir them to the depths and lash them into a fury. In those early days people who, like Pamfil Palykh, needed no propaganda to hate intellectuals, officers, and gentry with a savage hatred were regarded by left-wing intellectuals as a rare find and worth their weight in gold. Their inhumanity seemed to these intellectuals to be a marvel of class consciousness and their barbarism—a mode of proletarian firmness and revolutionary instinct.

ZHIVAGO is not content to reject Marxism in this negative way. Side by side with his critical comment on the new ideas he develops his own views on life and history. His view of the world is Christian, but it is a Christianity which would be acceptable to many agnostics. It seems to derive for the most part from those Russian religious thinkers who, like Berdyaev, recoiled from Marxism at the beginning of the century and turned or returned to Christianity. The central idea as expressed by Zhivago and other people in the novel who think like him, is that there has been only one true Revolution in human history and that was the coming of Christ and the doctrine of free personality implicit in his teaching.

Zhivago's uncle, to whom he is largely indebted for his view of the world, puts it this way:

> One may be an atheist, not knowing whether God exists or why, and yet, at the same time, one may know that man lives not in nature but in history, and that history, as we now conceive of it, was begun by Christ and has its basis in the Gospels. And what is history? It is centuries of work on the systematic solution of the mystery of death and its future conquest. It is for this that people discover mathematical infinity and electro-magnetic waves . .·. . . and write symphonies . . . . To make discoveries like this one must be spiritually equipped, and the foundations of this equipment are to be found in the Gospels. What are they? First of all: love for one's neighbour—that higher form of living energy which fills the heart of man and must be released and expended. And then the chief components of modern man without which he is unthinkable, namely the idea of free personality and the idea of life as sacrifice . . . .

Pasternak, through Zhivago and other characters in the novel, looks at the revolutionary epoch in the light of this Christian view of man and his life in history. It is untrue, as Surkov has reportedly alleged to the Italian publisher of the novel, that he has attempted to show that the October Revolution was the greatest crime in Russian history. Like many other Soviet writers before him, he has described some of its attendant horrors, but neither is he sparing of the iniquities of the old order and of the brutalities committed by the Whites during the Civil War. In describing the revolutionary period he is at least as impartial as Sholokhov in *Quiet Flows the Don*. But while it would never occur to him to condemn October, any more than he would think of condemning an earthquake, he does judge it. His final judgment seems to be that while October was a step forward in some material respects, it was also—and this was its tragedy—an impossible attempt at spiritual counter-revolution. In trying to substitute the idea of the collective (or the 'People') for the idea of a community of free, individual personalities, in trying to invert the Christian ethic (*i.e.* in asserting the primacy of hatred over love), the inspirers and leaders of the October Revolution, he suggests, were ultimately doomed to failure. They could not hope to wipe out the effects and the basic idea of a much older revolution. They were trying to revert to a conception of man which had been made obsolete by the advent of Christianity. This is expressed in the following passage:

> In everything to do with the care of the workers, the protection of the mother, our revolutionary era is a wonderful era of new, lasting, permanent achievements. But as to its interpretation of life, its philosophy of happiness, its propaganda is such a comic remnant of the past that it's almost impossible to believe that it's meant to be taken seriously. If it had the power to reverse history all this pompous nonsense about leaders and peoples would set us back thousands of years—we would have to live in a Biblical time of patriarchs and shepherd tribes. But fortunately this is impossible . . . .

AT the time of his death at the end of NEP in 1929, it was Zhivago and those like him who seemed to be a comic remnant of the past. The optimism in the last sentence of the passage quoted above seemed scarcely justified. The spiritual counter-revolution looked as though it might succeed, not only because of repressions and physical coercion, but because of the limitless capacity of people to delude themselves with rationalisations of their situation. This was the temptation, the *soblazn* (to use the more expressive Russian word) of the twenties. The *izgois* like Zhivago seemed to be a dwindling minority. More and more intellectuals were able to persuade themselves that their reservations about the new order were an almost criminal self-indulgence. It took the horrors of the next two decades to disabuse those of them who survived. The theme of the *izgoi* wrestling with his doubts was commonplace in Soviet literature during the twenties. The type was often presented with great subtlety and even with sympathy, but the general conclusion was to present him with the choice of either submitting or being thrown out onto 'the rubbish dump of history.' Novels like Yurii Olesha's *Envy* and particularly Ehrenburg's *Second Day*, undoubtedly had their effect. Even the favourite poets of the *izgois* often unwittingly helped in their demoralisation. Esenin wrote plaintively of his agony at no longer having any part in life. Many no doubt followed him in wishing that, as he put it, they could 'hitch up their trousers and

run after the Komsomol.' By the end of the twenties even the most tenacious *izgois* often found themselves isolated not only from society at large, but even from their friends.

This is what Zhivago discovers just before his death in a long conversation with two old friends of childhood, Gordon and Dudorov, of whom he knows that everything they say will be sincere, not dictated by cowardice or any other such consideration.

Dudorov has recently returned from jail after serving a sentence for some unspecified political offence. He tells his two friends that the arguments of the prosecution, his treatment in jail, and particularly his heart-to-heart talks with the interrogator, have 'ventilated his brains' and 're-educated' him politically. As a result he has 'grown in stature as a person.' All this is approved by Gordon:

> Dudorov's reasoning appealed to Gordon precisely because it was so hackneyed. He nodded in sympathy and agreed with everything that Dudorov said. He was touched by the very triteness of Dudorov's words and thoughts and he took the second-hand nature of these copy-book statements as a sign of their common humanity. Dudorov's pious words were in the spirit of the times, and it was just because they were so fore-ordained and so transparently sanctimonious that Zhivago was revolted by them. A man who is not free always idealises his bondage. This is how it was in the Middle Ages and the Jesuits always made play with it. Zhivago could not stand the political mysticism of the Soviet intelligentsia.

On leaving his two friends Zhivago comments to Dudorov; 'It was painful to me to listen to you when you told how you were re-educated and grew in stature while you were in jail. It was like listening to a circus horse describing how it broke itself in.'

Shortly after the conversation Zhivago dies. The main part of the novel ends with a description of his funeral service. The symbolism of the funeral is too obvious to need explaining. It is a funeral service not only for Zhivago, but for the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole. It is a sort of last reunion of *izgois*. It turns out that Zhivago was not quite as isolated as it seemed. Large numbers of unknown friends and admirers who had read his privately printed poems come to pay their la respects.

WITH the end of NEP, characterised as 'th most false and ambiguous of the Sovi periods,' the elimination of the intelligentsia w about to begin in earnest. Even such meag possibilities of independent intellectual life as ha existed during NEP were to vanish. With collect visation the régime was about to begin 'reshapin life with a vengeance. One of the ways in whic this was to be done is foreshadowed in the fin paragraph of the main part of the novel. La Fyodorovna, the great love of Zhivago's life, wit whom he had lost contact at the end of the Civ War, happens to return to Moscow at the tim of his death. One day, not long after his funera she leaves the house and never returns. Wit characteristic vagueness her fate is described a follows:

> Evidently she was arrested on the stre and she died or disappeared, Lord know where, under an anonymous number in long lost list, in one of the innumerab general or women's concentration camps o the North.

This is not the end of the novel. There is short epilogue relating to the year 1943 in whic the intervening years are touched on in retrospe in a conversation between Zhivago's two friend Dudorov and Gordon. Both of them have bee chastened by their experiences in the decade afte Zhivago's death. In his last conversation wit them Zhivago had not been able and had, indeed scarcely attemped to persuade them of the fa laciousness of their arguments. It was only the personal ordeals in the years before the War whic opened their eyes and convinced them that the friend had been right. Both of them have miracu lously survived concentration camps and whe they meet during the War in a small town behin the front line they discuss their experiences an draw conclusions which show that they have ove come the 'mysticism of the Soviet intelligentsia

Dudorov tells how he was sent to one of th most terrible of the penal camps. His group wer taken from the transport and led by armed guard to an open snow field in the middle of a fores There was nothing except a post marke 'GULAG 92 YA N 90,' (*i.e.* a serial number of th Chief Directorate of Concentration Camps of th

.K.V.D.). Then, he continues—and again the mbolism of the passage is self-evident—:

> They told us: 'Here is your camp. Settle down as best you can'. . . . We cut down saplings with our bare hands in the frost to build huts. And would you believe it, we gradually built our own camp. We cut down the wood to build our own dungeons, we surrounded ourselves with a stockade, we equipped ourselves with prison-cells and watch-towers—we did it all by ourselves.

iis realisation on the part of one of the few rvivors of the holocaust of the thirties, that ose intellectuals in the twenties who luntarily renounced their freedom to act id think as individuals, according to dividual conscience, were in effect helping to uild a prison for themselves and their people, is ie of the most poignant moments in the whole ork. It is followed by some remarks of Dudorov the immediate causes of the catastrophe:

> I think, he says, that collectivisation was a false step and a failure. But it was impossible to admit the mistake. In order to hide the failure it was necessary by every possible means of intimidation to stop people thinking and judging for themselves, to force them to see the non-existent and to attempt to prove the opposite of what their eyes told them. Hence the unparalleled cruelty of the *yezhovshchina* (*i.e.* the purges), the promulgation of a constitution which it was not intended to apply in practice, and the introduction of elections not based on the principle of a free vote.

e goes on to describe the War as a release from is nightmare:

> When the War broke out its real horrors, its real dangers, and the threat of real death were bliss compared with the inhuman reign of fiction. They brought relief because they broke the spell of the dead letter.

Towards the end of the epilogue Dudorov and ordon meet Tanya, a former *bezprizorny* who is tached to their unit as a laundress. They cognise in her the illegitimate daughter of Zhivago. She tells them the fearful story of her childhood and this prompts Gordon to comment in more general way on the fallacy of the idea of revolutionary progress:

> It has happened several times in history that some ideal and lofty conception has become coarse and material. Thus it was that Greece became Rome and the Russian enlightenment became the Russian Revolution.

But the two are consoled by the thought that all this suffering has not been in vain. Moreover the War has put an end to the Revolution and made the causes underlying it inoperative: 'Its (*i.e.* the Revolution's) indirect results have begun to make themselves felt—the fruits of fruits, the consequences of consequences. From all their sufferings people have derived great strength of character. They are unspoilt, heroic, and capable of vast, desperate, and unheard of deeds.'

THE book ends with a note of optimism about the future. There is another gap in time of 'five to ten years.' Dudorov and Gordon are sitting in their flat in Moscow looking through Zhivago's poems. Although in the author's comment 'the enlightenment and freedom which people expected after the War had not come together with victory, nevertheless, the harbinger of freedom haunted the air during all the post-war years, constituting their only historical sense.' The two, now ageing, friends think on this evening as they sit and look out over Moscow that 'this freedom of the spirit had now come and that on this very evening the future had taken up residence in the streets below them, that they themselves had entered into this future and were henceforth part of it. They felt confident for this holy town, for the whole world and for those participants of this story who had survived until this evening, and they were filled with the silent music of happiness. And the book in their hands, (*i.e.* Zhivago's poems which form the appendix to the novel) seemed to know all this and to give support and confirmation to what they felt.'

CO-EXISTENCE IN THE SOVIET THEATRE

Policies and Parodies

John N. Washbu

ONE of the concomitants of the very extensive ideological shift that took place within the USSR in 1946-1948 in response to the introduction of a more 'activist' foreign policy, was the prominence given to the 'international theme' in Soviet literature. Directives for treating this theme were outlined in several decrees concerning literature and the arts issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party between mid-August, 1946 and mid-February, 1948. The full extent of this drive was perhaps most palpably shown in works for the stage. The Central Committee decree of 26 August, 1946 entitled 'On the Repertory of Drama Theatres and Measures for Its Improvement,' virtually forced Soviet dramatists to produce, and Soviet theatres to stage, anti-Western plays treating contemporary questions.

With the Soviet theatres placed in a special repertorial strait-jacket, and required to produce at least two or three new spectacles on contemporary themes annually, it is not surprising that Soviet drama offers the richest source of anti-Western motifs in postwar Soviet literature. Of course, there were several major works of Soviet poetry and prose dedicated to exposing wolfish capitalists and imperialist warmongers and giving vociferous support to fighters for peace in all lands : collections of verse like K. Simonov's *Friends and Foes* (1948), N. Tikhonov's *Two Streams* (1951), A. Surkov's *Peace to the World* (1950), A. Malyshko's *Beyond the Blue Sea* (1951), M. Bazhan's *English Impressions* (1949); Ilya Ehrenburg's novels *The Ninth Wave* (1951) and *Warmongers* (1949 and 1953 editions) and N. Shpanov's *The Conspirators* (1951 and 1952 editions). But these works merely served to supplement drama, the chosen instrument of mass indoctrination.

Anti-Westernism in the USSR since World War II is almost invariably synonymous with anti-Americanism. For Moscow the principal target is Wall Street and not the City, Uncle Sam and not John Bull. This is the case e though Winston Churchill and other Brit leaders bear the brunt of the propaganda att in such plays as *Great Days* (1947), by N. Vir *Behind the Second Front* (1948), by V. Sobko, a *I Want to Go Home* (1949), by S. Mikhalk

The initial stage of the anti-Western campa in Soviet drama was devoted to depicting t worlds, the capitalist and the communist, and portraying two Americas by differentiat between the oppressors and the oppres within capitalist society. Two Worlds, and sharp contrast between their physical and mo aspects, appear in *Island of Peace*, by E. Petr written in 1939 but not published or staged u 1947, in N. Virta's *Conspiracy of the Doom* written in 1947-1948, and in *Governor of Province* (1947) by the Tur Brothers and L. Sheinin. Two Americas are shown in seve plays, including K. Simonov's popular p *The Russian Question*, published in late 1946 a staged with great success throughout the Sov Union thereafter. Following standard Sov postwar literary practice, dramatists portra the 'camp of peace, progress, and freedo headed by the Soviet Union,' as being subst tially stronger than the 'camp of war, obsc antism, and misanthropy, run by the Ang American imperialists,' and they left no doub the ultimate victory of 'the common people' capitalist America and England over th 'ruling circles.'

The Russian Question shows the friends a foes of the Soviet Union in the newspaper wo in America. Honest Harry Smith, reporter fo New York City newspaper, represents dem cratic and progressive America. His princi enemy MacPherson, the paper's owner a publisher, is pictured as a warmonger, a gang of the press who resorts to calumny against Soviet Union in order to advance American pl for world domination. The theory of the t Americas is presented forcefully in Smith's l

atement at the end of the play. Says Smith :

> .... For a long time the aforementioned Smith was naive enough to think that there was but one America. Now he knows that there are two. And if, fortunately enough, yes, fortunately for the aforementioned Smith, there is no place for him in the America of Hearst, then he will find himself a place in the other America—the America of Abraham Lincoln, the America of Roosevelt.

THE theory of the two Americas formulated in *The Russian Question*, was also advanced by aywrights Prut and Kozhevnikov in *The Fate Reginald Davis* (1947). This play has as one its motifs the economic rivalry between presentatives of the United States and Great itain. As fierce business competitors, each eking to gain economic control of the Trieste ipyards, Sir Andrew Barding and his American unterpart, Lt.-Colonel Dew, have no scruples out using underhanded tactics against one other. Yet Barding and Dew join forces mporarily for the purpose of destroying their mmon adversary—Captain Davis and his rtisan friends.

A distinctive feature of the 'two Americas proach' is the portrayal of cruelty to Negroes. uring the period 1946-1948 three plays were ged in the Soviet Union to publicise race ejudice in America. The first was an American oduction, *Deep Are the Roots*, by J. Gow and d'Usseau, which had had its premiere in New ork on 26 September, 1945. It was translated to Russian with several small but significant nissions, and was staged by the Vakhtangov eatre in Moscow in May, 1947. The second s *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1948) by A. Brushtein, urious compound of nineteenth and twentieth ntury racial discrimination based on two novels Harriet Beecher Stowe. It had its premiere in e Central Theatre of Transport in Moscow in 48. The third was *Snowball* (1948) by V. ubimova, an original Russian play about ool life in America which quickly became a ssic in the repertory of all children's theatres the USSR.

The second stage of the campaign covered the riod 1949-1950 and was marked by an all-out sault upon the American way of life. The authors placed their major emphasis on the worship of money in America and also made much of the alleged desire for war and the craving for world domination on the part of leading figures in American political life. Two playwrights, N. Pogodin and A. Surov, wrote satirical comedies about Democratic Party political bosses in Kansas City, Missouri.

The play that best typifies this second stage in anti-Americanism is Lavrenev's *Voice of America* (1949), a Stalin Prize winner for that year. The principal villain of the piece, Senator Herbert D. Wheeler of Alabama, twice proclaims that America's mission is to rule the world. In his first speech, made in June, 1945 to American soldiers in Germany, Wheeler declares :

> From this day forward throughout the entire world nothing is going to be done anywhere without our knowledge and consent. We have a right to do that because the American way of life is the most sensible one in the world.

In his second speech, delivered in 1948 to friends on an off-the-record basis, Wheeler improves on his earlier effort :

> America has before it the tremendous task of taking a shattered and corrupt world and bringing it under our strong moral leadership! It is the Reds that have shattered and corrupted the world.... We, with our healthy nerves, with our sober judgment, with our democracy established by our forebears and by God, must become the spiritual police of the world, cleansing it from evil and sin. Acting in this rôle we must abandon rotten prejudices and the archaic respect for the so-called sovereignty of nations and for the inviolability of frontiers.... The idea of order does not recognise any frontiers!... And the western frontier of America today lies on the Yenisei, and the eastern lies on the Ob.

Mixed with such sabre-rattling were a number of weird practices which playwright Lavrenev evidently hoped to palm off as genuinely American. Percy S. Butler, a lawyer turned lobbyist, greets his fiancée with the so-called Wisconsin salutation, which almost rivals in stupidity the so-called Denver salutation of pulling one another's ears and stepping on one another's toes.

Lack of familiarity with American mores tended to make some of the situations and dialogues in Lavrenev's plays (and other such productions) slightly ludicrous. The ditty which Lavrenev's soldiers of the 45th Pensacola Regiment have to sing in Act I may serve as an illustration :

> We are soldiers of the 45th!
> Dadli-padli, tirliri-biri, ol-loho!
> We are wonderful guys!
> Dadli-padli, tirliri-biri, ol-loho!
> Dribble, cribble, hey-ho!
> Fearlessly we fought our enemies!
> Dadli-padli, tirliri-biri, ol-loho!
> And everyone in the States is proud of us!
> Dadli-padli, tirliri-biri, ol-loho!
> Dribble-cribble, hey-ho!

Pogodin, an experienced playwright, also had difficulty in presenting a convincing picture of America. Neither of the two variants of his play *Missouri Waltz* (1949) was successful. In the production of the Ermolova Theatre in Moscow the gangsters stole the show from the play's positive heroes. They appeared in such a romantic light that the thug who killed Gennari, one Gargotta from Chicago, was actually applauded by the Muscovite audience! The Vakhtangov Theatre in Moscow had Pogodin rework the play before staging it. The emphasis was shifted from the negative gangster characters to the positive heroes, young trade union leader Robin and liberal (but naive) politician Carey Foster. But this drastic change failed to save the play, which had a very short run; and *Soviet Art* (6 May, 1950) twitted Pogodin on his inability to describe life in distant Missouri.

One major propaganda trend developed during this period was the identification of the Nazis with American military and political leaders. This guilt-by-association technique for identifying Americans as the natural heirs of Hitler and his Nazi clique is best illustrated by the motion picture *Secret Mission*, released in August, 1950. It shows an American Senator in Berlin early in 1945 trying to make a deal with the Nazis before Germany capitulated. The same Nazi-American alliance, on an even more unlikely basis, this time in postwar Missouri, was portrayed in A. Surov's satirical comedy *A Fellow Countryman of the President* (1949). Known by its sub-title *The Mad Haberdasher*, the p contained some bitter sneers at President Trum

In the third stage of the campaign Ameri military and political leaders were sho advocating in all seriousness the annihilation non-Anglo-Saxons by the use of bacteriolog weapons. To make the propaganda literat about the Korean War more telling to peoples of the Soviet Union, some playwrig began specialising in gory details of the butch and mayhem allegedly perpetrated by Ameri commanders during the Allied intervention Russia in 1918-1920. The artistic level of s hastily conceived and unrealistic plays fell so l even by Soviet standards, that late in 1 Malenkov and others demanded a halt to output of such trash (*khaltura*).

One of the plays that ushered in the hyster stage in the anti-American campaign Perventsev's *Junior Partner* (1951). In describ both the daily antics and the basic philosophy life of Army Air Force Colonel Jackson, a pe tyrant who is apparently terrorising all Engla the playwright has abandoned any attempt verisimilitude. Colonel Jackson backs up claim that money is the highest measure morality by stating :

> With money I can buy conscience, moral meat and metals. . . . Everything! Make offer this very minute to any avera American to tear out his right eye, or spit on the portrait of his dead moth or. . . . to eat a quarter of a pound of hum flesh for one hundred thousand dollars and, if the newspapers write up his feat, will eat that flesh!

The wild statements made by Colonel Jacks throughout the play include not only boa about atomic bombs and plague germs, but a a reference to an American earth satellite, wh will give America control of any given spot the face of the globe. . . .

The playwright whose works best illustrate t 'spirit of the epoch' in the approach to thi American is A. Yakobson, author of *The Jack* (1951) and *Guardian Angel from Nebraska* (195 In *The Jackals* Yakobson describes the la oratory experiments of American scienti working under War Department auspices. T despicable scientists with their radioact

lvery-grey dust' want as their guinea pigs, not es and monkeys, but Negroes and, if possible, oreans and Chinese. As might be imagined, merica's domination of the world will be sured once this 'dust' goes into mass pro- uction. In the dramatic satire *Guardian Angel om Nebraska* the scene shifts from America to orway, where one Theodore Nathan Truman ays the rôle of 'cultural' ambassador, teaching rominent Norwegian women the intricacies of at popular American toy—the yo-yo!

The use of the name Truman in a disagreeable ntext is also a feature of Solodar's play *The Boy om Marseilles* (1951). The evil representative a Boston steamship line has just supervised e unloading in Marseilles of diseased seed otatoes and is now preparing to take aboard e *SS. Caroline Truman* boxes of guns destined r Indo-China. It is emphasised on two casions that this vessel was named in honour Caroline (sic) daughter of the President of the nited States.

During the 1952-1953 theatrical season much tention was paid to the theme of foreign inter- ntion in Russia in 1918-1920. N. Nikitin's ovel *Northern Aurora* was made into a play lled *Northern Lights* and staged in Moscow and eningrad at the end of 1952. Other plays on the me theme produced shortly thereafter were *rgei Lazo*, by E. Bondareva, *The Glory of Those ays Will Never Die*, by L. Rudy, and *We all Never Forget*, by M. Maksimov. In the st of these plays the American and Japanese terventionists are castigated and humbled, hile American punitive detachments are said have burned women alive in their peasant huts.

BY the spring of 1954 audience disbelief in the anti-Western propaganda dispensed in absurd d primitive plays coincided with palpable guilt elings among a majority of Soviet writers, and, ore important, a general shift in the party line. ne first tangible indication that such a change d occurred was the visit of the Comédie rancaise in April, 1954. The effect that this mous troupe had on the intelligentsia of oscow and Leningrad was electrifying.

As a 'Western vogue' developed in Soviet ama Soviet dramatists stopped writing new plays on life in the West. Plays of European and American writers began to replace, and not merely to supplement (as had been the case with the plays of Howard Fast, Vaillant and others in 1951-1953), the turgid satires on contemporary foreign themes by Soviet dramatists.

Soviet theatre directors were soon reaching beyond plays like Jack London's *The Theft* and Shaw's *Mrs. Warren's Profession* for newer plays with a more muted anti-capitalist or anti-American message. When in 1956 both Leningrad and Moscow theatres began preparations for staging Knott's *Dial M for Murder*, Agatha Christie's *Witness for the Prosecution*, and a French play of the same type, the 'two Worlds theory' and 'two Americas approach' seemed doomed, with murder and detection, wholly devoid of social content, submerging anti-Western propaganda motifs. At this point B. Izakov, writing in *Literary Gazette* (3 January, 1957), urged that this harmful tendency be checked, and *Pravda* on the following day gave him its support.

If the trend toward a relatively free choice of Western plays is reversed or curbed by the pressure generated by the Izakov article, one might expect Soviet dramatists to resume the writing of plays about life in America and the West. But it is obvious from Svobodin's devastating review of *After a Long Separation* in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (20 April, 1957) that Soviet dramatists such as the Tur Brothers cannot return to those postwar stereotypes of Americans which they had created before 1954. Plays that were once sure-fire successes in Moscow are now objects of derision.

What then can we expect today from Soviet dramatists who venture to write on an international theme? The attempt made by I. Shtok, whose play *Caravan* was published in the journal *Teatr* for May, 1957, may provide the answer. Shtok's play reflects the friendly spirit that characterised diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers in 1942, the year in which the action of the play takes place. The leading American figure, Admiral Rigmen, is drawn with respect and care, coldly but with no trace of hostility. It is perhaps an encouraging sign of the times, but it may be too early to regard it as reflecting a general trend.

'In every herd there is some restive steer'

AN ENDURING THEME

Vera Alexandrova

THE upheaval of October, 1917 belongs among those revolutions whose internal conflicts have been posited in their very origins. By far the most tragic conflict, and one which emerged at the very outset of the victorious revolution, was the campaign against the free human individual in the name of the collective good. Maxim Gorky devoted one of the articles in his series 'Uncontemporary Thoughts' (*New Life*, 3 May, 1918) to the defence of a seventeen-year-old youth, who had been sentenced to seventeen years corrective labour because he had 'openly and honestly' declared : 'I do not recognise the Soviet power.' The task of bringing up a youth to be courageous and honest in the base conditions of Russian life—wrote Gorky at that time—had demanded an enormous expenditure of spiritual strength, and almost a whole century of sustained effort. Yet the very people for whose freedom that effort had been expended now condemned a brave youth.'[1]

An even sharper recognition of this conflict is expressed in the article 'Tomorrow' (1919-20) by Evgenii Zamyatin, one of the vanguard of the Soviet period in Russian literature :

'We have lived through the stage when the masses were oppressed; now we are living through the period of oppression of the individual—in the name of the masses; tomorrow will bring the liberation of the individual in the name of man. . . . Man is being forgotten—for the sake of collective work; but we would rather remind people of something else : collective work is made for man.'[2]

[1] Gorky started his 'Uncontemporary Thoughts' in the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*) in St. Petersburg soon after the revolution of February, 1917. They were published as a volume by Ladizhnikov in Berlin in 1918. Gorky continued this series even after the October revolution. But these articles, which reflected Gorky's extremely critical attitude to the Soviet government, were never reprinted and do not even appear in the latest edition of his collected works in thirty volumes (Moscow, 1953).

[2] First published in the newspaper *In Defence of Man*, and reprinted in *Faces*, by the Chekhov Publishing Co., New York, 1955.

It was in defence of unrestricted human individuality that Zamyatin also wrote his satirical novel *We*, a precursor of George Orwell's novel *1984*. The action of *We* takes place in a certain 'Unified State,' which is building a gigantic machine called the Integral. The success of this undertaking, in the view of one of the participants through whom the story is told, is made possible only because human freedom has been abolished and everything is subordinated to the will of the leader, known as The Benefactor. But within this apparently monolithic state there appears a woman rebel, who fights for her right to be a free individual. Others with the same idea gather around her. The rebellion she has planned fails through the treachery of one of the plotters—who is keeping a diary—and the woman rebel is executed. The novel was written as far back as 1920, but could not appear in Soviet Russia, and was first published in an English translation in New York in 1924. Its appearance exacerbated the author's already strained relations with the leaders of Soviet literary policy. In 1931 Zamyatin managed to get permission to leave Soviet Russia, became an emigré and settled in Paris, where he died in 1937.

The boldness with which Zamyatin spoke in defence of downtrodden human individuality was not characteristic of Soviet writers generally in the first stages of the revolution. The majority limited themselves to a half-hearted or melancholy acknowledgment of the bare facts of oppression of the individual and man's solitariness. Dmitri Furmanov in his novel *Chapaev* makes this characteristic confession :

'Keenly in those days did a man feel that it was of little avail to possess only a pair of clear eyes, only two acute and sensitive ears, two hands ready to work and a single head on his shoulders and a lonely heart in his breast. In those inhuman days it was hard to be a man.'

These modest comments found an answering echo in the wryly humorous observations of

·o of Ilya Ehrenburg's *The Stormy Life of zik Reutshvanets :* 'When one-hundred-per-ıt history strolls about the streets, there's thing left for the ordinary man but to expire m sheer delight at the spectacle.' Lazik even :s to protest against such 'Chinese two-times-ɔ,' but the result of these attempts is merely lure and imprisonment. So Lazik wanders m country to country in search of a small but rnal truth—man's right to happiness—until in end he becomes convinced that happiness 'is y an outmoded word in a powerful language.'

N its own way, Ivan Kataev's short story, *The Poet*, sheds further light on why the theme of oppressed human individual was handled so gerly. Kataev was one of the most brilliant resentatives of the Pereval (The Pass) writers' up, who fought for sincerity, humanism and istic realism (the Pereval group with all its ding exponents was liquidated during the scow trials of 1936-38; their reputation was tially restored only after the death of Stalin l Khrushchev's report to the closing session the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist ty in 1956). In this story, Kataev relates how hero, during the civil war, became separated m his unit, and it was only when he had ained it that it seemed to him he had 'regained happiness.' 'Happiness lay with the majority. itude was sadness and death.' Pyotr Zabezh-, the hero of Mikhail Zoshchenko's story *Goat*, is an even more faint-hearted character. bezhkin is so terrified by the revolution and all vicissitudes of fate it brings that he marries elderly wife, simply because he imagines her to the owner of a goat which he has noticed by door of her house : with a goat—even if re are staff reductions as the accountant ps scaring him by saying—all won't be lost!

But there were other reasons that forced ters and their solitary heroes to be circum-ct, and to seek a refuge in the collective. By the most significant among them was the ognition of a certain historical guilt among the er generation of the Russian intelligentsia for backwardness of the people (this feeling was ticularly marked in the poet Alexander Blok). a mysterious way, this feeling was handed on, n though in attenuated form, to the repre-tatives of the younger generation of writers. The mood is strikingly reflected in Yuri Liebedinsky's first short novel, *A Week* (before joining the Communist Party, Liebedinsky was a Menshevik). Anna Simkova, one of the characters in the novel, having been summoned to a party conference in Moscow, observes the passengers who have humbly settled themselves on the steps of the station staircase while waiting for the train, which will arrive nobody knows when. Darting about among them on the same staircase are responsible party workers, with brief-cases under their arms, looking completely indifferent. Simkova, watching the humbly waiting passengers, suddenly wants 'to cover herself with their inveterate grime, to take their lice upon her own body, and lie there waiting endlessly, occasionally moving to one side to make way for the shiny leather boots and shoes.' The same feeling of guilt appears in *Travellers*, the last, unfinished novel of the late Lydia Seyfullina (before joining the Communist Party, Seyfullina was a Socialist Revolutionary).

A disdainful and mistrustful attitude towards the separate human individual was the dominant trait among writers of the 'twenties. But as the Soviet régime consolidated itself, it became increasingly clear that its official ideologists were not really such staunch upholders of the collective. More and more they gave their sympathy to a new phenomenon in Soviet life and literature—to the strong personality who seemed to embody the thoughts and feelings of the revolutionary proletariat (such as Badin, the Executive Committee representative in Fedor Gladkov's novel *Cement*, Natalya Tarpova in the novel of the same name by Sergey Semenov, and others). In the second half of the 'twenties, such heroes were more and more frequently referred to as 'the egoists.'

THE first challenge on behalf of the downtrodden human individual was made by Yuri Olesha in his short novel *Envy* (1927). Its principal hero is Andrey Babichev, a former old Bolshevik, now director of a consumer goods trust; he radiates health, energy, and optimism, sings even in the lavatory, takes a cold bath in the morning, quacking loudly like a duck, and munches hard apples with noisy relish. Andrey's brother, Ivan Babichev, represents the Soviet 'underworld'; he idles away his time in public houses, where he recites poetry and cheats at cards. Ivan calls himself a 'romantic' and

'the last dreamer on earth.' He urges all the 'children of the past century' to unite around him, and he will lead them against the smug authorities who rule their lives. He has a confederate, a young man called Nikolai Kavalerov, whom Andrey Babichev has picked up out of pity in the street one night, drunk. But Kavalerov is jealous of Babichev, and feels nothing but hatred for his benefactor. Having decided to leave Andrey, Kavalerov writes him a letter which is, in effect, a confession : he refuses to acknowledge Andrey Babichev's superiority; in fact, for Kavalerov, Babichev is merely 'an ignorant and obtuse functionary,' 'a mediocre individual, thrust into enviable prominence solely through external circumstances.' Kavalerov for his part proclaims that more attention must be paid 'to man'; he wants to fight 'for tenderness, for pathos, for the individual, for names as moving as the name Ophelia, for everything you crush underfoot.'

From this point on, and until the end of the 'thirties, the Soviet 'superfluous man' becomes just as integral an aspect of the first Five-Year plans as the shock-workers, heroes of labour, and Stakhanovites. And all these characters, individualists whose lives have ended in ruin (such as Debets, in the late Boris Levin's short novel *There were Two Comrades*, or Volodya Safonov in Ilya Ehrenburg's novel *The Second Day*), are spiritually richer and more significant than such standardised heroes as Ehrenburg's Kolka Rzhanov and others.

A more considerate and benevolent attitude to man—but then only to the Party member or the Stakhanovite—manifested itself at the end of the 'thirties. The reason for this switch must be sought in the devastating effect produced on Soviet society by the great Moscow trials of the mid-thirties and the purge of the Party and administrative machine. In the field of literature, this change is expressed most fully in Yuri Krimov's novel *The Tanker Derbent* (1938), and in Boris Voytekhov's and Leonid Lench's play *Pavel Grekov* (1939). The hero of *The Tanker Derbent* is a young and clever mechanic, Sasha Basov. His superiors do not take to him because he is perpetually inventing things and searching for reasons; no one knows whether anything will ever come of his plans—but in the meantime he is a thorn in everyone's side. The authorities manage to rid themselves of Sasha by sending him off on the antiquated tan Derbent. What grieves Sasha most is that wife, Musya, turns away from him. She somehow come to share the attitude of Sash superiors, and tries to persuade him to w 'like everyone else,' instead of 'trying to original and stirring up a fuss.' But Basov is afraid of official rebuffs or even of solitude. A he emerges victorious : thanks to his efforts tanker Derbent escapes from danger. At very end, Musya returns to him, honestly c fessing that she is an 'average person,' and tha had 'not been in her power' to live with 'a h doomed to a lifetime of futility.'

Substantially the same sort of hero, unafraid solitude and continuing to fight for what considers right, is shown in the play *Pavel Grek* (the original title of the play was *A Real Li* An honourable Party member, Pavel Grek working in Central Asia, is slandered by 'interr enemies' in the Party, and as a result of th intrigues is expelled from the Party. But he d not give up; instead, he travels to Moscow a there fights for his rehabilitation. Like Bas Pavel Grekov also finally emerges victorio But basically, the play itself underwent its o 'real life' drama after it was accepted for p duction : the theatre committee demanded t excision from the play of the scene in the Pa Committee during which the Secretary, Rid asks Grekov to return his Party card. After stubborn fight, and thanks to the fact that at th moment the theatre's artistic director w dismissed, the Party Committee scene w included in the production. When the pl reached the public, it was precisely this scene th won a resounding success, especially among t delegates to the Moscow Komsomol Conferen who were present in the theatre.

BUT turning aside from the relatively sm number of works dealing with the problem individual freedom (Veniamin Kaverin's *Art Unknown*), the period of the first Five-Year pla was the grimmest in the history of Sov literature. It was particularly strained during a after the Moscow trials. Literature lost ma writers at that time; their good name was r stored—but only partially—after Khrushche speech at the closing session of the 20th Co munist Party Congress in 1956. It is difficult

how long the period of literary confusion ght have dragged on, if the Second World r had not broken out and Hitler had not aded the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding all tragedy of the first two years of war, in the rary field these years were remarkable for ir creativity, and were accompanied by many lical changes in themes, in the choice of heroes, l in the whole content of poetry and prose. Within the scope of the present essay, it is portant to concentrate on just one element of nge : the new attitude towards the individual. is new trend began to appear even in the iting of the war years, but it was in the first nths after the war that it emerged with partic- r prominence. Captain Spibak, the hero of lentin Ovechkin's novel *Greetings from the nt* (1945), returning to the front from leave l overhearing the conversations on the train, htly feels that the nearer the war gets to its l, 'the more people are thinking of their own in- idual destinies, of their devastated homes . . . . the legacies of war that they have faced or ve yet to face.' It was on this same theme that e great debate' started up in literature and press as soon as the war ended. It was tally cut short by the post-war purge of rature in the years 1946 to 1948.

But it is not for nothing that the contem- raries of the revolution hold the stubborn ief that an historically-occasioned rebellion not be annihilated. The postwar frame of nd went underground, and there pursued its n concealed life. The death of Stalin, and the uggle for power at the summit, weakened rty control over literature and writers renewed interrupted debate.

Here it is important to establish the funda- ntal themes of that debate. As soon as, in second half of the war, it became clear that Soviets would be victorious over Hitler, se Party members and 'non-Party Bolsheviks' o had maintained a cautious silence during the rlier wartime setbacks once more began to raise ir heads. The late Aleksey Tolstoy was their resentative in literature, and gave by far the st open lead to the group in his article 'On the ontier of History' (*Literary Gazette*, 23 October, 43): 'After all he has lived through, the hero of r time cannot and dare not succumb to weak- ss and disillusionment, living by his romantic memories of October; he must comprehend that it is the strong, brave, resolute man who is the sole heir of October and the *master* of his epoch.'

But Tolstoy was mistaken : the country cried out for another sort of hero. And it was not Tolstoy, nor Babaevsky with his *Knight of the Golden Star*, nor Simonov nor Pavlenko—in spite of the backing they were openly given by the literary authorities—who emerged as the 'foremost' writers, but instead, such writers as Valentin Ovechkin, Vera Panova and Alexander Tvardovsky, who sensed that, after all their great sufferings and privations, the people longed above all for a liberalisation of the régime. The experiences of the war years had changed people's mental outlook. People had suffered and endured much, and they began to expect much from the government when the war was over. To be sure, one could not expect what had been destroyed to be restored all at once, but at least one could look for a transformation 'in people's relations with each other.' When open discussion of this inner yearning was brutally stifled, people continued to discuss it secretly, in circumlocutions. And it was then that the post-war 'dissenting citizen' suddenly appeared on the scene; but unlike the 'negative hero' of the pre-war period, the post-war dissenter distinguishes himself by his *resolution*, his capacity to defend himself and his ideas. It is worth citing the case of First Lieutenant Boyarishnikov in Pavlenko's *Happiness*. When the Communist Colonel Voropaev asks him where he fought, Boyarishnikov tersely replies that he fought wherever he was sent by headquarters, and received no special distinction in the war, but that he has a 'tranquil' conscience.

THE fate of the individual is a theme which is touchingly illustrated in Alexander Tvardovsky's poem 'Two Brief Lines' (1946) :

> From the pages of a lost notebook
> Two brief lines about a boy who fought
> Who was killed in nineteen-forty [bravely,
> Killed among Finland's icy wastes. . . .

It is not altogether clear to the poet himself why, 'in the middle of a great cruel war,' he still cannot forget the youthful fighter, why he is so saddened by 'that far-off fate.' And suddenly a flash of insight comes to him :

> It is as though it is I who am lying there,
> Frozen to death, so young; killed

In that war that is already forgotten,
Killed, so young, there I lie. . . .

The writings of Vera Panova dwell even more specifically on the humble individual. In her novel *Kruzhilikha* (1947), there are quite a number of remarkable pages devoted to this new conception of human individuality. There is a particularly significant chapter, describing a night meeting between the director of the factory, General Listopad, and the secretary of the factory trade union organisation, Uzdechkin. Relations between the factory director and the secretary have become strained. Listopad decides that they must be restored to normal. He visits Uzdechkin late one evening, when Uzdechkin has just put the children to bed (he has lost his wife during the war), and has begun to wash some clothes. Uzdechkin lives in extreme poverty. While the two men are having a candid discussion, each is driven to express his own truth: Listopad's truth, as a successful and energetic administrator, and the truth of the humble Uzdechkin, who endures life's buffeting and labours on 'without a murmur.' And in this discussion it is the integrity of Uzdechkin which prevails.

The struggle for the liberation of the individual has been accompanied by one very remarkable phenomenon, which one is tempted to describe as a revision of the very foundations of Party ethics. It is this that forms the theme of Nikolai Pogodin's latest play, *Petrarch's Sonnet*, which appeared in the second *Literary Moscow* anthology (1956). Dmitri Alexeyevich Sukhodolov, head of a big construction project somewhere in Siberia, and father of a grown-up son, falls in love with an assistant at the local library, a girl called Maya. There is no romance, properly speaking. Sukhodolov writes letters to Maya; he is happy and at the same time extremely confused. The real core of the drama is rather complicated, and is revealed in a conversation Sukhodolov has one evening with the house servant, Marina, who has lived in Sukhodolov's household for many years and has become almost a member of the family. Having used the word 'horizon' in her talk with Sukhodolov, Marina helps him to bring into the open his own most intimate thoughts: 'An horizon—that's an important matter. . . . And when it disappears. . . . then everything grows pitch dark. . . . then one's in a bad way.' From childhood, Sukhodolov has 'learned how to hate.' And hitherto he considered that 'if you lose that feeling, t you've lost the essential. You're no longe proper Party member, but just a worker in ranks.' Therefore, he regards 'class hatred' 'a sacred and honourable emotion.' But one th perplexes him: 'Nowadays, there are no lon any enemy classes left among us. So the quest arises: whom is one to hate? There wasters and misfits and thieves. At most, t earn our contempt, and sometimes even pity.' But what Sukhodolov has in mind is great hatred.' 'Who must I hate in my c country? Perhaps the time has come to learn love?'—these are things Sukhodolov silen asks himself and reflects upon. Marina joyfu echoes these thoughts aloud: 'How splendid would be!' Sukhodolov does not spare hims and does not conceal the fact that hitherto has loved fame, success, the future, that he loved his Party, his son, and the people, but t 'an ordinary, humdrum human being—him don't love. Towards such a man I behave col and disdainfully'. . . . This conversation night, as often happens in Soviet literature, interrupted just at the most exciting point. it has a sequel: Sukhodolov's old friend, musician Armando, knows about his love Maya. And although he gives Sukhodolov aw by telling Sukhodolov's wife about his infa ation, the former forgives him and even vis him in his hotel. Here Armando, although he filled with remorse for his own betrayal, nev theless tells Sukhodolov that he does not p him: although late in the day, he has all t same come to realise through his own experien that 'the world is not made up merely of gre material achievements, but of great feelings well. Great and extremely precious. . . .'

Forty years of Soviet literature have n afforded much scope for the expression of su feelings on behalf of the oppressed individua but they remained latent throughout the perio manifesting themselves in a veiled form. Litera developments in the post-Stalin period ha shown that they come to the surface whenev the opportunity arises, and stubbornly displa the attitude of hope expressed by Evge Zamyatin nearly forty years ago, when he sa that 'tomorrow will bring the liberation of t individual in the name of man. . . .'

OCUMENT

he Party's Control of the Judiciary in China

We reproduce below extracts from an article in the Peking Jen Min Jih Pao, *the central organ of the Chinese Communist Party, entitled 'No Perversion of the Character of the People's Court Allowed.' It was written by Jo Ch'uan and Ho Fang, and published on 24 December, 1957.*

leadership by the Party necessary for the administra- of justice by the People's Court? And is the People's rt a weapon for the people's democratic dictatorship? e two questions are basic questions over which we have engaged for a long time in controversy with rightist Ch'ien and others.... We must wage a severe struggle nst them, thoroughly criticise the erroneous view of pendence of the judiciary' and 'the benefit of the doubt he accused,' and give the People's Court—a weapon he people's democratic dictatorship—full play in the alist revolution and socialist construction.

using the idea of 'the independence of the judiciary' ppose the Party's leadership of judicial work, Chia en has given public expression to an erroneous view. aid: 'The Party's leadership of the judiciary is realised ugh the enactment of laws. A judge who obeys the in effect obeys the Party, since the law represents the of the people and also of the Party. Therefore all a e needs to do is to obey the law; there is no need for Party's leadership whatsoever.' He maintains that this 'principle' underlying the provision in the Constitution in the Organic Law of the People's Court that 'the le's Court shall administer justice independently and abide only by the law.' So, according to Chia Ch'ien, Party can exercise its leadership only in legislation and ot specifically interfere with the judicial work of the le's Court, for this would be 'interfering with' the pendent administration of justice of the People's rt and 'contravening' the provisions of the Constitution the Organic Law of the People's Court. Such a view is erroneous.

rst of all, it should be pointed out that Chia Ch'ien's ment that 'to abide by the law amounts to abiding by Party's leadership,' and that the People's Court inisters laws only, and not policy,' aims in effect at ishing the Party's leadership. As we all know, laws are or less generalised and crystallised, but the political economic situation in our country during the transi- period is liquid and changes rapidly. At present, while laws are not yet perfect, we cannot meet the needs of ical development and of the class struggle by mere anical reliance on the body of existing laws for solving udicial problems. When dealing with problems for h there is as yet no provision in the law, we must act rding to the policy of the Party and the state. This is ll. Even when our laws are perfect, policy will continue the soul of the law and administration of justice must be guided by policy. For instance, the law allows latitude with regard to punishment for criminal ces, and in deciding whether to be severe or lenient a must take into consideration, in addition to the merits e case, the principles and policies adopted at different s and places by the Party and the state. Therefore, the 's leadership of judicial work is necessary not only ng the process of legislation, but also in the administra- of justice. It is necessary not only now, when our laws are not yet perfect, but also after they have become perfect. Chia Ch'ien said, 'When the laws are complete, the judiciary is ready for independence.' That is obviously a reactionary view. His erroneous view that 'to abide by the law amounts to abiding by the Party's leadership' means that law is supreme and omnipotent. Such a reactionary view is designed to oppose adherence to the law to adherence to the Party's leadership, to separate the people's judicial work from reality, from the masses and the leadership of the Party, and to injure the revolutionary cause. We must resolutely oppose such a view. Furthermore, Chia Ch'ien's view that 'by interfering with the administration of justice by the People's Court the Party is breaking the law' is a flagrantly false and anti-Party accusation.... How can it be described as a breach of the law? Facts have shown that the Party's intervention in the administration of justice by the People's Court, far from being a breach of the law, is an effective check on the administration of justice and will correct any violations of the law that may occur in the course of administering justice, thus ensuring the correct enforcement of the law. Chia Ch'ien's erroneous argument that 'by specifically interfering with the administration of justice the Party breaks the law' is aimed in effect at nullifying the leadership of the Party as provided for in the Constitution, and is therefore really an attempt to break the law.

Chia Ch'ien opposes the leadership of the Party on the ground that 'the People's Court shall administer justice independently and abide only by the law,' as provided for in both the Constitution and the Organic Law of the People's Court. That is a gross misinterpretation of the provision. What is the correct interpretation?

First, the provision that 'the People's Court shall administer justice independently and abide only by the law' means that the People's Court shall administer justice independently but does not mean that the People's Court is independent of the Party. The people have given the power to administer justice to the judicial organ—the People's Court. That is to say, the People's Court alone, and no other organ, shall exercise the power to administer justice. Viewed in this light, the provision in the Constitution that 'the People's Court shall administer justice independently and abide only by the law' distinguishes the task of the People's Court from that of all other state organs.

Second, the provision that 'the People's Court shall administer justice independently and abide only by the law' means that while administering justice, the People's Court must strictly abide by the law and must not be bribed to distort the law or disregard it, that the People's Court shall administer justice according to law without interference from any other state organ, any people's organisation or individual, and that while administering justice, the lower people's courts are not bound by the orders or subject to the interference of superior people's courts. It should be pointed out, however, that freedom from illegal intervention from any other state organ and

any people's organisation or individual does not mean freedom from the leadership of the Party or from having to listen to the views of the masses. Chia Ch'ien slanderously attacks the acceptance by the People's Court of the leadership of the Party and its attention to the views of the people while administering justice. His attitude is diametrically opposed to our principle that the people's judicial work must be subject to Party leadership and conform to the mass line. . . .

The argument by Chia Ch'ien and the others that 'Party committees do not know the circumstances of a case and their leadership is not necessarily correct' does not bear scrutiny. Party committees have a complete grasp of the whole situation, they know the political situation as a whole and the state of affairs between the enemy and us, and they understand very well the feelings and demands of the people. Therefore the Party alone can weigh the pros and cons of a case in relation to the situation as a whole and correctly direct the work of all departments. It is only under the leadership of the Party that the correct administration of justice by the People's Court can be assured. Obviously, the outcry of Chia Ch'ien and the others only serves to reveal their truly anti-Party character.

For a long time, Chia Ch'ien and the others have not only opposed the Party's leadership of the People's Court on the ground that there must be 'independence for the judiciary,' but, by abusing their power, they have also shielded criminals and exculpated them. They. . . . advocate the 'benefit of the doubt for the accused,' which is basically contrary to the principle of the people's judicial work maintained by the Party. In their own words, 'the benefit of the doubt for the accused' means that, in dealing with criminal cases, the accused must first of all be considered 'innocent' regardless of the actual circumstances of the cases in question; in cases where the accused are guilty of serious crimes 'extenuating circumstances' must first of all be considered; and in the case of a serious crime that deserves capital punishment, circumstances must first of all be considered which may save the criminal from the death penalty. On the basis of 'the benefit of the doubt for the accused,' a view which protects the criminal, they advocate the principle of 'assumption of innocence' and 'the judge's freedom of conviction' in handling criminal cases.

In accordance with the principle of 'assumption of innocence,' an accused person. . . . must be assumed innocent before the court of law makes a legally valid judgment. In accordance with the principle of 'the judge's freedom of conviction,' they maintain that a judge may by virtue of his 'inner convictions' (so-called independent thinking) 'freely' determine guilt or innocence. . . .

In defence of their own reactionary stand, Chia Ch'ien and the others call the 'principle' of 'assumption of innocence' and 'the judge's freedom of conviction' a 'universal truth in the administration of justice,' and declare that any deviation from this 'principle' would be 'subjectivism and partiality' and would result in the 'wrongful conviction of innocent persons.' But practice is a standard with which to measure truth. In spite of their sophistries and specious reasoning, facts have shown that it is their subjective and prejudiced 'benefit of the doubt for the accused' that helps criminals to escape punishment. . . . It is quite ob that the erroneous views of Chia Ch'ien and the othe the so-called 'assumption of innocence' and 'the ju freedom of conviction,' based on 'the benefit of the d for the accused,' are a reflection of their bourgeois tionary position and their idealistic viewpoint. The diametrically opposed to our judicial principles base the working class position and dialectic materialism.

Since the principle of 'assumption of innocence' 'the judge's freedom of conviction' advocated by Ch'ien and the others favours only the accused, naturally unfavourable to the people's fight agains criminal elements. What they do in their administra of justice is to believe in the false statements of the acc made often with a view to evading criminal responsib and to disbelieve the complaints of the accuser o victim in criminal cases, the accusations of the masse the findings and the indictments of the public sec and procuratorial agencies. This in effect repudiates mass line adopted by the People's Court in its ad stration of justice and the correct relationship of div of labour and responsibility and mutual checks bet the People's Court and the public security and curatorial agencies, established on the basis of soci judicial principles. . . .

As an instrument of the people's democratic dict ship, the most important task of the People's Court punish, through its judicial activities, counter-revolu aries and all other criminals who resist socialist tr formation and sabotage socialist construction. B judicial function, the People's Court fights against criminal elements and punishes them. The object i reform the criminal elements (with the exception of t sentenced to death) into self-supporting and u citizens, and to teach all citizens to abide by and sup the socialist judicial system, and induce them to join people's judicial organs in the fight against the crim elements and in the effort to prevent and repress crim activities. The more resolutely and correctly the Peo Court punishes the criminal elements, the more e ively will it be able to reform them, to prevent crim activities, and to consolidate the socialist judicial sys Since Chia Ch'ien and the others aim to lessen the gui the criminals and exculpate them by giving them benefit of the doubt,' they are not helping to reform criminal elements and prevent criminal activities, but encouraging the criminals and criminal activities. A result, they are naturally not helping to consolidate socialist judicial system, but undermining it.

In conclusion, 'the benefit of the doubt for the accu advocated by Chia Ch'ien and the others and t opposition to the Party's leadership of the work of People's Court on the ground of 'independence of judiciary' aim in effect at changing the character of People's Court and weakening the people's democr dictatorship. In order to consolidate the Party's lea position in the work of the People's Court so that it truly be an effective weapon for the people's democr dictatorship, we must wage a resolute struggle against anti-Party, anti-socialist views and acts of Chia Ch'ien his friends.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY SMITH AND OUZMAN LIMITED, LONDON AND EASTBOURNE.

(*Continued from page two of cover*)

D. H. Cole and A. C. Crosland

The theory of the "middle class" is propa-ed at present by dozens of bourgeois ideol-sts in the United States, Great Britain, France, stern Germany, and other countries, as well by the opportunist and right-wing socialist oreticians such as G. Cole, the Fabian, Crosland, and others. The characteristic t of this bourgeois myth is that it is at present orporated into the official doctrine of several italist countries, in the first place the United tes. The legend about the "middle class" he basis of the bourgeois doctrine about ople's capitalism" ....' (*Kommunist*, 1958, 3).

nes Burnham

James Burnham put forward his thesis about "managerial revolution" as early as 1941 .... ring the stormy years of war the book did not voke much attention, but after the war the ory of "managerial revolution" became lespread among bourgeois economists looking attractive labels to conceal the contradictions l the decline of contemporary capitalism, and present it as "people's capitalism" .... claimed by the ideologists of the monopolies, "managerial revolution" is a distorted ture of the growing parasitism of the monop-tic bourgeoisie ....' (*Vestnik Statistiki*, 7, 5).

rlo Schmid

Misusing the concept of "revolution" and rrowing from natural science the little word utation," Schmid is deliberately trying to e a vague and confusing impression of the provements which are said to have basically nged the character of "all our contemporary ," of contemporary capitalism .... Paying regard to the facts, he tries to demonstrate t the development of capitalism in the period imperialism, and particularly after the first rld war, acquired a new character, funda-ntally favourable for the workers ....' *prosy Ekonomiki*, 1957, 12).

stav A. Wetter

Georg Klaus has undertaken in his book *uits, God, and Matter*, to take issue with Gustav A. Wetter's falsification of dialectical materialism .... The author has shown convincingly on the basis of abundant scientific material that the tenets of dialectical materialism can stand any criticism, and are not incompatible with the findings of modern science, as Wetter would have us believe; on the contrary, they coincide with and are confirmed by them ....' (*Deutsche Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie*, 1957, 6).

Hans Driesch and Max Hartmann

'The vitalistic ideas of Driesch are developing more and more in the direction of pan-psychism, combined with an open fideism, referring to God as the "ultimate cause" of the "rational order" of nature .... Mechanistic beliefs and idealist irrationalism lessen the value of M. Hartmann's critical positions .... We regard as completely correct the statement of the question given in the works of T. D. Lysenko, who holds that "in biology it is always necessary to be interested not only in why and how a given process is or was developing, but also to know *for what purpose*, to secure what biological ends, it develops." (*Agrobiology*, 1956, 4) ....' (*Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 2).

Edward Teller

'Teller is Dulles' scientific shadow .... With Latter he has written a book called *Our Nuclear Future*. The prospect of living in a close embrace with the hydrogen bomb seems a hopeful one to Teller .... We can imagine him whispering to his wife: Do you know, darling, my bomb will cause an explosion in cosmetics? You mean in the cosmos? No, in cosmetics. The human species will bathe in the waves of atomic radiation, and will emerge from it as beautiful as Venus rising from the waves .... Then what is all the fuss about? Why should not Teller and Latter, who are so concerned with the good of humanity .... verify their hypotheses on themselves? Let these joint authors go to the atomic testing range in Nevada and have, let us say, just one hydrogen bomb dropped on them. We will then see what sort of "mutations" will result, and how favourably they will influence Teller and Latter. But is it worth looking at the result if it is predetermined: Having given birth to the bomb, Teller would meet his death by the bomb. Perhaps this particular "mutation" would really improve the human species ....' (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 8 April, 1958).

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Editée aux Editions de Minuit

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